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Abstract
The language used in advertising has been the subject of studies 
in different diciplines, but surprisingly little has been done in 
linguistics. The main purpose of my study is to give an adequate 
analysis of the language of written advertising in the U.K. and in 
Japan, within the framework of pragmatics, and to explain how 
communication occurs between the advertiser and audience. I 
consider what communication is and how it is achieved, and 
investigate aspects of communication prominent in the language of 
advertising.
The first chapter is a survey of the literature, covering 
structuralist, semiotic and linguistic aproaches to the language of 
advertising. The second chapter is a discussion of pragmatic 
theories. It is argued that Relevance Theory (Sperber and Vilson 
1986a) provides the best basis for explaining the comprehension of 
utterances, including advertising. A study of puns forms the 
subject of the third chapter. As a trigger for processing which 
does not necessarily add to the informative content of an utterance, 
puns provide a potential problem for Relevance Theory. But I argue 
that Relevance Theory sheds light on the variety of ways in which 
puns function in advertising. In the fourth chapter, I investigate 
another potential problem for Relevance Theory, posed by the 
language of advertising, that of partial suppression of the 
speaker's intentions. The fifth chapter focuses on the projection 
of the image of women in advertising.
- 3 -
Table of contents
Page
Abstract
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1: Some problems of meaning in advertising
1 .1 . Analysis ol meaning in advertising
1.2. Some structuralist approaches
1.3. Some semi otic approaches
1.4. Some linguistic approaches
1.5. Conclusion
Chapter 2 - Meaning.and.. c qhupunidation
2.1. The basic concepts of communication
2.1.1. Grice's approach and its critique
2.1.2. Sperber and Wilson's approach
49
50 
56
.4
2.1.2.1. Manifestness and cognitive environment 59
2.1.2.2. Ostensive-inferential communication 62
2.2. Indirect communication 69
2.2.1. Grice's approach 69
2.2.2. Other pragmatists' approaches 74
2.2.3. Sperber and Wilson's approach 79
2.2.3.1. The deductive inference system 81
2.2.3.2. Relevance 85
2.2.3.3. How context is determined 93
2.2.3.4. Descriptive and interpretive use 101
Chapter 3: The pun in advertising
3.1. Introduction 106
3.2. The interpretation of the pun 111
3.3. Ambiguity and the pun 141
3.4. Puns and metaphors. 149
3.5. Conclusion 159
Chapter 4; Covert Communication
4.1. Introduction 163
4.2. Sperber and Wilson's ostensive communication 164
4.3. Non-ostensive communication in advertising 167
4.4. Communication and ostension 186
4.5. Weak implicatures and non-ostensive communication 202
4.6. Covert communication 214
4.7. Conclusion 220
Chapter 5: Images of women in advertising
4.1. Introduction 222
4.2. Word meaning and concept 223
4.3. Intelligence 234
4.3. Individualism 246
4.5. Feminist 262
4.6. Conclusion 269
Epilogue 272
Notes 274
Bibliography 275
- 6 -
Acknowledgements
My gratitude goes firstly to Professor Ruth Kempson, my 
supervisor, for all her useful comments and advice. She kindly kept 
me on as her supervisee and continued to help me for my last year,
in spite of the fact that she was on sabbatical. My special
gratitude goes to two other people who gave me strong academic and 
moral support: Professor Brian Moeran and Dr. Deidre Wilson.
Before Professor Kempson took me on as a supervisee, Professor 
Moeran was the only person in the world to find my work interesting 
and worth-while, and his interest and support kept me going. I 
sincerely hope that this thesis has not proven his judgement wrong. 
Dr. Wilson gave me many helpful comments and much encouragement, 
especially when I was in the later stages of writing, despite the 
fact that she was on sabbatical for most of that period. Without 
help and encouragement from these people, I could not have finished 
my thesis, and I count it a great priviledge to have been working 
with them. If I remain unenlightened, the fault is entirely mine.
I am also extremely grateful to my late grandmother, Hatsue 
Akutagawa. Without her financial support, I could not even have 
started a Ph.D. I deeply regret having been unable to finish my 
thesis before her death in March 1988. In addition, I must express
my thanks to the Great Britain-Sasakawa Foundation for giving me a
grant, which helped me to pay the fees for my final term.
-  7 -
Mr. Patrick Hanks taught me the joy of studying linguistics, 
and indeed the joy of studying in general, which I failed to 
experience throughout sixteen years of the Japanese educational 
system. Had I not met him at University of Essex, where I did my
post-graduate diploma and M.A., I would not have experienced such
joy and would not even have dreamed of becoming an academic. I 
stand in his debt.
My thanks go to Yoko Hino for supplying me with Japanese 
magazines essential for my research, and to William Tanaka for 
proof-reading my thesis, collecting examples of British
advertisements, and general encouragement.
Last but not least, my heart-felt gratitude goes to my family, 
especially to my two mentors: my mother, Kazuko Tanaka, and my aunt, 
Takako Takizawa, for their manifold support and encouragement. The 
family who encouraged and helped me both financially and mentally 
through my Ph.D. were all women - grandmother, mother and aunts - to 
whom higher education was denied, whose husband and brothers went to 
university, and who were forced to play a domestic role for lack of 
opportunities. I am extremely grateful that they generously 
supported me and gave me an opportunity which they never had.
- 8 -
Chapter 1: Some Problems of Meaning in Advertising
1.1. Analysis of meaning in advertising
There has long been considerable interest in the means used by 
advertisers to convey a desired message to their audience. In this 
opening chapter, I wish to survey selected parts of this literature, 
in order to assess how the problems raised by the language of 
advertising have been seen and approached by other authors, and what 
are the major strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. More 
specifically, I am interested in analysing in this chapter how other 
authors have dealt with the following basic questions: How is
communication achieved? In particular, how is advertising as a form 
of communication carried out? How does the advertiser convey a 
message to his audience by what he says?
In Section 2, I shall examine two books by structuralists, and 
in Section 3, I shall consider works by two semioticians. Although 
semiotics is a form of structuralism, it concentrates more narrowly 
on systems of signs. Section 4 will look at various studies of the 
language of advertising within the domain of linguistics.
It is my contention that the literature to date has not paid 
enough attention to the context within which audience read and 
process advertisements, and has relied too much on the supposed
structures of symbols in the text itself. This in turn explains my 
own recourse to Relevance Theory as the most appropriate tool for 
the study of the language of advertising, as I attempt to 
demonstrate in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
1.2. Some structuralist approaches
Some attempts to analyse advertisements within the framework of 
structuralism have tended to obscure the problems, rather than to 
clarify them, notably the two books published by Leymore and Millun 
in 1975. However, they have had considerable influence on thinking 
about the language of advertising through their major claim that 
representations in advertising are reducible to an underlying 
structure. Leymore attempts to analyse advertisements in terms of 
binary oppositions, and Millun in terms of classifications.
Leymore attemps to derive from advertisements 'apparent 
characteristics' (1975:22), and from them what she calls 'exhaustive 
common denominateors' (1975:43), which are both reduced to binary 
oppositions and regarded as the structure of the system. For 
example, in the analysis of the advertisements for butter, she 
argues that their argument on margarine is based on the following 
equations:
- 1 0 -
butter : margarine - dear cheap
concord : protest
content : discontent
care negligence -
love hate
(Leymore 1975:43)
where *: ' means 'is to' and '-' means 'like'. The exhaustive common 
denominators which she derives from binary oppositions above are:
Crucial to her analysis is an assumption that all relations in 
a universe of discourse can be reduced to binary oppositions. She 
argues that ' it is possible... to reduce all advertising phenomena 
into a binary structure, which is at once exhaustive and complete' 
(1975:127). Furthermore, she claims that a binary structure is 
based upon psychological reality. She argues:
peace : war - butter : margarine
(Leymore 1975:43)
the essential activity of the human mind is
- 1 1 -
classificatory and its most fundamental rules may be 
reduced to those of contradictions and permutations - 
in other words, to binary oppositions* ... the innate 
structuring ability of the human mind can be 
expressed in the form of binary oppositions and, 
consequently, the binary oppositions with the 
highest generalizing force are, in the last resort, 
the invariants or the universals of the human mind.
(Leymore 1975:10-1)
The claim that the human mind categorises in terms of binary 
oppositions is not new (Trubetzkoy 1939). However, the argument 
against it is just as old. In fact, Trubetzkoy's original 
phonological representation was in part based on gradual 
oppositions, which, it has been argued, defy the notion of binary 
opposition (Hyman 1975).
But what is the status of binary oppositions? It is unclear 
whether they are physical properties, names of concepts or abstract 
entities. Nor is it clear whether they belong to the conscious 
experience of anyone, and whether they vary from individual to 
individual or are shared by different persons. As for the claim 
that they are 'exhaustive', firstly, it is not clear how she derives 
these oppositions, and secondly, it is hard to see how any 
opposition can be claimed as the 'correct' one. Vhere does
«  32 -
atomisation stop? And how can correct oppositions be identified? 
For example, why is the opposition to 'concord' 'protest', rather 
than 'discord', or, why do we have 'love' and 'care', but not 'like' 
or 'affection'? It is not plausible to argue that when we see 
advertisements, we also see these oppositions.
Leymore does discuss two reservations which have been expressed 
about the binary structure. One of them is that it is not clear 
that all human thought is as a rule dichotomised in binary 
oppositions. The other is that the structure is two-valued and does 
not accommodate for gradable features. However, in support of the 
binary structure, she argues that in all such cases, the sense of 
opposition stems from the fact that the terms are discussed with 
respect to some 'implicit norm' (1975:7). Vhat is not discussed is 
what she means by 'implicit norm', a term which remains vague and 
undefined.
Even if we accepted that there were such things as binary 
oppositions in respect to some 'implicit norm', there is still doubt 
as to whether binary oppositions could be applied to everything. 
For example, let us consider colour terms. It could be argued that 
black/white is a binary opposition, but what about red and brown? 
It might be accepted that black is incompatible with white, red, and 
brown, in the sense that there is no such colour as whitish black, 
reddish black, or brownish black. But the colour term 'reddish 
brown' is acceptable: red and brown can co-exist with each other.
How can we tell which of these colours is the 'norm'? Leymore does
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not provide any device to identify them. It is not clear if it is 
of any use to classify everything in terms of binary oppositions. 
Even if we accept that classificatory activity is the essential 
activity of the human mind, it does not mean that its underlying 
principles are reducible to binary oppositions.
There are two possible positive points to be retained from 
Leymore's approach, although neither is without flaws. Firstly, 
contrast can be expressed in an economical way through the use of 
binary oppositions. It helps to draw attention to differences
between two items. But this should not make one forget the
importance of similarities. Secondly, Leymore's analysis might help 
in testing the presence or absence of certain values in a society. 
There might be some advantage in examining advertisements in terms 
of whether certain values are manipulated. This said, values are 
culture-dependent and it is not clear if there is any such thing as 
'universal' (1975:11) values, as she claims.
Millun proposes to connect the role of advertising and the role 
of women by analysing women's images in advertising in terms of a 
system of classification, which he explains as follows:
...the categories that are in fact derived, stem 
directly from what have already been seen to be 
central concerns and should not be derived from some 
theoretical superimposed structure. The categories
- u  -
and classifications should emerge from the material 
rather than be imposed upon it. Each 
classification should be the result of previous 
thought and investigation, and tailored to bring out 
those aspects felt to be the most significant.
Now, let us examine some of his classification systems. The 
following are types of expression of men and women in advertising 
proposed by him:
Types of men's expression Types of women's expression
(Millun 1975:25, author's italics)
thoughtful soft/introverted
self-reliant cool/level
seductive seductive
narcissistic
carefree carefree
kittenlike
paternal maternal
practical practical
comic comic
catalogue catalogue
- 15 -
(Millun 1975:97-8)
If we compare the men's list to the women's list, it seems that 
'thoughtful' and 'self-reliant* replace 'soft/introverted* and 
'cool', respectively. One begins to wonder whether this is because 
these categories simply 'emerged' from the material, or because 
someone is called 'thoughtful' if he is a man but if she is a woman 
she is described as 'introverted'. Furthermore, there seem to be 
two types of expression missing from the men's list, which are on 
the women's list, namely 'narcissistic' and 'kittenlike'. It is not 
clear what is meant by 'kittenlike' and how it is different from, 
for example, 'comic'. As to 'narcissistic', the reason why there is 
no such type for men is surely not because men are incapable of 
being 'narcissistic'; after all, the word comes from a male name. 
There seem to be two possible explanations for this: one is that
when a man is 'narcissistic', he is described as something else, 
'self-reliant', for example; the other is that men are 
'narcissistic' all the time, anyway.
These classifications are not only culture-dependent. They 
also depend upon the time, place and purpose or interest of the 
research. They cannot be accepted as properties which are central 
to the structure.
Millun calls such categories 'emerged from the material* 
(1975:25) and assumes that they are in some sense directly
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observable. This is in effect an attempt at a thoroughly empiricist 
position, which suffers from the central contradiction inherent in 
an empiricist view of language. In so far as they are correct, these 
categories are not independently identifiable but resolutely 
cognitive. Thus, although he argues that the categories and 
classifications should 'emerge from the material' rather than 'be 
imposed upon it' (1975:25), they do not really 'emerge' from
advertisements: it is merely that one thinks that they do. In
effect, he admits this, for he adds that categories should be the 
result of 'previous thought' (1975:25) and they are designed to
bring out aspects which are 'felt' (1975:25) to be significant.
The categories and classifications Millun is suggesting as 
somehow value-free are in fact influenced by the time, place and 
purpose of the research. Thus, in defining his method of analysis, 
Millun starts by suggesting that one needs to note the presence or 
absence of four elements: the product, the props, the setting and
the actors (1975:88), without any explanation or justification as to 
why there are four elements and why those four. He finds it
'remarkable' (1975:136) that there should be a close relationship 
between setting and actors. I would argue that settings and actors 
are both part of his fifth element -'arrangement', and that it is 
only natural that one should find that they are closely related. 
Thus, Millun's classifications are marked by a high degree of 
arbitrariness. On the one hand, they depend on the purposes, 
interests and bias of the researcher. On the other hand, their 
relationship to each other cannot be adequately explained.
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When Millun applies his system of classification to 
advertisements, he is bound to find some correlation between certain 
categories, by virtue of the nature of the categories. For example, 
a 'sophisticated woman' tends to be found in a setting with ' non- 
everyday moods', rather than a 'family setting with everyday moods', 
partly because the actress is arranged to match the settings, or 
vice versa, and partly because he calls a woman found in that kind 
of setting sophisticated. His sets of categories describing men and 
women's expressions are far from self-evident: they reveal a
particular view of men and women, upon which his analysis is based, 
rather than images of men and women in advertising. In an attempt 
to examine the ways in which women are presented in advertising, 
Millun endorses stereotypical views of women, rather than 
questioning them. His analysis is a categorisation of images of 
women according to criteria which are accepted in the respective 
society. In Chapter 5, I shall return to the analysis of images of 
women in advertising, and attempt to show how it can be approached 
by examining how certain words are used to describe women in 
advertising.
1.3. Some semiotic approaches
If Leymore and Millun fail to provide an adequate explanation 
as to how communication in advertising is achieved and how
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advertising messages are understood, a more convincing system of 
meaning is presented by Williamson (1978).
Williamson starts off by analysing a Goodyear tyre 
advertisement, which has an illustration showing a jetty with a car 
on it. Apparently, the car is being tested for its braking 
performance. She argues that, on the 'manifest* (1978:19) level, 
the jetty signifies the test of braking power and connotes 'risk', 
but on the 'latent' (1978:19) level, it signifies tyre because of 
their similarity in appearance, and connotes 'safety'. She goes on 
to argue:
...this transference of significance does not exist 
as completed in the ad, but requires us to wake the 
connection: it is nowhere stated that the tyre is as 
strong as the jetty, therefore this meaning does not exist 
until we complete the transference ourselves.
(Williamson 1978:19, author's italics)
Williamson nearly stumbles on the fact that advertising 
messages are not fully encoded and that interpreting advertisements 
takes more than just decoding; they need the audience to make 
appropriate connections. All semiotic aproaches are based upon the 
assumption that communication is achieved by simply encoding a
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message, and this assumption is precisely the defect they suffer 
from. It is a defect shared by Barthes, whose approach is surveyed 
below.
The problems of the semiotic approach have been argued by 
Sperber and Wilson (1986a) at length. Let me highlight the points 
they make which are valid in this discussion. They argue that a
generative grammar is a code; what is encoded is phonetic 
representations of sentences and what is decoded is semantic 
representations of sentences. However, a sentence is used in 
different ways to convey different messages, as in (1):
(1) He is charming.
There are possible situations in which (1) is used to mean (2) or
(3):
(2) Paul is charming.
(3) Bob is charming.
Furthermore, sentence (1) can be used with a certain tone of voice 
to mean (4) or (5):
- 20 -
(4) Paul is not very pleasant.
(5) Bob is not very pleasant.
Thus, a sentence can be used with various linguistic and non- 
linguistic properties, such as a tone of voice, who the speaker and 
the hearer are, the time and the place of the occasion, and so on. 
That is, the same sentence can be used as different utterances to 
have different interpretations. The semantic representation of 
sentence (1) can be decoded and be analysed in terms of a generative 
grammar. However, a generative grammar cannot determine whether 
'he' refers to Paul or Bob. Nor can it account for how (1) can be 
interpreted as (4) or (5). It might provide the hearer of (1) with 
the information that 'he' refers to a single male third person, or 
that (1) suggests a certain attitude of the speaker, that is, that 
he is being ironical, rather than sincere. However, the hearer is 
still left with the gap between linguistic representations of the 
sentence and the interpretations that the different utterances are 
used to convey. In each situation, there are always other 
possibilities, and the hearer has to select a referent or an 
interpretation among others.
Thus, utterance interpretation cannot be fully accounted for in 
terms of semantic rules as part of grammar. As we have seen in 
examples (1) - (5), the semantic representation of the sentence does
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not provide sufficient information for the hearer to achieve a 
complete interpretation of an utterance in context.
While suggesting that interpreting advertising messages is not 
merely a matter of decoding, Williamson resolves this dilemma by 
presenting a system of meaning. She argues that the 'transference' 
is 'based on the fact that the first object (jetty) has a 
significance to be transferred' (1978:19, author's italics):
...the advertisement does not create meaning 
initially but invites us to make a transaction where 
it is passed from one thing to another. A system of 
meaning must already exist in which jetties are seen 
as strong, and this system is exterior to the ad - 
which simply refers to it, using one of its components as 
a carrier of value (in the case of (the example above), 
strength, durability) i.e. as a currency.
(Williamson 1978:19, author's italics)
She calls this mechanism 'referent system' (1978:19) and goes on to 
define 'currency* as follows:
Currency is something which is representing a value
- 22 -
and in its interchangeability with other things, 
gives them their 'value', too.
(Williamson 1978:20)
Pateman (1983) rejects her arguments as unsound. For a
currency which allows the jetty-strength connection to exist, there
have to be an infinite number of such systems. Williamson herself 
notes that the jetty represents risk as well as strength. She may 
be right in saying that the jetty in the advertisement represents 
both risk and strength. However, she does not explain how an
audience will know which system is valid, either the jetty-risk one 
or the jetty-strength one, or yet another one. This is especially 
problematic when, according to Williamson, the jetty-risk system is 
used on the 'manifest' level and the jetty-stength one on the
'latent' level. How is an audience to know which system is to be 
used when? She points out herself that there is nothing in the 
advertisement written to the effect that the jetty stands for 
something. How is an audience supposed to select these two valid 
systems out of all the possibilities and use them at the right 
level? What criteria does an audience have in choosing the correct 
currency? These are the questions Williamson conveniently neglects. 
And these are the questions for which an adequate theory of 
communication must provide an answer.
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Williamson is aware that, for communication to succeed, the 
audience must be involved in doing the work of processing and that 
there is a gap between the message which is obtained by decoding and 
the message the audience actually recovers. She argues that the gap 
is filled by the audience's knowledge, but she goes on to assert 
that this knowledge-base is itself rule-governed:
To fill in gaps we must know what to fill in, to 
decipher and solve problems we must know the rules of 
the game. Advertisement clearly produces knowledge 
. . . but this knowledge is always produced from 
something already known, that acts as a guarantee, 
in its anteriority, for the ' truth' in the ad itself.
(Williamson 1978:99, author's italics)
According to Williamson, 'the assumption of pre-existing bodies 
of knowledge' (1978:100) allows the reference system to work. 
However, the question is: what criteria does the audience use in
order to choose relevant information out of the whole range of 
knowledge they have? She adds that her concern is precisely which 
reference to pre-existing bodies of knowledge is used in 
advertising. It is worth investigating what ideologies advertisers 
employ in their advertisements. From this perspective, her analysis 
is stimulating and raises a central question. However, she is
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unable to answer the crucial question which she raises: how are
advertisements understood?
'Rhetoric of the image' by Barthes (1977) is claimed by Dyer 
(1982:224) to be a major essay on semiotics and its application to 
the analysis of an advertising message. Barthes studies the 
interrelationships between the image and the advertising message, 
using an advertisement for pasta called Panzani as an example. This 
is perhaps the text which gets us closest to an answer to our 
crucial question, although it still suffers from defects of a 
structuralist interpretation.
Barthes argues that there are three kinds of message: the
linguistic message, the coded iconic message and the non-coded 
iconic message. The linguistic message consists of the caption and 
the labels. Barthes points out that there exist two levels of 
interpretation of the linguistic message, namely, denotational and 
connotational. In the example, the advertised product name denotes 
the pasta, and connotates 'Italianicity'. Putting aside the 
linguistic message, Barthes argues that we are left with the pure 
image. This is divided into two categories, which are the iconic 
equivalents of connotation and denotation. The former is also 
categorised as a coded, symbolic, and cultural message, while the 
latter is said to be the non-coded, perceptual and literal message.
However, the denotation-connotation distinction is not clear- 
cut neither at the linguistic nor at the iconic level. Perceptual
- 25
information is not independent of cultural knowledge. As Sperber 
and Wilson (1986a:65) point out, a distinction between 'central' 
thought processes and 'input', 'perceptual' or 'peripheral' 
processes is assumed in current cognitive psychology: so-called
input systems are said to transform information from sensory 
representations ihfe conceptual representations, all of which are in 
the same format. The information provided by such input systems, 
however, underdetermines the information derived from them. The 
central process integrates information derived from the perceptual 
system with information stored in memory to determine what is 
actually perceived. Thus, even the processing of information by 
perceptual organs is affected by one's cultural knowledge.
Barthes mentions 'anthropological' (1977:36) knowledge of a 
tomato, a string-bag, a packet of pasta, and so on, but once a red 
and round object is recognised as a 'tomato', rather than as an 
'imperfect ball' or a 'red vegetable', perceptual knowledge is no 
longer devoid of cultural knowledge about 'tomatoes'. Moreover, as 
a string-bag and a packet of pasta are cultural objects, it can 
hardly be seen as valid or useful to separate their 'perceptual' 
values from their 'cultural' values.
Barthes argues that if all cultural signs are removed from the 
image, one continues to 'read' (1977:35) the image, and that one 
obtains the non-coded, perceptual message. This is a statement 
which is hardly acceptable. Mot only can cultural knowledge not be 
separated from perceptual information, but it is common-sensical to
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argue that it is perception which comes before knowledge: it is a
perceptU-.al stimulus which comes to one's cognitive system first. 
This initial stimulus triggers the recuperation of stored 
information and therefore calls upon knowledge, rather than 
knowledge coming to one's mind first and giving way to the late 
comer, namely, perception. One has to perceive a round and red 
object first in order to identify it as a 'tomato', before gaining 
messages such as ' Italianicity' , or freshness.
The analysis of the advertisement in question concludes that 
there are four discontinuous connotational signs: (a) a suggestion
of a return from the market implies the freshness of the products 
and domestic preparation; (b) the colours used in the poster mean 
' Italianicity' ; (c) the serried collection of different objects
suggests the idea of a total culinary service; (d) the composition 
of the objects implies the image of the still life painting. 
Barthes emphasises the discontinuity of these signs (1977:34-5).
However, this 'discontinuity' becomes unconvincing if one looks 
at these signs. How can the freshness of the products and the 
domestic preparation be categorised as one message, while the idea 
of a culinary service forms a distinctive category? The division 
seems arbitrary, in much the same way as the classifications of 
other authors discussed above. Moreover, it is possible for an 
audience to put more effort into deciphering the advertisement and 
to derive further messages, for example, the idea of harvest, 
abundance, and so forth.
- 27 -
Ve have considered in examples (1) to (5) that decoding is not 
quite enough for communication. Then, the question to be asked
would be how the audience achieves an adequate understanding of an
advertisement, while there exist a potentially infinite number of 
different messages carried by a finite number of signals in it.
Barthes seems to be aware of the problem, but he attempts to 
resolve it by arguing that the linguistic message has a function 
vis-a-vis the iconic message, a function which he calls 'anchorage'. 
By this, he means the selection of the intended message:
... all images are polysemous . .. (which) poses a 
question of meaning and this question always comes 
through as a dysfunction even if this dysfunction is 
'recuperated by society as a tragic ... or a poetic 
game ... (The linguistic message) helps (an
audience) to choose the correct level of perception. . .
(Barthes 1977:39, author's italics)
It sounds convenient, but unfortunately it is not realistic. 
It is a truism that linguistic message is also polysemous. However 
much we would like them to be clear and straightforward, linguistic 
codes are not devoid of ambiguity. Reference assignment,
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disambiguation and enrichment are only part of the normal process of 
utterance interpretation (Sperber and Wilson 1986a:185), as in the 
following example:
<6) It is strange.
(7) The food is hot.
(8) Come back early in the morning.
'It' in (6) would have to be assigned to an appropriate referent. 
The word 'hot' can mean either 'having a high temperature' or 
'spicy', and the audience of (7) would have to decide which the word 
means in the context. 'Early' in (8) is vague and the understanding 
of (8) would not be completed untill the audiance has enriched 
information as to how early the speaker of (8) means.
If we were to accept that communication is a matter of 
decoding, and if we wished to account for interpretation of <6) to
(8), for example, we would have to accept that there are rules of 
pragmatic interpretation and add them onto rules of semantic 
interpretation. However, it is not possible to write general rules 
to account for most aspects of utterance interpretation, and it 
would be necessary to have an infinite number of rules.
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Sperber and Wilson argue (1986a:27) that verbal communication 
involves more than a single form of communication. It involves 
linguistic encoding and decoding, but there is a gap between the 
linguistically encoded message of a sentence and what the speaker 
means, or what the hearer understands. They argue that verbal 
communication also involves inferential processes. Their claim is 
that in verbal communication, the code and inferential inodes of 
communication are combined together and enable people to achieve a 
more sophisticated level of communication which neither model can 
provide on its own.
Let us now consider the inferential model of communication. 
The input of a decoding process is a signal and the output is a 
message, which is paired to the signal by an underlying code. The 
input of an inferential process is a set of premises and the output 
is a set of conclusions, which follow logically from the premises, 
as in the following examples:
(9) Input: An amber light.
Output: Be cautious.
(10) Input: If it is a Sunday, the shop will be closed.
It is a Sunday.
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Output: The shop is closed.
However, the question is how the premises used in the process 
are determined. The answer lies in finding premises which match the 
intentions of the speaker and determining how the hearer can come to 
recognise them. It was Grice (1957) who first raised the
significance of the publication and recognition of intentions in 
communication, and various pragmatists have since developed 
inferential models of communication. The inferential model is
formulated around the speaker's intention. It states that
communication is achieved by the speaker providing evidence of his 
intentions and the hearer inferring his intentions from the evidence 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986:24). 1
Another problematic feature of Barthes' account is his claim 
that language is the prime example of a semiological system (Culler 
1983:73), and that it is possible to talk of explicit, discontinuous 
messages, as in the example of the four messages he claims to derive 
from the pasta advertisement. Sperber and Wilson (1986a:66) argue 
against this assumption, saying that the kind of explicit
communication that can be achieved by the use of language is not a 
typical but a limiting case. For Sperber and Wilson, the goal of 
communication is the improvement of the individual's knowledge of 
the world, and the communicator does not convey a finite number of 
explicit and precise messages. Instead, he provides his evidence 
for a number of conclusions, which become more accessible to the
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audience to varying degrees as a result. While it is right to 
argue that linguistic communication can achieve a degree of 
precision and complexicity unattainable by non-linguistic means of 
communication (Sperber and Wilson 1986a:174), linguistic 
communication does not function by communicating a limited number of 
explicit and strong messages.
Barthes' semiotic analysis also fails to provide an adequate 
account of the degree of strength of a conveyed message, or of the 
indeterminacy of meaning. It is questionable whether advertisers 
regard the polysemous nature of both linguistic and non-linguistic 
messages as the 'tragedy' which Barthes did (1977:39). On the 
contrary, as I argue extensively in Chapter 3, the advantage of 
punning, which is frequently used in advertising, lies in its 
multiplicity of meanings, for it can be eye-catching and it can 
sustain an audience's attention longer. Nor does it matter much 
whether a particular message is conveyed or not, even if an 
advertiser has a set of assumptions which he hopes his advertisement 
might convey. As long as an advertisement catches an audience's 
attention, sustains it for a time, creates some response and remains 
in the audience's memory, the advertisement is said to be 
successful. The recovery of a message other than that intended is 
far from being regarded as redundant or as a failure.
Thus, Barthes' analysis is incapable of explaining the 
following case. A Winston advertisement shows a wok pushed into a 
black forest gateau with the following caption:
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(11) Ve're not allowed to tell you anything about
Winston cigarettes, so here's a wok in the Black 
Forest.
The appreciation of this advertisement involves more than de­
coding the linguistic and iconic message in the advertisement. A 
wok in the Black Forest is absurd and it is irrelevant to 
cigarettes. And this is all intentional. The advertiser expects 
this caption to attract the audience's attention and sustain it, 
hopefully longer than usual, as the caption is quite absurd and 
comes as a surprise. Possibly, the pun might attract extra 
attention, too. The advertiser hopes that it is memorable; due to 
its absurdity. Even better, the audience might like it, as it might 
appeal to their sense of humour. Thus, the advertiser could 
possibly create some favorable feelings among the audience.
1.4. Some linguistic approaches
The next work on advertising to be surveyed is an article 
called 'How is understanding an advertisement possible?' by Pateman 
(1983), which appeared in Language, Image, Kedia edited by Davis et 
al. It is a criticism of Barthes and Williamson, and it favours a 
pragmatic approach. Pateman argues that semioticians take for
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granted 'important conditions of possibility of the routine 
accomplishment' (1983:187). By 'the routine accomplishment', he 
means not only audience's linguistic knowledge, but also assumptions 
about the communicator's intention, the principles of conversation, 
activity type, point or purpose, and so on.
First, he introduces a theory of script-based understanding 
(Schank and Abelson 1977); then he notes that advertisements are 
'rarely identified in isolation and retrospectively but rather they 
are identified in a context where they have been anticipated' 
(1983:188, author's italics), and argues that unless an 
advertisement is identified as an advertisement it would be 
'strictly impossible for us to understand...it' (1983:189). His
argument is adequate to the extent that advertisements tend to 
appear where they are anticipated, and knowledge that something is 
an advertisement helps the audience to understand it.
However, Pateman's thesis is inadequate for a general 
understanding of the language of advertising. Although it may be 
rare, a text can be identified as an advertisement without any prior 
knowledge that it is one. It does sometimes happen that one reads a 
text, regarding it as an article and finds out as one reads it that 
it is in fact an advertisement. The information that something is 
an advertisement is not a prerequisite for understanding it.
Secondly, Pateman argues that knowledge about what kind of 
thing fills a slot can be used in analysing a particular object
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which fills a slot. He borrows the notion of 'activity type' from 
Levinson (1978), which is defined as follows:
I take the notion of an activity type to refer to a 
fuzzy category whose focal-members are goal-defined, 
socially constituted, bounded events with constraints 
on participants, setting and so on, but above all on 
the kinds of allowable contribution. Paradigm 
examples would be teaching, a job interview, a jural 
interrogation, a football game, a task in a workshop, 
a dinner party, and so on.
(Levinson 1979:368)
Pateman adds advertising to this list. He argues that participants 
in different activity types are prepared with minimal knowledge 
about an activity in which they are engaged, which includes the 
purpose of the activity. He goes on to say that in the case of 
advertising the purpose is to sell products, and that without this 
knowledge an advertisement is not understandable.
However, there are considerable problems with this formulation. 
For example, the goals of a dinner party are by no means clear. 
Being sociable and not offending anyone come to little more than a 
vague and arbitrary set of ' dos and don'ts'. Nor does Levinson
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prove his point by referring to a court case in which an alleged 
rape victim had just admitted that she had been sexually involved 
with two men before; at this point the defence lawyer said to 
her:'And you are seventeen and a half?', implying that a girl of 
seventeen who has already slept with two men was not a woman of a 
good repute (1978:380-1). This is not a convincing argument to
support the notion of activity type. For such a statement does not 
have to come from a lawyer in a criminal court in order to suggest 
this meaning. This example may suggest something about a lawyer's 
tactics, but it does not explain what it is supposed to explain, 
that is, how people understand what they understand.
Sperber and Wilson (1987:742) argue that, while recognising the 
importance of goals, purposes, plans,' and so on, there is no 
defining them, and that it is impossible to show how they are 
selected or constructed, and, once selected, how they affect 
comprehension. Their claim is that there is one sole criterion used 
in comprehension which is called relevance, which is to be discussed 
at length in Chapter 2, and they define relevance in a context and 
to an individual. They go on to argue that given a definition of 
relevance in a context, and the way the context is constructed, 
assumptions about the goals and purposes of the participants in a 
conversation form part of the context, and that therefore the notion 
of relevance is not incompatible with our intuitions about goals and 
purposes.
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Pateman's category of goal-defined activity is just as vacuous 
when applied to advertising. The purpose of an advertisement is to 
make the audience want to buy a certain product, when they would not 
buy it but for the advertisement. If advertisers are to depend 
entirely upon their audience's recognition of their goal, their 
chances of success will not be high. Advertising cannot be seen as 
goal-bound in a social sense, for the goal of an advertisement is 
not shared by the audience. In effect, advertising is socially 
'goal-divided' rather than 'goal defined', inasmuch as the different 
parties involved are striving for different social goals. The 
ultimate purpose of advertising is to cause a change in the thought 
and behaviour of the audience against their will. The advertiser 
wishes to change the minds of uninterested persons in his audience 
and make them buy his product. How this can be achieved is the 
topic of Chapter 4.
Thus, Pateman's argument against semiotic approaches in favour 
of a pragmatic approach is sound, and his intuitions to support the 
notion of goals and purposes are valid. However, his analysis 
suffers from the defects of the theory it is based upon. A more 
adequate pragmatic theory is needed in order to achieve his purposes 
of analysing how advertisements are understood. I shall argue in 
Chapter 2 that Relevance Theory provides just that.
Until now, we have been considering non-linguists' contributions 
to the study of the language of advertising, even though people like
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Pateman use linguistic theory. It is now necessary to cover the 
writings of linguists.
Leech (1963) is regarded as a 'classic' in this field: as Dyer 
(1982:225) remarks, Leech provides a comprehensive study of 
advertising style. However, his work is descriptive and stylistic, 
and it is not an attempt to explain how advertising as communication 
is achieved. It was written before work on pragmatics developed. 
Since then, linguists turned their attention to the nature of 
communication, whereas Leech merely provides an account of the style 
and range of constructions used.
The object of Leech's work is to describe British advertising 
language in a linguistic framework, but it is not of great interest 
to my study because of its descriptive nature. For example, he 
presents a list of the adjectives most frequently used in television 
advertising, which includes 'new', 'good/better/best', 'free', 
'fresh', 'delicious', and so on. However, it could be argued that 
they are all predictable. Firstly, they fall into a category of
most frequently used adjectives in English in general. Secondly, 
given that food and detergents are two of the product categories on 
which most is spent by advertisers, it can be expected that a 
considerable proportion of the materials studied was in these 
categories, and it is thus not surprising that words such as 'fresh' 
and 'delicious' should get onto the list. Moreover, advertisers 
often use 'free' referring to incentives used in their promotion. 
Thus, although his findings are interesting and useful from a
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descriptive point of view, they do not offer much of a contribution 
to understanding how communication takes place in advertising.
The latest relevant work is by two linguists, Vestergaard and 
Schroder (1985). They argue that advertisements tend to take a 
certain 'behavioural normalcy' for granted (Vestergaard and Schroder 
1985:141). Although the notion of 'behavioural normalcy' needs more 
explanation, what they mean is that advertisers take a certain 
behaviour or attitude as the norm without explicitly saying so, as 
in the following example, which is a caption for a Dr. White's Panty 
Pads advertisement:
(12) Is there anything you can't wear?
(Vestergaard and Schroder 1985:143)
This advertisement is emphasising that the pads are thin and don't 
show, and the question presumably is whether there is anything one 
can't wear with the kind of pad in question. Vestergaard and 
Schroder argue that since the question does not strike one as 
meaningless, it must imply that with other towels there are things 
you cannot wear. They have a point in that advertisements treat 
certain assumptions as valid without explicitly stating them.
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However, this process is not exclusive to advertising, and it 
is involved in a whole range of utterance interpretation, as will be 
shown later. Where Vestaargard and Schroder go really wrong is when 
they argue that this is a 'semantic process of ... imposition of a 
behavioural normalcy'. It is not one's semantic knowledge about the 
words in (12) which reveals an underlying assumption that there are 
things one cannot wear with other pads. This problem cannnot be 
treated at a semantic level: it is a pragmatic one.
The last work to be surveyed here is The Language of Television 
Advertising by Geis (1982). The purpose of the study is to describe 
how language is used in American television advertising, and how the 
language of advertising is understood by audiences in terms of 
pragmatic theory.
Geis argues that the advertiser should be held responsible for 
non-idiosyncratic inferences drawn by an audience, as well as what 
his advertisement asserts and what its assertions entail, as 
ordinary people cannnot be expected to distinguish between valid and 
invalid inferences (1982:33). He takes a Gricean approach and 
argues that pragmatic theory must be dependent on semantic theory 
(1982:34). His assumption is that the hearer draws inferences from 
an utterance with the aid of his semantic knowledge and Grice's 
cooperative principle:
A sentence S conversationally implies a proposition P
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in a given conversation if P can be "calculated"
given
a. the literal meaning of S,
b. general principles governing conversation,
c. the context of the conversation
d. background knowledge shared by speaker and hearer.
(Geis 1982:30)
Problems of Gricean analysis have been discussed by Sperber and 
Wilson, and will be explained in Chapter 2. Here, it is sufficient 
to point out that Geis has not suggested how 'the context of the 
conversation' is determined. Moreover, the notion of mutual 
knowledge has been discussed and dismissed as psychologically 
unreal. (Clark and Marshall 1981, Sperber and Wilson 1986a) It 
would not be possible to pin down an advertiser on these notions 
which are impossible to establish. An advertiser could deny any 
accusation by saying that he was not aware that his viewers shared 
that particular knowledge. Geis argues that advertisers should be 
held responsible for the conversational implicature of what they 
say. While this is in itself a reasonable and interesting proposal, 
Geis' actual analysis is not a succesful basis for implementing any 
such restriction.
Geis bases his analysis upon Grice's notion of cooperation 
between participants in a conversation, and presents six maxims,
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rather than Grice's four, incorporating maxims taken from Grice, 
Boer and Lycan (1975), as well as his own. In effect, Grice's 
Maxims of Quantity and Quality are each broken down into two maxims, 
the Maxims of Strength and Parsimony, and the Maxims of Truth
and Evidence, respectively. They are defined as follows:
The Maxim of Strength: Say no less than is necessary.
The Maxim of Parsimony: Say no more than is necessary
The Maxim of Truth: Do not say what you believe to be
false.
The Maxim of Evidence: Do not say that for which you
adequate evidence.
The Maxim of Relevance: Be relevant.
The Maxim of Clarity: Avoid obscurity of expression.
(Geis 1982:31)
Sperber and Wilson (1981) have argued that Grice's maxims are 
not all independently necessary and that they may be reduced to a 
single principle, which is the principle of relevance. Geis himself 
is aware of problems which arise from inter-relations among maxims. 
He gives as an example an advertisement for Aftate, which is a 
deodorant for feet:
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(13) Aftate for Athlete's foot, with a medication that 
kills athlete's foot fungus on contact.
(Geis 1982:55)
Geis argues that it is implied that Aftate kills athlete's foot 
fungus on contact, and that the Maxim of Relevance is responsible 
for this implicature. However, taking into consideration the Maxim 
of Strength, and the fact that advertisers make the strongest claim 
they can in their advertisement, the fact that it is never actually 
claimed that this medication kills athlete's foot fungus on contact 
implies that Aftate may not in fact kill athlete's foot fungus on 
contact. He adds:
In general, the Maxims of Strength and Relevance can
give rise to quite different implicatures ........ in
general consumers are much more likely to go with the 
Maxim of Relevance than with the Maxim of Strength, 
for in such cases the latter requires much more 
sophisticated reasoning than does the former.
(Geis 1982:55-6)
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He is suggesting that there is a hierarchy among the maxims and 
the Maxim of Relevance is superior to that of Strength. However, 
advertisers cannot be held responsible for different implicatures 
which are argued to be derived from different maxims. Geis argues 
that 'in general' audience are 'much more likely to' go with the 
Maxim of Relevance. But this cannot be used for determining what 
advertisers are responsible for, as the claim is too weak and not 
specific enough. Thus, again, Geis' approach suffers from the 
general defects of Gricean pragmatics, that is vagueness and 
arbitrariness. Sperber and Vi Ison offer an account which supersedes 
Geis' considerations and which does not suffer from the problems 
inherent in a Gricean approach,
Geis' major finding is how weak claims made by advertisers are, 
as in the following example:
<14) ...a remarkable nasal spray that lasts and lasts 
up to 12 continuous hours.
(Geis 1982:3)
(14) claims that the nasal spray in question remains effective for 
twelve hours at most, which is weaker than just saying that it lasts 
for twelve hours. Based on the assumption that advertisers will 
make the strongest claims that they can possibly defend, Geis
- 44 -
concludes (1982:4) that the advertiser of the nasal spray cannot
justify the stronger claim. He goes on to argue that judging from
the fact that weak claims as such are commonly used in advertising, 
they must have a stronger impact on the audience than their literal 
strength would indicate.
Geis presents scales to measure the strength of claims, for 
example, strength of probability and modal verbs. He gives an 
imaginary situation in which John Jones is known by 100 women and is 
interested in knowing how many of those women like him, and presents 
a list of sentences:
(15) a. Every one of the women like John Jones.
b. Most of the women like J.J,
c. Many of the women like J.J.
d. Some of the women like J.J.
e. Few of the women like J.J.
f. None of the women like J.J.
(Geis 1982:63)
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and he proposes a method of ranking relative strength as follows:
Given a scale S (say 10 point scale plus 0) and a 
comparison class C formed with respect to lexical 
element E, assign those members of C that have 
absolute values to the appropriate points on S and 
assign all other members of C to S, giving equal 
space on S to each member.
(Geis 1982:64)
He argues that given the above method, sentences (15a)-(15e) 
would be mapped into the following scale:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6____ 2 S 2___ 1SL
none few some many most all
(Geis 1982:65)
and he argues that 'Many X's are P' would be interpreted as claiming 
that something between 50% and 75% of X have property P. (1982:65)
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This definition is too specific and unrealistic at the same 
time. His argument sounds acceptable in this particular context. 
However, it is possible to imagine situations in which this 
measurement does not work, depending on the number of subjects
involved. The question is how far beyond the given context does 
this work? It might be argued that it applies to the case of
ninety-nine women, instead of one hundred. Or it might apply to the 
case of ninety-eight women, and so on. However, it would not apply 
if the number of women is three: even if nearly 70% of the three
women liked John Jones, it could not be claimed that many women
liked John Jones. Where is the cut-off point, if there is any? The 
scale pays no consideration to context. A scale that is valid in an 
imaginary context but not in others is of little use to an analysis 
of advertisements.
Thus Geis' analysis suffers in part from the general defect of 
formal pragmatics. It attempts to explain utterance comprehension 
by adding rules of pragmatic interpretation, which are unrealistic 
and not comprehensive, and it does not account for the role of 
context in utterance comprehension.
Geis considers problems in utterance interpretation and argues 
that they should be dealt within the framework of pragmatics. 
However, his analysis shares the problems of Gricean and formal 
pragmatics, and remains too vague and arbitrary. Furthermore, his 
proposed solutions, such as scales for probability terms and modal 
verbs are inadequate, for he pays no attention to the context
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against which an utterance is processed. It is necessary to 
investigate these problems in terms of a more adequate pragmatic 
analysis, which provides an adequate account for the notion of 
context.
1.5 Conclusion
The lack of any account of context has indeed been the 
fundamental weakness of all the writings on the language of 
advertising to date. They have failed to take into consideration 
the context in which an advertisement is interpreted.
In this chapter, I have argued, against semiotic approaches, 
that understanding advertisements is not merely a matter of 
decoding, and that we must consider inferential processes which are 
involved in utterance interpretation. I have further argued that 
the interpretation of advertisements is best approached from a 
pragmatic point of view, and that we need an account which 
integrates the notion of context. However, existing pragmatic 
approaches suffer from the general defects of Gricean pragmatics, 
namely, vagueness and arbitrariness, or of formal pragmatics, that 
is unrealistic rigidity. In short, existing approaches to
advertising share the defects of the theories of communication on 
which they are based.
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In the next chapter, I shall argue that Relevance Theory by 
Sperber and Wilson offers a principled account of how an utterance 
is interpreted by the hearer against the context. It is a theory 
which supersedes all the intuitions and partial approaches surveyed 
in this chapter. Relevance Theory is flexible and comprehensive at 
the same time, and it provides a better theory of communication than 
any of those surveyed in this chapter, and therefore it offers an 
effective framework for the interpretation of advertisements.
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Chapter 2: Meaning and Communication
2.1. The basic concept of communication
In Chapter 1, I have examined works by various social 
scientists, including linguists, on the analysis of meaning in 
advertising. I have argued that structuralist and semiotic 
approaches are not very fruitful, and that problems of meaning 
cannot be fully accounted for by semantic analysis. It would seem 
that the topic is best approached from a pragmatic viewpoint. In 
this chapter, I shall consider how some pragmatists have approached 
the problems of utterance interpretation and how best we can analyse 
the interpretation of advertisements.
Section 2.1 will examine Grice's analysis and an alternative 
approach by Sperber and Wilson. In Section 2.1.1., I shall look at 
Grice's approach to meaning and communication, and in Section 
2.1.2., I shall consider Sperber and Wilson's criticism of Grice's 
approach, Section 2.1.2. will be further broken down into smaller 
sections, in order to study Sperber and Wilson's analysis 
systematically. Section 2.1.2.1. will look at cognitive
environment. Section 2.1.2.2. will focus on the notion of 
manifestness. Ostensive-inferential communication will be defined 
and explained in Section 2.1.2.3. Section 2.2 will discuss indirect 
communication and various approaches to analysing it.
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2.1.1. Grice's approach and its critique
Grice tries to draw a distinction between two kinds of meaning 
as in the following examples:
<1) Those spots mean measles.
<2) Those three rings of the bell (of the bus) mean 
that the bus is full.
(Grice 1957:377)
Grice calls the first type of meaning 'natural meaning', and 
the second 'non-natural meaning'. He presents (3) as the
formulation for natural meaning and (4a) and (4b) as those for non­
natural meaning:
(3) A means to do so-and-so (by x).
(4) a. A means something by x.
b. A means by x that.
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(Grice 1957:378-9)
where A is a human agent.
The point is that, in regard to (1), there is no asking 'Who 
means it?'. However, in the case of (2>, it is possible to ask 'Who 
means it?' or ' What does he mean by it?'. The key difference is 
that, in the case of non-natural meaning, there is some intended 
cause of belief.
Grice proceeds to a consideration of different stimuli, which 
he calls 'utterances', such as an artist drawing a picture, a 
conductor ringing a bell, and a police officer waving to a driver, 
all of which are non-linguistic acts, but arguably genuine acts of 
communication. The word 'utterance' is confusing here, so following 
Sperber and Wilson, I shall use the term 'stimulus' instead.
Grice argues that the recognition by the audience of the 
intention behind a stimulus is crucial. For example, suppose that A 
left B's handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce 
a detective to believe that B was the murderer. In this case, Grice 
claims, one could not say that the handkerchief has a non-natural 
meaning. Nor can one argue that A, by leaving the handkerchief,
meant as a non-natural meaning that B was the murderer, in that A 
specifically does not intend his audience to know his intention.
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Another concern Grice has as to the definition of non-natural
meaning is the distinction between non-natural meaning and
'deliberately and openly letting someone know' or 'getting someone 
to think'. He explicates this distinction with the following 
examples:
(5) a. Herod presents Salome with the head of St.
John the Baptist on a charger.
b. Feeling faint, a child lets its mother see
how pale it is (hoping that she may draw her
own conclusions and help).
c. A man leaves the china his daughter has 
broken lying around for his wife to see.
(Grice 1957:382)
Grice argues that, although here we seem to have cases which 
satisfy conditions so far given for non-natural meaning, yet (5a) to 
(5c) are not cases of non-natural meaning. He contrasts 'telling* 
with 'deliberately and openly letting someone know' or 'getting 
someone to think' , and says that the latter two cases are not
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'telling' or non-natural meaning. The question is: is this
distinction valid?
Grice gives further examples:
(6) a. A shows Mr. X a photograph of Mr. Y displaying 
undue familiarity to Mrs. X.
b. A draws a picture of Mr. Y behaving in this 
manner and shows it to Mr. X.
(Grice 1957:382)
According to Grice, (6a) is not a case of non-natural meaning,
but <6b) is. The reasons are that in the case of (6a), Mr. X's
recognition of A's intention to make him believe that there is
something between Mr. Y and Mrs. X is irrelevant to the production 
of this effect by the photograph. However, in the case of (6b), it 
will make a difference to the effect of A's drawing of Mrs. X, 
whether or not he takes A to be intending to inform him about Mrs. 
X, and not to be just doodling or trying to produce a work of art.
It is worth noting that this distinction between photography 
and drawing has been made by Barthes in his analysis of advertising. 
He gives the following reasons to support this distinction: (a) to
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produce an object or a scene in a drawing requires a set of rule- 
governed transpositions; (b) the operation of the drawing
immediately necessitates a certain division between the significant 
and the insignificant; (c) drawing demands an apprenticeship
(1977:43).
However, all these points in fact apply to photography as much 
as to drawing. It is not the case that the reproduction of an 
object in a photograph is carried out without human operation; it 
takes more than simply pressing a shutter. It includes some 
manipulation, such as the intended selection of objects and 
focusing. It is particularly interesting that Barthes draws this 
distinction in his discussion of advertising. In advertising, 
everything, whether a photograph or drawing, is carefully and 
skilfully controlled.
Thus, the distinction between intended non-natural meaning and 
intended meaning, as reflected in the distinction between 
photography and drawing which Grice is trying to make is not as 
clear-cut as he claims it to be. Even in the case of (6a), Mr. X's 
recognition of A's intention to make him believe that there is 
something between Mr. Y. and Mrs. X can be crucial. For example, if 
A leaves the photograph in question lying around by accident and it 
is found by Mr. X among other photographs of many people enjoying
themselves at a party, Mr. X may not suspect anything between his
wife and Mr. Y.
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As to (5a) - (5c), too, it is difficult to observe the
distinction between 'telling' and 'deliberately and openly letting 
someone know' or 'getting someone to think'. The difficulty partly 
6tems from the fact that Grice does not make clear what is 
communicated by the respective communicators of (5a) - (5c). For 
example, it might be accepted that in (5a) Herod was 'deliberately 
and openly letting' Salome know that John the Baptist was dead. 
However, one might be tempted to say that Herod was 'telling' that 
he had kept his promise to her. It could be argued that (5a) - (5c) 
are both 'telling' and 'deliberately and openly letting someone 
know' a whole range of things.
Indeed, Sperber and Wilson argue (1986a:53) that there is no 
clear-cut distinction between the two, and that there is a continuum 
of cases between 'deliberately and openly letting someone know' or 
'getting someone to think', where strong direct evidence is 
provided, and 'telling', where all the evidence is indirect.
As to what is communicated, Grice argues (1957:386) that only 
what may be called the primary intention of a communicator has a 
bearing on the non-natural meaning of a stimulus. For example, he 
argues that if a man intends to get a woman to do something by 
giving her some information, it cannot be regarded as relevant to 
the non-natural meaning of his stimulus to describe what he intends 
her to do. His argument is valid in that the communicator's 
informing her of something is an act of communication, but his 
getting her to do something as a result is not. However, if the
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former is called the primary intention, can the latter be called the 
secondary intention? Are there layers of intentions? Is there a
clear-cut boundary between them? These points are not elaborated by 
Grice, but they are by Sperber and Wilson, who distinguish between 
what they call informative and communicative intentions.
2.1.2. Sperber and Wilson's approach
Grice's analysis of non-natural meaning can be reformulated in 
terms of three sub-intent ions on the part of speaker: the speaker
utters x, intending to inform the hearer of y; in so doing, the 
speaker intends the hearer to recognise his intention to inform her 
of y; and the speaker intends the hearer's recognition of his 
intention to inform to play a part in her comprehension process.
Let us suppose that the speaker thought that he studied hard 
the night before the utterance and wanted to communicate the fact by 
saying (7):
(7) I studied hard last night.
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The speaker will be said to have succeeded in communication 
once his intention to inform the hearer of the fact that he studied 
hard the previous night is recognised by the hearer. There are 
situations in which the hearer recognises that the speaker intends 
to inform her of a fact, but nevertheless she does not believe it. 
For example, she may have seen him at a party the night before, and 
therefore she may not be convinced that he studied hard on the night 
in question. Thus, it is possible that the speaker's intention to 
inform is recognised without this intention being fulfilled. When 
the speaker's intention to inform is recognised and yet fails to be 
fulfilled, his intention of making his intention to inform a part of 
the hearer's reasoning also fails. Then, only his intention of 
making his intention to inform recognised will be fulfilled. Both 
his intention to inform and his intention to make the hearer* 
recognition of his intention to inform a part of her comprehension 
process will not be fulfilled. However, even then, the speaker will 
have succeeded in communication; what he will have failed to do is 
to convince his hearer.
Sperber and Wilson argue that if intention to inform does not 
need to be fulfilled for communication to succeed, as I have just 
shown, this intention to inform cannot be described as an intention 
to communicate. They therefore call this intention to inform the 
'informative intention'. On the other hand, the speaker's intention 
to make his intention to inform recognised by the hearer, according 
to Sperber and Wilson, is the true intention to communicate, and 
they call it the 'communicative intention'. By definition, when the
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speaker's intention to inform is not fulfilled, the speaker's 
intention that the recognition by the hearer of his intention to 
inform should play a part in her comprehension process is not 
fulfilled either. Since an intention to inform need not be 
fulfilled for the purposes of successful communication, an intention 
that the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention to inform 
should function as part of her comprehension process cannot be 
necessary either. Sperber and Wilson define these two layers of 
intentions as follows:
Informative intention: to inform the audience of 
something.
Communicative intention: to inform the audience of one's 
informative intention.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:29)
As I have shown above, an informative intention can be 
recognised without being fulfilled. Once an informative intention 
gets recognised, the consequent communicative intention is 
fulfilled. However, the reverse is not necessarily true. A 
communicative intention can be fulfilled without the corresponding 
informative intention being fulfilled: the hearer may recover the
information intended by the speaker without believing it.
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This distinction between informative and communicative 
intentions will turn out to be of great significance in 
characterising the covert transmission of information and attitudes 
typical of many advertisements. It will be central to my discussion 
of 'covert forms of communication' (Chapter 4), and it is important 
to clarify here just what is at issue.
These complex intentions all depend on the notions of 
manifestness, cognitive environment, ostention, and ostensive- 
inferential communication. I shall therefore take these four 
notions in turn.
2.1.2.1. Manifestness and cognitive environment
When an assumption is accessible to an individual, and there is 
more evidence for it than against it, Sperber and Wilson call it 
'manifest', and they define cognitive environment in terms of 
manifestness as follows:
A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and 
only if he is capable at that time of representing it 
mentally and accepting its representation as true or 
probably true.
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(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:39)
A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts 
that are manifest to him.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:39)
The notion of manifestness can be extended from facts to all 
assumptions. To be manifest is to be either perceptible or 
inferable. Manifestness is also a matter of degree. An assumption 
can be weakly or strongly manifest to a certain individual.
Sperber and Wilson argue that the communicator's informative 
intention is better described as an intention to modify the 
cognitive environment of the addressee, rather than as an intention 
directly to modify the thoughts of the addressee. They add that the 
actual cognitive effects of a modification of the cognitive 
environment are only partly predictable.
A communicator may form a certain design on his audience. 
However, to what extent he has control over his addressee is 
questionable, and is certainly a matter of degree. He may not have 
much control over her actual thoughts, but he may have more control 
over her cognitive environment. It is plausible that he should aim 
more at altering her cognitive environment than her actual thoughts.
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There are questions related to this, which have been posed 
above: what is communicated?; what is communication? Communication, 
according to Sperber and Wilson, is a modification of the audience's 
cognitive environment. It is not meant to create a thought or a 
belief in the audience. Nor is it meant to transfer a certain piece 
of information to the audience's mind. The communicator
communicates something by making a set of assumptions accessible to 
the audience, and providing evidence for them, i.e. making them 
manifest, or more manifest. What is communicated is a set of 
assumptions, rather than a specific piece of information. The 
communicator intends to alter the audience's cognitive environment 
by adding a set of assumptions to that environment or making them 
more accessible.
Sperber and Wilson also suggest that communication is a matter 
of degree. On the one hand, when the communicator intends to make a 
particular assumption strongly manifest to the audience, then that 
assumption is strongly communicated. On the other hand, when the 
communicator's intention is marginally to increase the manifestness 
of a wider range of assumptions, then these assumptions are weakly 
communicated. There is no cut-off point between strongly
communicated assumptions and weakly communicated assumptions, nor 
between what is communicated and what is not communicated. Rather, 
there is a range of assumptions, some of them strongly communicated 
and some of them weakly so.
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Suppose that I ran into a friend, who asked me what I was going 
to do on the weekend, and I pointed to the books which I was 
carrying. By doing so, I would intend to modify her cognitive 
environment and to draw her attention to the books I was carrying. 
The fact that I was carrying books would be made more manifest to 
her, although she might have noticed them already. Among the things 
I would be making manifest to her is the fact that I was behaving in 
this particular way. Let us suppose that my friend concluded that 
my behaviour was deliberate, that I was not just trying to balance 
what I was carrying, and that I was making this gesture in order to 
attract her attention to the books. Then my behaviour can be said 
to have made manifest to her the fact that I intended to make some 
particular assumptions manifest to her. It is behaviour which makes 
manifest an intention to make something manifest, and it is called 
by Sperber and Vilson 'ostensive behaviour', or 'ostention' 
(1986a:49).
2.1.2.2. Ostensive-inferential communication
Sperber and Vilson argue that a certain type of human 
intentional communication is a case of ostention. It is this 
ostensive communication that they are interested in and that they 
propose an account for.
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Ostention reveals two layers of information: first, there is
the information which has been pointed out; secondly, there is the 
information that the first layer of information has been pointed out 
intentionally. In the case above, my friend might or might not have 
noticed that I was carrying books. My ostensive behaviour would be 
drawing her attention to them in an obviously intentional way, 
making her conclude that there was some relevant information to be 
obtained from the fact that I was drawing her attention to the books 
which I was carrying.
Sperber and Vilson argue that all human beings automatically 
aim at the most efficient information processing possible, and that 
this efficiency can be assessed by the standard of 'relevance'. The 
notion of what is relevant will be explicated later. Here, it 
suffices to note that when the processing of new information gives 
rise to a multiplication effect, it is called 'relevant' (1986a:48). 
A multiplication effect is defined as the process whereby when new 
information is added to old information, they yield new information.
Ostensive behaviour provides evidence of one's thoughts. It 
succeeds in doing so because it implies a guarantee of relevance. 
Vhen I ostensively pointed out my books to my friend, my behaviour 
gave her a guarantee of relevance, that there was something worth 
her attention, and this made manifest the intention behind my 
behaviour.
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Sperber and Vilson argue that the term 'communication' can 
legitimately be applied to all cases of ostention. They also argue
that communication is inferential. Thus, they treat ostensive
communication, inferential communication, and ostensive-inferential 
communication as being all the same thing. Ostensive-inferential
communication consists in making manifest to an audience one's
intention to make manifest a basic layer of information, and 
therefore it can be described in terms of an informative and a 
communicative intention.
Here is a reformulation of the notions of informative and 
communicative intentions, taking into account the concepts of 
raanifestness:
Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest 
to the audience a set of assumptions.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:58)
Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to 
audience and communicator that the communicator has this 
informative intention.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:61)
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It is worth noting that communicative intention is defined in 
terms of mutual manifestness. The notion of mutual manifestness 
needs explanation. A cognitive environment shared by two or more 
people, to whom it is manifest that they share it, is called by 
Sperber and Vilson a mutual cognitive environment. In a mutual 
cognitive environment, for every manifest assumption, the fact that 
it is manifest to the people who share the environment is also 
manifest. Every manifest assumption in a mutual cognitive
environment is called mutually manifest. Mutual manifestness is 
weaker than mutual knowledge. It does not suffer from the 
psychological objections to mutual knowledge discussed by Clark and 
Marshall (1981) and Sperber and Vilson (1986a). And yet, the notion 
provides a sense of overtness to Sperber and Vilson*s notion of 
ostensive communication. For, when the speaker makes an assumption 
mutually manifest to his hearer and to himself, he is making 
manifest to her not only the assumption itself, but also the fact 
that it is manifest to him as well.
To Sperber and Vilson, communication must to some extent be 
overt. However, one might ask: what difference, if any, does it
make whether the communicative intention is mutually manifest to the 
communicator and audience or not? Can this be a criterion for 
distinguishing one variety of communication from other forms of 
information transmission? This is an issue to which I shall return 
in Chapter 4.
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Sperber and Vilson argue that mere informing alters the 
cognitive environment of the audience, but ostensive communication 
alters the mutual cognitive environment of the audience and the 
communicator. Their claim is that, although mutual manifestness may 
not have significant cognitive importance, it is of crucial social 
importance. For, a change in the mutual cognitive 'Environment of 
the communicator and the audience is a change in their possibilities 
of interaction. (1986a:61-2) Let us look at the following examples:
(8) Could you give me a hand with my luggage?
Suppose that Paul said (8) to Kay as he was carrying luggage.
Kay would recover that by saying (8), Paul was asking her to help
him with his luggage. She might decide to help him, and by doing
so, comply with his request. Or, she might tell him that she was in 
a hurry, and by doing so, she might refuse to comply with his 
request. Either way, by ostensively communicating (8), Paul will be 
faced with Kay's response, which has social consequences: in the
former case, he would feel an obligation to her for complying with 
his request; in the latter case, he would be disappointed by her 
refusal. On the other hand, if Paul did not say (8) and did not 
ostensively communicate his request, but communicated to Kay that he 
was in need of help, for example by showing his struggle with the 
luggage, it would be a different situation. Even if Kay voluntarily 
offered to help him, Paul would not be under the same kind of
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obligation to her as when she responded to his request. Or, if she 
ignored him, it would spare Paul the loss of face involved in her 
open refusal to comply with his request. Either way, Paul would be 
free of the social consequences which would be caused by his 
ostensively communicating his request to her.
Thus, ostensive communication, that is communication by making 
the speaker's informative intention mutually manifest to the hearer 
and himself, involves some social consequences. By making his 
informative intention mutually manifest, the speaker is 
simultaneously making it mutually manifest that the fulfilment of 
his informative intention is in the hands of the hearer. Whether or 
not Kay offered to help Paul, her reaction would cause some 
alteration in their relationship. Ostensive communication can cause 
social consequences, which mere information transmission does not.
This social aspect of ostensive communication is significant in 
the study of advertising. The distinction between informative and 
communicative intentions plays an important role in characterising 
the covert form of informative transmission and attitudes 
characteristic of much advertising, which will be the subject of 
Chapter 4.
Finally, Sperber and Vilson define ostensive-inferential 
communication as follows:
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Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator 
produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to 
communicator and audience that the communicator intends, 
by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions <I).
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:63)
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2.2 Indirect communication
I have so far addressed the problem of communication by 
considering instances of information directly communicated. 
However, a major problem in pragmatics is the phenomenon of indirect 
communication, which Grice calls conversational implicatures.
In Section 2.2.1., I shall first examine Grice's approach to 
indirect communication. In Section 2.2.2., I shall consider 
accounts proposed by other pragmatists. Section 2.2.3 will consider 
an alternative approach by Sperber and Vilson.
2.2.1. Grice's approach
In his 'Logic and conversation' (1975), Grice gives an example 
of two people, A and B, having a conversation about a mutual friend
C. A asks B how C is getting on in his new job, and B replies, 'Oh
quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to
prison yet.' Grice explains, 'I think it is clear that whatever B
implied, suggested, meant, etc., in this example, is distinct from 
what B said...' (1975:43)
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This example is an attempt to draw attention to those aspects 
of meaning which are not semantically determined, that is, so-called 
'conversational implicature' (1975:45), taken to be opposed to 
'conventional implicature', which is semantically determined.
Conversational implicature is worked out from the meaning of 
the sentence uttered, together with the context, on the basis of the 
assumption that communication is governed by the principle of 
cooperation. More specifically, the assumption is that the speaker 
has observed certain general principles of communication. For 
Grice, the crucial distinction between conventional implicature and 
conversational implicature is that the latter is calculable:
The presence of a conversational implicature must 
be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in 
fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is 
replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if 
present at all) will not count as a conversational 
implicature; it will be a conventional implicature.
(Grice 1975:50)
Grice then proposes a formulation of how this calculation might 
go, as follows:
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(9) a. He has said that p.
b. There is no reason to suppose that he is not 
observing the maxims.
c. He could not be doing this unless he thought that
q-
d. He knows (and knows that I know that he knows) 
that I can see that the supposition that he thinks 
that q is required.
e. He had done nothing to stop me thinking that q.
f. He intends me to think, or is at least willing to 
allow me to think, that q.
g. And so, he has implicated that q.
(Grice 1975:50)
Sperber and Vilson argue that this is not a logical argument; 
it is not even clear which of (9a) to (9g) are meant to be premises 
and which conclusions. In (9c), the content of the implicature is 
introduced for the first time, but this is by no means deducible 
from (9a) and (9b). (9c) has to be either an independent premise
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itself, or derivable from (9a) and (9b) with some supplementary 
premises, which remain to be specified. Thus, (9) does not offer an 
adequate account of the working out of conversational implicatures.
This is also the case in the following example:
(10) She: Would you go and get some flowers?
He: I'm just going to Covent Garden.
How can the conversational implicatures of his utterance be 
recovered? This is the kind of question a pragmatist aims to 
answer. As it has been argued, they are not recoverable from his 
utterance and Grice's general communication principles alone.
If it was used in a context containing assumption (11), then 
his utterance would be treated as conveying proposition (12):
(11) They sell flowers in Covent Garden.
(12) He will be able to get some flowers.
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On the other hand, if it was used in a context containing assumption 
(13), then his utterance would be interpreted as communication (14):
(13) They do not sell flowers in Covent Garden.
(14) He will not get any flowers.
Grice presents a list of sources of data upon which the hearer 
will rely to work out conversational implicatures as follows:
(15) (i) the conventional meaning of the word used,
together with the identity of any 
references that may be involved;
(ii) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims;
(iii) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of 
the utterance;
(iv) other items of background knowledge;
(v) the fact (or supposed fact) that all 
relevant items falling under the previous 
headings are available to both
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participants and both participants know or 
assume this to be the case.
(Grice 1975:50)
(11) and (13) are alternative contextual assumptions, which, 
together with other assumptions, permit the deduction of conclusions
(12) and (14), respectively.
However, there is nothing in Grice's account to determine where 
the required premises come from, or exactly how they interact to 
determine the full import of indirect reply (12). In the next 
section, we shall examine what other pragmatists have to offer as to 
these questions.
2.2.2. Other pragmatists' approaches
Many pragmatists have no clear theory of non-demonstrative 
reasoning, except a shared conviction that non-demonstrative 
reasoning cannot even contain a deduction as one of its sub-parts. 
As Sperber and Wilson point out, other pragmatists do not offer a 
positive alternative. Take Bach and Harnish, for example:
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Our empirical thinking in general is rife with 
generalizations and inference principles that we are 
not conscious of when we use them, if we are 
conscious of them at all. It would take us well 
beyond present-day cognitive psychology to speculate 
on the details of any of this. Whatever these 
processes are, whatever activates them whatever 
principles or strategies are involved, they work, and 
work well.
(Bach and Harnish 1979:93)
Bach and Harnish argue that the form of inference by which 
implicatures are recovered 'is not deductive but what might be 
called an inference to a plausible explanation' (1979:92-3).
Brown and Yule take a similar line:
It may be the case that we are capable of deriving a 
specific conclusion ... from specific premises . . . 
via deductive inference, but we are rarely asked to 
do so in the everyday discourse we encounter .... We 
are more likely to operate with a rather loose form 
of inferencing...
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(Brown and Yule 1983:33-4)
Brown and Yule present the following as a counter-example to 
deductive reasoning in comprehension:
(16) ... in the kitchen there was a huge dresser and 
when anyone went in . . . the hats and coats were 
all dumped on this dresser
(Brown and Yule 1983:34)
They argue that deductive reasoning could not lead the audience 
to infer that the hats and coats mentioned in (16) belong to 
visitors of the house in which there is a dresser in the kitchen. 
They are right that implicated premises are not deduced - only 
implicated conclusions are deduced, as Sperber and Vilson make 
clear. Implicated premises are retrieved or derived from memory, 
and confirmed via consideration of relevance.
Leech claims that all implicatures are 'probabilistic* 
(1983:30) and the process by which they are recovered is 'not a 
formalised deductive logic, but an informal rational problem-solving 
strategy' (1983:31).
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Levinson argues that implicatures are 'quite unlike logical 
inferences, and cannot directly be modelled in terms of some 
semantic relation like entailment' (1983:116). He uses the 
following example, in which there is an assumption that in order to 
get the lavish subsidy under some scheme one must have three cows. 
The inspector asks John's neighbour the following question:
(17) a. I: Has John really got the requisite number of
cows?
b. N: Oh sure, he's got three cows all right.
(Levinson 1983:116)
Levinson points out that the neighbour's reply does not commit 
him to the implicature ordinarily associated with (18a), namely, 
(18b), by Grice's maxim of quantity:
(18) a. John has three cows.
b. John has only three cows and no more.
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The survey of studies on inference system by other pragmatists 
has been presented by Blakemore (1987). She points out that in the 
background to Levinson's rejection of deduction there is an 
underlying distinction betwen context-dependent inferences and 
context-independent inferences. She further argues that inferences 
which hinge on the meanings of the words are deductive, while 
inferences which depend on contextual information used as premises 
are inductive, but 'inductive' inference of this type can be reduced 
to deductive inference, as Sperber and Vilson show.
Sperber and Vilson disagree with Levinson as to where the 
premises which are used in the recovery of implicatures come from, 
and argue that this pragmatist follows directly Grice's 
characterisation of implicature, with all its associated vagueness 
and defects.
Let us look at example (10) to (14) again. Neither (13) nor
(14) are deducible from the content of (10) alone. Moreover, if 
they were deducible from (10b) they would not be implicatures in 
Grice's sense, for, according to him, 'the truth of a conversational 
implicature is not required by the truth of what is said' (1975:58). 
If this is a defining feature of implicature, no implicature will be 
deducible from the explicit content of an utterance alone. However, 
to say that (12) and (14) are not directly deducible from (10b) is 
not to say that deductive reasoning does not play a significant role 
in their derivation.
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2.2.3. Sperber and Wilson's approach
How, then, can the process of recovering implicatures be 
accounted for? Sperber and Vilson argue that the principle 
underlying the recovery of implicature is identical to the principle 
of recovering the speaker's intention.
The process of inferential comprehension is a combination of 
hypothesis formation and logical deduction. In principle, it is not 
fully determinable. Even under the best of circumstances,
communication may fail. The speaker's informative intention may 
neither be decoded nor deduced. All the hearer can do is to 
formulate a hypothesis based on the speaker's ostensive stimuli. 
Her hypothesis may later be confirmed through the following 
exchange. However, there does not exist such a thing as a proof of 
the speaker's informative intention.
Contrary to all other pragmatists, Sperber and Vilson argue 
that such deduction processes, as shown by examples (10) to (14), 
play a central role in the recovery of implicatures. Indeed, this 
follows directly from their theory of cognition, which is an 
expansion of Fodor's theory of the mind (1983). Their claim is that 
in processing information, people aim to bring about the greatest 
improvement of their overall representation of the world for the 
least cost in processing.
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A non-demonstrative inference process has free access to 
conceptual memory. They argue that it is a 'central thought 
process' (1986a:66), which involves forming a hypothesis on the 
basis of the input delivered from various perceptual and linguistic 
systems and confirming it against background assumptions stored in 
memory.
This distinction between 'central' processes and 'input', 
'perceptual' or 'peripheral' processes is attributed to Fodor <1983 
and 1985). Fodor argues that the central systems are beyond our 
investigation for two reasons: (a) The function of the central
system is the fixation of beliefs, about which little is known; <b) 
The range of facts or beliefs which are involved in the fixation of 
further beliefs is unlimited. He compares the psychology of central 
processes with the philosophy of confirming scientific hypotheses.
Sperber and Wilson reject this comparison. They see the 
central thought process of utterance interpretation as more typical 
of central cognitive processes than is the forming and confirming of 
scientific hypotheses, which operates on a different time-scale. 
The latter requires an enormous amount of time and effort, while 
ordinary utterance comprehension is instantaneous. Very little time 
and effort is spent on interpreting an utterance, for example (10b).
Sperber and Vilson also argue that, although the central 
processes are not fully determinable in principle, as argued by 
Fodor, at least some of them are highly constrained in practice.
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Their claim is that the goal of cognitive activities is the 
maximisation of relevance, that is, to get the greatest contextual 
effects with the least processing effort, and that this counts as a 
single criterion in the process of utterance interpretation.
Thus, Sperber and Vilson argue that conversational implicatures 
can be characterised as a partly deductive process. I shall examine 
their analysis systematically. In Section 2.2.3.1, I shall look at 
the deductive inference system. Section 2.2.3.2 will consider the 
notion of relevance. The determination of context will be the 
subject of Section 2.2.3.3. In Section 2.2.3.4., I shall discuss 
the notions of descriptive use and interpretive use.
2.2.3.1. The deductive inference system
A deductive inference is a formal operation which takes 
propositions as premises and yields propositions as conclusions. 
Given a set of deductive rules, and given a set of premises, the 
deductive conclusions do not vary. A set of conclusions are 
automatically generated. They need not therefore be stored 
separately. Thus, a deductive system would provide a significant 
economy of storage.
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According to Sperber and Vilson, propositional representations 
are stored as factual descriptions of the world, which are called 
•factual assumptions' (1986a:74). They are entertained with greater 
or lesser confidence, depending on the form of their acquisition. 
They argue that a conclusion derived via deduction inherits its 
strength from the strength of the premises used in the derivation 
processes.
A deductive system would provide not only a tool for the 
working out of new assumptions and their addition to an existing
system, but also a device to monitor the accuracy of any conclusions
derived by the system. Since the strength of these conclusions
depends on the strength of the premises used in their derivation, 
inference rules can be used to assess the accuracy of the
assumptions entertained by testing them against one another.
Sperber and Wilson's hypothesis is that the human deductive 
device yields only non-trivial conclusions, which they define as 
follows:
Non-trivial logical implication
A set of assumptions (P) logically and non-trivially 
implies an assumption Q if and only if, when (P) is 
the set of initial theses in a derivation involving 
only elimination rules, Q belongs to the set of 
final theses.
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(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:97)
Sperber and Vilson call those rules which take only one 
proposition as input 'analytic rules', and the implications which 
are derived entirely by such rules 'analytic implications'. Rules 
which take two separate propositions as input are called 'synthetic 
rules', and any implication which is not analytic is a 'synthetic 
implication' (1986a:104).
The distinction between analytic implications and synthetic 
ones is crucial. The analytic implications of a given assumption 
are intrinsic to it, and they are recoverable as long as the 
assumption itself is recoverable, simply by reprocessing it through 
the deductive device. On the other hand, synthetic implications are 
not intrinsic to any single member of the set of the assumptions 
from which they are derived. If humans are interested in improving 
their overall representation of the world, they must therefore be 
interested in recovering as many synthetic implications as possible 
from any set of assumptions they are currently processing, before 
putting them away into separate storage. Analytic implications, by 
contrast, are only worth recovering as a way to recovering further 
synthetic implications.
Assumptions which are taken into the memory of the deductive 
device may come from the following four sources: (a) perception; (b)
linguistic decoding; (c) encyclopaedic memory; and (d) the result of
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a deductive process. Here, we are concerned with the effect of 
newly presented information, in particular of assumptions derived 
via the linguistic input system, on old information which is drawn 
from an existing representation of the world. In other words, we 
are concerned with the effect of deductions, in which the set of 
initial theses placed in the memory of the deductive device can be 
partitioned into two subsets, new information and old information. 
Sperber and Vilson call this effect 'contextual implication', which 
is defined as follows:
Contextual implication
A set of assumptions (P> contextually implies an 
assumption Q in the context <C> if and only if;
(i) the union of P and <C> non-trivially implies Q,
(ii) (P> does not non-trivially imply Q, and
(iii) (C) does not non-trivially imply Q.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:107-8)
A contextual implication is new information: it cannot be derived
from <P> or <C) alone. It is derivable only from the union of old 
and new information.
A central function of the deductive device is thus to derive 
instantaneously and automatically, and therefore unconsciously, the
contextual implications of newly presented information in a context 
of old information.
2.2.3.2. Relevance
To modify and improve a context is to have some effect on that 
context. Sperber and Vilson call such an effect a 'contextual
effect' (1986a:108). An utterance can have contextual effects in a 
context in one of three ways. The first one is new information,
together with old assumptions, yielding information which is not 
derivable from the new information or the old assumptions alone. 
The second one is new information strengthening old assumptions. 
And the last one is new information contradicting, and therefore 
weakening or leading to the abandonment of old assumptions. 
Assumptions placed in the memory of the deductive device come with 
varying degrees of strength, and hence a deduction may result in 
contradicting weak assumptions, which are then abandoned.
It can be recalled that our basic assumption has been that all 
humans automatically aim at the most efficient information 
processing possible, and that there is a single criterion for 
efficiency, which is 'relevance'. 'Relevance' here does not mean 
exactly the same thing as the English word 'relevance'. It is a 
universal concept, and natural languages need not lexicalise it.
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However, Sperber and Vilson argue that scientific psychology needs a 
concept which is close enough to the ordinary language notion of 
’relevance'. They also argue (1986a:119) that there is an important 
psychological property which the ordinary notion of 'relevance' 
roughly approximates, and hence it is appropriate to use the term in 
a related, more technical sense.
The notion of contextual effect helps to describe two essential 
properties of utterance comprehension: first, comprehension involves 
the joint processing of a set of assumptions; and second, in that 
set some assumptions stand out as newly presented information which 
are being processed in the context of old information.
Sperber and Vilson define 'relevance' as follows:
Relevance
An assumption is relevant in a context if and only if 
it has some contextual effect in that context.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:122)
This definition satisfies the intuition that the notion of 
relevance must involve the context in which an assumption is 
relevant.
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It is worth emphasising that Sperber and Vilson define 
relevance purely in terms of the contextual effect. There is an 
intuitive question as to whether humans process a stimulus, striving 
for only more contextual effects. The reward humans aim at when 
they spend time and energy in processing a stimulus might include 
other kinds of advantages which are not analysable in terms of 
contextual effects. This is the question I shall come back to in my 
discussion of puns and covert forms of information transmission in 
Chapter 3 and 4 respectively.
The definition of relevance is insufficient without mentioning 
that relevance is a matter of degree. Intuitively, it is clear that 
the greater the contextual effects of a newly presented item of 
information, the more relevant it is. But this is not yet 
satisfactory. For, it might mean that, to this end, humans would 
continue to process a newly conceived phenomenon, combining it with 
an endless stock of information, in an attempt to see if it improves 
their representation of the world. This is where the concern over 
processing effort is so important. Sperber and Vilson define 
relevance in terms of contextual effect in combination with 
processing effort:
Relevance of a phenomenon
Extent condition 1: a phenomenon is relevant to an 
individual to the extent that the contextual effects 
achieved when it is optimally processed are large.
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Extent condition 2: a phenomenon is relevant to an 
individual to the extent that the effort required to 
process it optimally is small.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:153)
Thus, other things being equal, the greater contextual effects the 
greater the relevance, and the smaller processing effort the greater 
the relevance. Let us consider a context which contains assumption
(19):
(19) If Tom is going to the party, I will go, too.
Suppose that in this context, (20) was posed:
(20) Is Tom going to the party?
Now, let us assess the effects (21a) - (21c) would bring:
(21) a. Tom is going to the party.
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b. John is going to the party.
c. Tom is going to the party, and John is going to 
the party too.
(21a) and <21b> have the same syntactic structure, and 
intuitively they would require approximately the same processing 
effort. However, in the context, (21b) would not have contextual 
effects which (21a) would carry, in other words, (21b) would not 
bear the relevance (21a) would have. Thus, in the context, (21a) 
would be more relevant than (21c). On the other hand, (21c) would 
yield the same relevance which (21a) has, but it clearly requires 
more processing effort than (21a). Hence, (21a) would be more 
relevant than (21c).
Earlier, we defined communication in terms of the 
communicator's ostensive behaviour. In order to succeed in 
communication, the communicator must attract the audience's 
attention. An act of ostension can be described as a request for
attention. Now, someone who asks you to behave in a certain way,
either physically or cognitively, suggests that there is a good 
reason to assume that you might benefit from complying with his 
request. This suggestion may be made in bad faith, but it cannot be 
wholly cancelled. If a request is made, the requester must have 
assumed that the requestee would have some motive for complying with 
it.
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There is a significant difference between being exposed to an 
ostensive stimulus directed at oneself and being exposed to another 
kind of stimulus. For example, there is considerable difference 
between someone shouting at you, 'Vatch out!' and you overhearing 
someone reading out a passage including such an utterance. With an 
ostensive stimulus, the addressee can not only hope that the 
stimulus may bear some relevant information for herself, but also 
has a precise expectation that the stimulus is intended to be 
relevant to her.
Thus, Sperber and Vilson argue that in ostensive-inferential 
communication, the communicator necessarily communicates that the 
stimulus he uses is relevant to the audience. In other words, an 
act of ostensive communication automatically communicates what they 
call a 'presumption of relevance' (1986a: 158). By this they mean 
that what is communicated, to the best of the communicator's 
knowledge, is that the ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be 
worth the addressee's attention.
As we have seen, the relevance of a stimulus is determined by 
two factors, namely, contextual effects and processing effort. 
Sperber and Vilson argue that, on the effect side, the presumption 
is that the level of effects achievable is never less than what is 
needed to make the stimulus worth processing. On the effort side, 
the level of effort required is never more than what is needed to 
achieve these effects. On the effect side, what is communicated 
must be relevant enough to make the stimulus worth processing, hence
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the presumption is a matter of adequacy. It is worth emphasising 
here that the presumption of relevance is not a presumption of 
maximal relevance. On the processing effort side, unless the 
communicator chooses the most relevant stimulus to make his 
informative intention mutually manifest, he may be confronted by the 
addressee's refusal to make the required processing effort. It 
would be in the interest of both the communicator and the addressee 
that the stimulus chosen requires the least processing effort to 
achieve the intended effects. Thus, on the processing effort side, 
the presumption is one of more than adequacy.
This heavy emphasis on minimising processing cost will face an 
apparent counter-example in punning. I shall discuss this point in 
the analysis of puns in Chapter 3.
The level of relevance that will be presumed to exist takes 
into account the interest of both the communicator and the 
addressee. Such a level is called a level of 'optimal relevance' 
(1986a:158). Accordingly, the 'presumption of optimal relevance' is 
defined as follows:
Presumption of optimal relevance
(a) The set of assumptions <11 which the communicator 
, intends to make manifest to the addressee is 
relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's 
while to process the ostensive stimulus.
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<b> The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one 
the communicator could have used to communicate 
< I >  .
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:158)
And the principle of relevance as follows:
Principle of relevance
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the 
presumption of its own optimal relevance.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:158)
Now, the fact that an ostensive stimulus carries a guarantee of 
optimal relevance does not necessarily mean that it is optimally 
relevant to the hearer. The speaker may be mistaken or he may be in 
bad faith. For example, I may say to you that they are showing 
Richard II at the nearby theatre and find out that Richard II is 
over and that they are now showing Richard III. In this case, the 
information is irrelevant to you. Then, my utterance does not 
comply with the presumption of optimal relevance. However, it will 
be consistent with the principle of relevance, so long as I 
rationally thought it would be optimally relevant to you.
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Thus, saying that an ostensive communication bears the 
presumption of relevance only means that the intended interpretation 
of an utterance is consistent with the principle of relevance, if a 
rational speaker might have expected to communicate an adequate 
range of contextual effects at the least possible processing effort. 
It is this consistency with the principle of relevance which acts as 
the sole criterion in utterance comprehension.
Sperber and Wilson's claim is that the principle of relevance 
provides an adequate explanation of the role of contextual 
assumptions in all aspects of utterance interpretation. In their 
view, the responsibility for successful communication is not shared 
equally by the communicator and the addressee. It is left to the 
communicator to make correct assumptions about the codes and 
contextual information that the addressee will have accessible and 
will be likely to use in the comprehension process. The 
responsibility for avoiding misunderstanding also lies with the 
communicator. All that the addressee has to do is to recover the 
interpretation which is consistent with the principle of relevance.
2.2.3.3. How context is determined
As shown above, relevance has been defined in terms of the 
contextual effect which an assumption yields in a given context. The
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question to be asked, then, is how the context is determined. It is 
a question which must be answered in any adequate account of 
utterance comprehension.
In much of the literature, it is a common assumption that the 
context for the comprehension of a given utterance is provided, and 
is not a matter of choice. It is also assumed that the context is 
not only determined at any given point of a verbal exchange, but 
also that it is determined in advance of the comprehension process. 
The assumption is that what the hearer does is to combine the new, 
that is, what is explicitly expressed, and the old, that is, the 
context which is already present in her mind at the start of the 
communication. The view that context is fixed in advance is
independent of the mutual knowledge framework. It is just a view 
that many semanticists and pragmatists happen to hold. Sperber and 
Vilson argue that the selection of an adequate context is part of 
the interpretation process, and must therefore be accounted for by a 
pragmatic theory.
In cognition, the individual aims to maximise relevance. 
Consideration of optimal relevance only comes in at the level of 
communication, when the hearer is trying to find out what
information is being offered. Here, the criterion is consistency
with the principle of optimal relevance.
The hearer of an utterance has available a set of potential 
contexts from which an actual context must be chosen. A context
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consists of assumptions from different sources, such as long-term 
memory, short-term memory, perception, and so on. It does not mean 
that any arbitrary subset of the total set of assumptions available 
might become a context. Sperber and Vilson claim (1986a:138) that 
the organisation of the individual's encyclopaedic memory, and the 
mental activity in which she is engaged, limit the class of 
potential contexts from which an actual context can be chosen at any 
given time.
For example, it is generally accepted that encyclopaedic 
information in long-term memory is organised into some kind of 
units. They have been discussed in the literature under such terms 
as 'schema', 'frame', 'scenario' and 'prototype'. Here, I shall 
follow Sperber and Vilson and use the term 'chunk'. Chunks may 
themselves be grouped into larger chunks, and contain smaller 
chunks. It seems plausible to argue that the smallest units that 
can be transferred from encyclopaedic memory to the memory of the 
deductive device are chunks rather than individual assumptions. For 
instance, it might be impossible to remember and add to the context 
the information that an elephant has large ears without also 
remembering and adding that it has a trunk. Also, it seems that not 
all encyclopaedic information is equally accessible at any given 
time. For instance, it seems plausible to assume that the 
encyclopaedic entry which has just been accessed in the most recent 
utterance comprehension is more accessible than any other.
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Let us assume that there is a small, Immediately accessible 
context, fixed in advance, and consisting of the proposition which 
has most recently been processed, together with its contextual
implications, and any assumptions used in deriving it. When new
information is received, it will be processed in this most immediate 
context.
Now let us consider some examples. If the initial context is
(22) and the proposition expressed by the utterance is (23), some
degree of relevance is immediately achieved:
(22) If the opera is by Mozart, Peter will go.
(23) The opera is by Mozart.
What would happen, then, if the proposition expressed is (24a), 
(24b) or (24c), instead?
(24) a. The opera is by the composer you have just
mentioned.
b. The opera is 'The Magic Flute'.
c. The opera is this (meaning the music which is
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being played at the time of the utterance).
Unless the initial context is extended in some way, no degree of 
relevance can be achieved in the cases of (24a) to (24c).
If the goal of processing is to find an interpretation 
consistent with the principle of relevance, i.e. which a rational 
speaker might have thought would be optimally relevant to the 
hearer, the hearer will be forced to add to the initial context (22) 
further information, which will be remembered from earlier 
discourse, as in the case of (24a), or recovered from encyclopaedic 
memory, as in the case of (24b), or derived from perception, as in 
the case of (24c). The goal will be to find premises which will 
combine with the old assumptions and yield adequate contextual 
implications in return for the minimum processing effort.
As these examples have shown, the accessibility of potential 
contexts is partly determined by the content of the proposition 
being processed. The content may direct the hearer's attention to 
the preceding discourse, or it may direct it to encyclopaedic 
information, or to the physical environment, as we have seen in 
examples (24a), (24b) and (24c), respectively. There will be cases
where more complex extension is required and simultaneous or 
sequential extensions of the context in a variety of different 
directions will take place. There is no principled limit on the 
number of extensions that may be needed to establish the relevance
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of a given proposition. It is only the hearer's capacity for 
extending the context which will practically limit the number and 
complexity of extensions involved for communication to be 
successful.
General procedures of context selection are cognitive, and 
geared to maximising relevance. Questions about the intended 
context are answered by reference to the criterion of consistency 
with the principle of relevance.
It is a basic assumption in most of the literature that the 
comprehension process is as follows: firstly, the context is
determined; secondly, the interpretation process takes place; 
lastly, relevance is assessed. Relevance is regarded as a by­
product of the comprehension process.
However, Sperber and Vilson argue that from a psychological 
point of view, this is highly implausible. From a purely logical 
point of view, any of the hearer's assumptions could be used in the 
interpretation of the utterance. However, the constraints on 
utterance interpretations are not only logical, but also
psychological. Humans are not in the business of simply assessing 
the relevance of new information. Their interest is to process 
information as efficiently as possible, that is, they try to obtain 
from each new item of information as great a contextual effect as 
possible for the smallest possible processing effort. The 
assessment of relevance is not the goal of the comprehension
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process, but only a means to an end, the end being to optimise the 
relevance of any information which is being processed.
Thus, Sperber and Wilson's account of the determination of 
context is contrary to the pre-existing view in the literature: it
is not that the context is determined, and then relevance is 
assessed; rather, humans expect that the assumption which is being 
processed is relevant, and they try to select a context in which 
their expectation is justified. In ostensive-inferential
communication, relevance is guaranteed. It is relevance which is 
treated as given, and context which is treated as a variable.
Let us consider the following example and see how the speaker,
with specific expectation about how his utterance will be relevant, 
directs his hearer towards an appropriate context:
(25) a. Kay: Would you like to go to Tosca?
b. Paul: I'm not keen on Puccini.
Here, Paul has not answered Kay's question directly, he has
only implied an answer. Kay has to recover the implicatures, or
some oi them, of the utterance. She must supply certain premises, 
either by retrieving them from her memory or by constructing them by 
developing assumption schemas retrieved from memory. Consistency
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with the principle of relevance will provide an adequate criterion. 
All she has to do is to supply premises which a rational speaker 
might have thought would lead to an interpretation which yields 
optimal relevance. One of the premises which Kay should be able to 
supply is:
(26) Tosca was composed by Puccini.
By processing Paul's reply (25b) against a context which contains 
assumption (26), Kay should derive the contextual implication (27):
(27) Paul would not like to go to Tosca.
Moreover, it is hard to see how Paul could have expected his reply 
to be optimally relevant without being processed in this way.
Sperber and Wilson distinguish (1986a:194-5) two kinds of 
implicatures: implicated premises, such as (26), and implicated
conclusions, such as (27), and claim that all implicatures fall into 
one of these two categories.
They also argue that the kind of implicatures discussed above 
share two properties. Firstly, they are fully determinate. Paul
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expects Kay to supply not merely something like premise (26) and 
conclusion (27), but a premise and a conclusion with just this
logical content. Secondly, Paul is entirely responsible for their
truth. Even if Kay did not know that Tosca was composed by Puccini 
prior to Paul's reply (25b), Paul has strongly encouraged Kay to 
supply assumption (26) by uttering (25b). He is just as responsible 
for the truth of (26) and (27) as if he had asserted them directly.
As Sperber and Wilson argue, this example shows that mutual 
knowledge is not a prerequisite for successful communication. Paul 
does not need to know if Kay has the information in (26), he would
not even have to wonder whether it is shared by Kay. Kay would come
to have this knowledge as a result of interpreting the utterance, if 
not before. By following the criterion of consistency with the 
principle of relevance, she will have to supply premise (26) and 
then to deduce conclusion (27). Paul may expect Kay to supply this 
premise, not because he has ground for thinking that it is already 
highly accessible to her, but rather because his utterance has made 
it accessible to her. In other words, by producing the implicit 
answer (25b), he has constrained her choice of context and directed 
her towards a particular interpretation.
2.2.3.4. Descriptive use and interpretive use
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So far, the analysis has been based on the assumjJ:ion that an 
utterance is used to represent things in virtue of its propositional 
form being true of that state of affairs. Let us consider the 
following exchange:
(28) a. Kay: Vhat did Mary say?
b. Paul: She is tired.
How, Mary might have said to Paul (29):
(29) I am tired.
Then, (28b) would used in virtue of its propositional form being 
true of that state of affairs.
Sperber and Wilson argue that there is another way in which an 
utterance can be used, that is, an utterance can be used in virtue 
of resembling some phenomenon, rather than in virtue of its 
proposition being true. For example, Mary might have said (30):
(30) Tsukare-ta.
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tire past 
I am tired.
(30) is a Japanese translation of (29). It would be used because it 
resembles Mary's utterance (29), as it has the same semantic 
structure.
Instead, Mary might have said to Paul (31)
(31) I am absolutely over-worked and could do with a good 
rest.
Then, again, (29) would be used because of its resemblance to 
Mary's utterance. It would be a summary. Even though (29) has a 
different proposition to Mary's actual utterance, they share some 
logical properties and some contextual effects.
Or else, Mary might have said things which did not make much 
sense, which could be attributed to the fact that she was tired. In 
this case, (29) would share with Mary's utterance neither its 
logical and semantic properties, nor its contextual effects. It 
would be used, because it resembled the state Mary was in.
- 104 -
Thus, an utterance can be used to represent things in two ways. 
On the one hand, it can be used to represent some state of affairs, 
in virtue of its proposition being true of that state of affairs. 
On the other hand, it can represent some other representation which 
also has a proposition in virtue of some resemblance between the two 
propositions. Sperber and Wilson name (1986a:228-9) the former 
descriptive use and the latter interpretive use.
Any two phenomena resemble each other at least in some way. 
There is a question of how close the propositional forms of two 
representations must be, in order that an interpretive use be 
acceptable. Sperber and Wilson claim that the criterion is the 
principle of relevance.
This notion of interpretive use of language, that is, 
representation in virtue of resemblance, is crucial to the analysis 
of rhetorical devices, such as metaphor and irony. It also plays an 
important role in the analysis of how language is employed to 
present images of women in advertising, which will be the subject of 
Chapter 5.
2.3. Summary
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In this chapter, I have argued that Sperber and Wilson's 
Relevance Theory provides the most comprehensive account of 
utterance interpretation. The framework is based on the notion of 
ostention, that is, the communicator's intention to communicate and 
to publicise this intention. It centres around the principle of 
relevance, which claims that an ostentive stimulus creates a 
presumption of optimal relevance. The task of the audience in this 
kind of communication is to process the communicator's utterance 
against background information and derive an interpretation which is 
consistent with the principle of relevance. The correct
interpretation is the one that meets this criterion.
In the following chapters, I shall apply Relevance Theory to 
the analysis of advertisements, with a particular focus on wordplay 
such as puns, manipulative aspect of advertising, and images of 
women in advertisements.
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Chapter 3: The Pun in Advertising
3.1. Introduction
Punning is one of the most common forms of speech play, 
although it has long been regarded as having a somewhat low status. 
Lionel Duisit describes puns as the 'least literary' (1978, cited 
from Redfern 1984:4) of figures, while Dryden calls them 'the lowest 
and most grovelling kind of wit' (1926:237, cited Redfern 1984:4). 
Culler quotes Pope's dismissal of the pun, saying 'he that would pun 
would pick a pocket' (1988:4).
However, not everybody is in the business of condemning and 
dismissing the pun. Nor has it disappeared and been forgotten. 
Sherzer argues that today puns are 'most often considered to be 
humorous in intention, inappropriate for serious discourse' 
(1985:215). They are often used as 'the witty comebacks of 
conversation stoppers and the punch line of jokes' (1985:214).
Sherzer goes on to make the important observation that puns are 
'highly appropriate for advertising' (1985:215). He does not 
develop this throw-away remark any further, and he does not explain 
how and why puns might be 'appropriate' for advertising. But it is 
indeed striking how ubiquitous puns are in British advertising, and 
how popular they also are among Japanese advertisers.
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(1) a. We're literally about to open.
b. Literally the finest store in Europe.
c. Book now for Christmas.
d. High brows raised here.
e. Browsers Welcome. (High brows and low brows)
f. Over 5 miles of books.
And they're all way over your head.
g. Materially supplied for seats of learning.
h. If you think this station's deep
You should see our poetry department.
i. Go to Dillon's. And be transported.
It looks as though people of letters in London appreciate the 
pun, for these examples have been selected from the captions used in 
a campaign run by Dillon's Bookstore after it was taken over by a 
large multinational corporation. According to their advertising 
agent (personal communication), Dillon's regard themselves as 
catering to the intellectual population not only of London, but
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There is a suggestion that even people in advertising share the 
literary critics' low opinion of puns, although this is open to 
doubt. Redfern (1984) reports that when he wrote to twenty of the 
largest international advertising agencies to find out the status of 
wordplay in advertising, the most common reaction was to claim that 
it was out of date to pun in advertisements. His explanation for 
this is that the agencies were reflecting the age-old embarrassment 
connected with puns, and upholding claims to the dignity of the 
profession. Redfern quotes Hopkins, who is an ex-ad man:
Frivolity has no place in advertising. Nor has humour. 
Spending money is usually a serious business... People do 
not buy from clowns.
(Hopkins 1927, quoted from Redfern 1984:130).
As Redfern points out, this is contradicted by McDonald's 
advertisements, which make use of a clown, although the situation 
and the trend may have changed since the days of Hopkins.
Let us look at the following examples from an advertising 
campaign for a prestigious bookstore, which would appear to indicate 
that advertisers attribute a high status to puns:
y<? << ,ar
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also of Britain, and possibly of Europe. They thought that the pun 
would appeal to their target audience because of its wit and humour. 
Apparently, the campaign has been very successful, Dillon's are 
happy, and this advertising campaign based on the pun continues for 
the moment.
A quick observation of advertisements, say at a tube station or 
in a magazine, would prove that the Dillon's campaign is not an 
exception. Use of the pun in British advertising is rife. This is 
perhaps not so much the case in Japan, but the pun is still a 
prominent form of wordplay found in Japanese advertisements. Even 
though I do not have more precise information on the statistical 
frequency of the occurence of puns in British and Japanese 
advertising, there can be no doubt that puns are frequently employed 
and are not considered inferior advertising strategy.
The reasons for the discrepancy between the information 
provided to Redfern and the realities of the advertising world need 
not detain me here, for the focus of this study is how puns function 
in advertising. Redfern's research may be out of date (it was 
published in 1984) or what we are observing might be the usual 
difference between principles and practice. It is sufficient for my 
purposes to point out that punning is a much used rhetorical device 
in advertising both in the U.K. and in Japan. Vhat this chapter 
aims at is to investigate how the device can be analysed in terms of 
the interpretation process involved. My assumption is simply that 
puns clearly offer advertisers advantages which they exploit.
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The assumed low status of puns may explain why attempts to 
investigate them within an academic framework have not been 
abundant. This is especially striking if one compares work on puns 
to that done on other rhetorical devices such as metaphor. As there 
has not been any study on puns carried out from the viewpoint of how 
they are understood by the hearer, I shall not present a survey of 
the literature.
Nor do I intend to present any taxonomy of puns. Culler 
argues that of the studies which attempt to define and classify 
puns, 'the results have never met with much success' (1988:4). 
Redfern declines to categorise by quoting Mahood, saying, 'Naming 
the parts does not show us what makes the gun go off (1984:5). On 
the assumption that the assignment of an utterance to this 
particular form of wordplay, namely the pun, or to a particular type 
of pun, is not part of what is communicated and does not play a 
necessary role in comprehension, neither definition nor 
classification of the pun make any significant contribution to the 
purposes of my study.
What makes the pun interesting to my study herejie that it 
appears to be problematic for Relevance Theory. It is plausible to 
argue that a pun requires greater processing effort than an 
utterance which is not a pun. Then, is the extra processing effort 
justifiable?. If it is so, how? If it is not, is punning a counter­
example to Relevance Theory? These are the questions which I shall 
investigate in this chapter.
In Section 3.2, I shall attempt to analyse puns in advertising 
in the framework of Relevance Theory. Section 3.3 will consider 
ambiguity in the pun. Although a pun has more than one possible 
interpretation, it may not necessarily strike its audiance as being 
ambiguous. I shall try to discuss why this is so. The comparison 
between puns and metaphors will be the subject of Section 3.4. Both 
a pun and a metaphor provide more than one possible interpretation. 
So what is the difference between them? This is the question I 
shall attempt to answer. In Section 3.5, I shall try to summarise 
the advantages of using puns in advertising.
3.2. The interpretation of the pun
The process of interpreting a pun appears to be related to the 
advantages it offers advertisers. The work by Redfern, mentioned 
above, includes a chapter on puns in advertising, in which he 
explains the utility of puns in advertising as follows:
Advertising space is costly. Economy is essential, and 
puns are highly economical (two meanings for the price of 
one word or phrase), and are in fact much more of a 
labour-saving device than many of the products they seek 
to promote
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(Redfern 1984:131).
Redfern's claims can be assessed in the light of the 
development of a pragmatic theory of relevance by Sperber and Vi Ison 
(1986a), which has provided an exciting new framework for analysing 
the comprehension of puns. As I have shown above, Sperber and 
Wilson argue that there is a single, necessary and sufficient 
criterion which the hearer uses in interpreting the speaker's 
utterance. This is consistency with the principle of relevance, 
which I repeat here for convenience:
Principle of relevance
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the 
presumption of its own optimal relevance.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:158).
When the communicator ostensively attracts the addressee's 
attention, a presumption is created that the ostensive stimulus is 
worth the addressee's attention. It is in the interest of the 
addressee that the stimulus is the most effective one the 
communicator could have chosen, that is, the most relevant one. 
However, this may not always be in the communicator's interest. 
What is in the communicator's intrest is to make sure that he has
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put the addressee to no unnecessary effort in achieving the intended 
effects. If the addressee is in doubt that this has been done and 
suspects that the communicator has deliberately chosen an obscure 
stimulus and caused her an unnecessary processing effort, she might 
doubt the communicator's genuine intention to communicate and refuse 
to make an effort to process the stimulus produced. Here the 
communicator's interest coincides with that of the addressee. It is 
in his interest to be understood and therefore to make it as easy as 
possible for the adressee to understand him. The stimulus he 
produces must be the most relevant one he could have used to achieve 
the intended effects.
All this does not seem to apply to a pun, for it demands extra 
processing effort. A pun triggers an alternative interpretation by 
its phonetic similarities. The addressee seems to be put to 
unnecessary processing effort into deriving an intended 
interpretation. Contrary to what Redfern says, a pun appears to be 
uneconomical. Or, is the extra processing effort imposed upon by a 
pun compensated for by extra contextual effects? I shall examine 
this point in this section.
Let us look at some examples of puns. The first one is from an 
advertisement for London Transport which appeared in the London tube 
stations and trains in 1981:
(2) Less bread. No jam.
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The criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance 
helps the addressee recover its intended interpretation. Reading 
the words 'bread' and 'jam', she will most probably take the words 
to mean 'bread' and 'jam' as food. Those will be the most 
accessible interpretations for most people. 'Bread and Jam' are 
stereotypical foods; whether separately or together, 'bread' and 
'jam' will be thought of as food. However, those interpretations 
will have to be rejected, as inconsistent with the fact that it is 
an advertisement, that it is for London Transport, and that it is 
found in an underground station or train. Having rejected the
interpretations which will come to her mind first, the addressee 
would hopefully remember that 'bread' can mean 'money' and 'jam' can 
mean 'traffic jam', and recover the proposition, 'less money, no
traffic jam*. Having done this, she will have to resolve some
further indeterminacies, such as what costs less money, costs whom 
less money, costs less money than what, and so on. Following the 
criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance and
considering that it is an advertisement for London Transport, and 
that it is meant to promote London Transport, something like the 
following should be recovered:
(3) If you travel by London Transport it will cost you 
less than travelling by car, and you will suffer no 
traffic jams, unlike when travelling by car.
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Although this may seem ironical when the addressee reads it, being 
jammed in a train, it is unlikely that it was intended by the
advertiser to be so.
Now, it scarcely seems economical to use the pun, contrary to 
Redfern's arguement. In terms of the processing effort it costs the 
addressee to recover proposition (3), it can hardly be said that it 
was economically expressed. The addressee will have to reject the 
first accessible interpretations of 'bread' and 'jam', and search in 
her memory for more relevant interpretations. 'Money', for example, 
may not be a highly accessible interpretation of the word 'bread'. 
In any case, the advertiser could easily have used 'money' and 
'traffic jam', and he must have been aware that these 
interpretations are not the first ones to be recovered by his 
addressee from the words actually employed. He is deliberately
causing her an extra processing effort.
If a pun was uneconomical and caused the addressee unnecessary
processing effort, it would breach the principle of relevance. 
Then, punning would be a counter-example to Relevance Theory. Does 
Relevance Theory fail to account for punning? Does the pun in (2) 
put the addressee to unjustifiable processing effort?
Although a pun may seem to contradict the principle of 
relevance at first sight, it does not require more processing effort 
than necessary, and Relevance Theory can account for it. In fact, 
it is precisely the advertiser's aim to get the addressee involved
136 -
in the advertisement. First of all, an advertisement must attract 
the addressee's attention. The caption will do just that because it 
was deliberately put there, but it seems so irrelevant at first 
sight. It will make her think, ' Vhat does that mean?' It will be 
more successful in attracting the addressee's attention than a 
caption like, 'Take the tube. It is cheaper...', which she may
entirely ignore. The purpose of this caption is not to convey a 
novel idea: there are not many new things to say about the tube.
When the ultimate message is so obvious, namely, 'Take the tube', it 
may well be more appealing for the addressee when it reads initially 
as if it was about 'food', rather than London Transport.
Another point to note is that at first sight, the caption seems 
'negative', which is unusual for an advertisement: from our
experience we are used to advertisements always mentioning good 
things only. This caption is different, for it is saying less or 
none of desirable things, namely, 'bread' and 'Jam'. 'Jam',
especially, has a meaning of something desirable, as in the
expression 'jam tomorrow'. Thus the caption strikes the addressee 
by sounding negative and makes her wonder what it is about.
Following on from this is the fact that since the caption costs 
the audience an extra processing effort, it sustains their attention 
for longer. This means that the caption may be remembered for 
longer. It is not a straightforward message, and it causes some 
thinking. Some of the audience may like it, because they think it 
is 'clever', or because it is 'unusual'. Some may not recover the
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message immediately, and then they may think about it for a while 
until they finally get it, or they may ask someone else what it 
means. Some of the audience may decide that they are not very keen 
on it, for it is so 'obscure'. These different reactions will all
be welcomed by the advertiser. An advertiser would like his
audience to look at his advertisement, think about it, and react to
it. Even if the reaction is negative, advertisers consider that any
reaction is better than no reaction.
From the point of view of the addressee, it may seem at first 
sight that there is no extra reward to outweigh the extra processing 
effort caused by the pun. In recovering the intended message of the 
caption, the addressee will automatically process the 'food' 
interpretation of the words 'bread' and 'jam', for these will 
normally be the most accessible interpretations, which will trigger 
the recovery of some encyclopaedic knowledge about food. However, 
they do not give rise to contextual effects in themselves. These 
interpretations are intended by the advertiser to be recovered by 
the addressee, but they are not the intended interpretations. 
Rather, they are intended to be ultimately rejected in the search 
for the intended interpretations.
However, an extra reward which the addressee will get is the 
pleasure of solving the pun. Solving a pun can give a kind of 
intellectual satisfaction to many people. And the resulting 
pleasure may have been intended by the advertiser, and give rise to 
a number of contextual effects. For example, the audience could
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have self-congratulatory thoughts, thoughts about the congeniality 
of the advertiser, and so on. So the addressee does get some reward 
- but at the price of recovering the advertiser's intended message, 
which she may otherwise have discounted or ignored.
There is also the point that if the pun had not been present, 
the addressee would have paid no attention to the advertisement, and 
hence it would have achieved no effects. So the effort needed to 
process the pun is still the minimum the advertiser was justified in 
demanding, given that he wanted to achieve the effects he did. 
Hence, the effort demanded is consistent with the principle of 
relevance.
According to Relevance Theory, the ostensive stimulus is the
c
most relevant, i.e. most economjal, one the communicator could have 
used to achieve the intended effects. Does this apply to the case 
here? The answer must be yes. The caption is the most economical
one the advertiser could have used to achieve the intended effects, 
for, without going through the whole process, the addressee would 
not get the message at the appropriate strength; she would not even 
pay attention to it if the caption was something like, 'Take the 
tube...'
Another aspect of Redfern's claim of the economy required in 
advertising is his characterisation of the pun as 'two meanings for 
the price of one word or phrase' . Are there really two meanings 
communicated in the London Transport advertisement? Is this
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generally the case? Surely, it varies. Redfern does not clarify 
what he means by 'two meanings'. As far as the meaning which the 
communicator has intended his audience to retain is concerned, there 
is only one meaning. The advertiser has intended 'bread' to mean 
'money' and 'jam' to mean 'traffic jam'. The 'food' interpretations 
are intended to be triggered, but they are also intended to be
abandoned. They are not intended interpretations as such, and that 
is precisely why the audience will continue to search for other
interpretations. If the addresseee was to take these 'food' 
interpretations to be the only ones intended by the advertiser, she 
would stop processing and would not search for other
interpretations.
It has been pointed out by Moeran (personal communication) that 
in the U.K., food is often used to promote technology. 'Apple
Computer', 'Apricot' and 'Peach Software', for example, use food 
names as their brand names. Packard, in his classic The Hidden 
Fersuaders, quotes some social science research, saying that food is 
'loaded with hidden meanings'. (1981:87). It is possible that food 
names have some appeal to an audience, as it gives humans life.
The use of food names in the promotion of technology, or any 
products other than food, is not practised in Japanese advertising. 
On the contrary, it has been observed that new brand of snacks are 
often given names which have no apparent association with food 
(Kookoku Hiyoo, December, 1984). Some of the examples are 'Suzuki- 
san' (Mr. Suzuki), 'Sato-san' (Mr. Sato), 'Choonan' (the first son),
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and 'Choojo' (the first daughter) for crispy snacks, ' Yama no 
Donguri* (the acorn in the mountain) for chocolate snacks, 'Kiri no 
Uki-fune' (the floating boat in the mist' , for chocolate. The point 
may be worth investigating for cultural studies, although I shall 
not pursue it in this study.
Let us now look at another example, which is a caption for
Papillon underwear. It reads as follows:
(4) The last thing you'll want to be seen in.
This caption is accompanied by an illustration, showing a woman in 
brassiere and panties. She has a white jumper around her neck and 
shoulders, which she is pulling with her hands in front of her
throat. It seems that she is taking it off.
Reading the caption, (4), would immediately force the addressee 
to recover the following interpretation:
(5) You would not want to be seen in Papillon underwear.
This would gives the addressee a context which includes the 
following assumption:
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(6) One does not want to be seen in something because it 
does not look nice.
Considering that it is an advertisement for underwear, and that 
advertisements normally say positive things about the product being 
advertised, it is quite unlikely that the advertiser has intended to 
communicate (5) to his addressee. This element of surprise would 
contribute to drawing the addressee's attention to the 
advertisement. The advertiser has intended the addressee to reject
(5). In fact, underneath the caption it reads:
(7) Much too pretty to hide.
On the assumption that (4) and (7) are somehow connected, the 
addressee might derive (8):
(8) The last thing you'll want to be seen in, because it 
is much too pretty to hide.
Then, the addressee would have access to another interpretation of 
(4). The advertiser has intended the audience to recover (5), but
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then reject it, and eventually recover the alternative 
interpretation (9):
(9) The Papillon underwear is the final piece of clothing 
you want to be seen in as you undress.
If (9) is processed in a context which includes (7), it would
give rise to further contextual effects, including (10):
(10) You want to be seen in Papillon underwear because it 
is so pretty.
It seems that examples (2) and (4) belong to the same category 
of puns. They trigger an interpretation, which is intended by the 
speaker, but also intended to be rejected, so that the addressee 
recovers an alternative interpretation, which is the one the speaker 
has intended to communicate. They have more than one possible 
interpretation. However, the speaker has intended to communicate 
only one of them. The rest are intended to be triggered, only to be 
eventually rejected. The immediately accessible interpretation, 
which is later rejected, is irrelevant in the case of (2), and
'negative' in the case of (4). These properties help the
advertisements catch the audience's attention. They also contribute 
to the increase in strength of the messages and the increase in 
memorability. Moreover, the audience get some satisfaction at 
solving a pun, which would give rise to a weak contextual effect.
There are more examples in this category, such as two captions 
for a Milton Keynes advertising campaign:
(11) a. Mind your own business. Move it to Milton Keynes,
b. You're welcome to London. Milton Keynes.
(11a) was found at the Milton Keynes railway station. (lib) 
was found on a billboard which can be seen from the train 
approaching London Victoria Station. In both cases, the first 
accessible interpretation of the first part of the captions would be 
rejected in favour of an alternative interpretation, which is the 
intended one.
The extent to which puns do or do not contribute to conveying 
the intended message varies from pun to pun. In the next example, 
unlike the London Transport advertisement, the processing of the 
advertisement as a pun does contribute to the overall message 
conveyed, despite the fact that the pun itself does not even provide 
an alternative propositional content. In 1977, the year of the
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Queen's Silver Jubilee, Guinness presented an advertisement which 
reads as follows:
(12) We've poured throughout her reign.
In order to identify the proposition expressed by the above 
utterance, disambiguation of the word 'pour' and reference 
assignment to the two pronouns, namely, 'we' and 'her', must be 
undertaken. Consistency with the principle of relevance provides an 
adequate criterion. 'Pour' can mean either 'flow* or 'serve 
liquid'. Considering the fact that it is an advertisement for beer, 
the 'serve liquid1 interpretation will be selected. From our 
experience, we know that the word 'we' in advertisements can refer 
to many things; an advertiser, audience, characters in it, the 
product advertised, and so on. Here, though, because of the verb 
which follows, namely, 'pour', it will be assumed that 'we' mean the 
Guiness company, which has been serving beer. The second pronoun 
will be more easily assigned. Because it is followed by the word 
'reign', and because it is the Queen's Silver Jubilee year and one 
hears about it all the time in the media, it will be interpreted as 
'the Queen's'. Thus, the following proposition will be recovered:
(13) Ve, the Guinness company, have served beer for as 
long as the Queen has been on the throne.
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However, the addressee could not help thinking of 'pour' in the 
sense of 'flow' and 'reign' as 'rain'. Although it is spelled 'r-e- 
i-g-n', and not 'r-a-i-n', among the homophones, that is, the words 
with the same phonetic properties, such as 'rain', 'reign' and 
'rein', 'rain' will probably be the most accessible one to the 
addressee. Reading 'reign', the addressee will think of 'rain', and 
they will be encouraged to do so by the word 'pour'. The advertiser 
further encourages his addressee along this line by deliberately 
omitting the word 'beer' after the verb. He could have said:
(14) Ve've poured beer throughout her reign.
but that would have invited the interpretation 'pouring rain' much 
less effectively.
The 'pouring rain' interpretation is only triggered; it cannot 
be claimed to be explicitly expressed, for the spelling used is 
'reign' and not 'rain'. However, the image of 'pouring rain' will 
be within easy access of the addressee, because of the kind of 
weather she is used to, so the effect would be achieved without much 
difficulty. And once 'pouring rain' is triggered, it will give the 
addressee access to her encyclopaedic knowledge about rain, which 
will include that it is typical British weather, that it is typical 
Queen's weather, for it tends to rain on her big occasions, and so 
on. So, the association between 'beer' and 'rain' may be added to
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the context in which the advertisement is finally processed, as an 
implicated assumption.
In Japan, 'beer' has the image of a 'summer drink', as opposed
to sake (rice wine), which is traditionally regarded as a 'winter
drink' . Beer is consumed cool and is advertised more before and
during summer. When there is a bad or shorter summer due to an
extended rainy season, the sales figures drop. However, in the 
U.K., where most beer is consumed lukewarm, the situation is 
different. It is a 'year round' drink, just as rain is a 'year 
round* weather. In Japan, beer is always advertised as a drink for 
hot and sunny weather. But in the U.K., it is reasonable that the 
advertiser should want to associate it with rain. The advertisement 
came out in the summer of 1977, when there was an unusually wet and 
bad summer. Guinness has always presented an image of a 'national 
drink*. It is surely not a coincidence that its advertiser has made 
an association with 'pouring rain', which is one of the prominent 
national characteristics of the country. So also is joking about 
the weather. Each of these additional contextual effects serves to 
enhance the desired effect of the advertisement that Guinness be 
seen as an integral part of Britain's national heritage, even though 
it could be argued that Guinness is in reality an Irish beer.
In this example, then, the pun is used to provide access to 
additional implicated contextual assumptions, which do give rise to 
intended contextual effects when the intended interpretation is 
eventually recovered and processed. The pun is not merely an
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attention-getting device, but it actually contributes to the 
eventual intended interpretation.
Let us look at a Japanese example. The following is a caption
for an airline advertisement, promoting its Okinawa flight, Okinawa
being islands in the far south, known as a resort area:
(15) Oo Kli NAa VAh
The capital letters correspond to larger characters in the 
Japanese original. The underlined letters are in katakana, which is 
a syllabic script used for things like onomatopoeias, loan words, 
exclamations, and so on, while the rest are in hirakana, which is 
the unmarked form of syllabic script.
By picking up the larger letters only, it reads 'o-ki-na-wa',
that is, 'Okinawa', the destination for the promoted flight. 
Reading all the letters, it reads 'oo-kii-naa-wah', where ookii 
means 'big', naa an exclamation particle, and wah in katakana an 
exclamation like 'wow'. Thus, the two different interpretations 
will be recovered:
(16) Okinawa.
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(17) How big! Vow!
The question which (17) will raise is: what is big?
Considering that it is an advertisement promoting an Okinawa 
holiday, it is likely that it refers to the Okinawa Islands. For 
the Japanese, who live in an over-crowded country, space is a major 
advantage, and it is reasonable for the advertiser to want to stress 
it. On the other hand, the audience could not help noticing that 
the girl in the illustration, in her bikini, is rather well-endowed, 
and wondering if ookii (big) refers to her breasts.
There are at least two possible candidates for the object 
described as ookii (big). However, the advertiser's intention in 
regard to them does not seem to be equally manifest. Among my 
several Japanese-speaking informants, some wondered if the 'breasts' 
one was a coincidence, and some did not question the intentionality 
of it at all. Some of the second group did not even think of the 
possibility of Okinawa being referred to, and incidentally, the 
second group were exclusively men. Considering that it is an 
advertisement, which is a carefully prepared work, where what 
Chomsky calls 'performance error' is unlikely, it is probable that 
the ' breasts' interpretation is invited intentionally, rather than 
accidentally.
Thus, the following interpretation might be derived:
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(18) In the Okinawa Islands, there are a lot of beautiful 
girls with big breasts.
However, I would hesitate to say that the advertiser has
intended to convey this on the basis of making his intention 
mutually manifest. Thus, the communicator's intention to convey an 
interpretation is sometimes made mutually manifest, and in others it 
is not. This question of the publication of the speaker's intention 
will be the topic of Chapter 4.
Nudity is shown to a greater extent in advertising and in mass 
media in general in Japan than in the U.K.. Even so, to show a
well-endowed girl in a bikini and explicitly say, 'How big her
breasts are!' will be regarded as irrelevant and too vulgar for an 
advertisement for an airline company. The advertiser's intention to 
refer to the girl is not made as manifest as it could have been; it
may not become mutually manifest at all. It is vague, which leaves
some room for the advertiser to deny the intention if necessary.
This example, then, may be regarded, unlike the two previous
ones, as a case of deliberate equivocation, that is, unresolvable
ambiguity. Or it may be that the pun is used only as an attention- 
getting device, with the 'space' interpretation being the only one 
mdcle mutually manifest, and perhaps additional contextual effects 
about the sort of people you will find in Okinawa also being
communicated.
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Examples (12) and (15) seem to be different from examples (2) 
(4), (11a) and (lib) which, it could be argued, form another
category. (2) and (4) force the addressee to recover
interpretations which she eventually rejects as irrelevant. The 
extra processing effort caused by the unintended interpretations is 
compensated for by the increased strength of the messages and their 
increased memorability, or by the addressee's pleasure at solving 
the puns. In the cases of (12) and (15), the unintended 
interpretations provide access to encyclopaedic information, which 
is actually used in processing the intended interpretations, and 
thus contribute to additional contextual effects.
So far, I have analysed two categories of puns. The first is 
that which triggers a seemingly most accessible interpretation, 
which is eventually rejected as irrelevant and not contribute to the 
processing of the intended interpretation. In the second category, 
a pun also triggers an interpretation which is to be rejected as 
unintended. But this interpretation contributes to the processing 
of the intended interpretation by providing access to encyclopaedic 
information, against which the intended interpretation is processed 
and yields contextual effects.
There is a third category, in which a pun triggers two or more 
interpretations, neither of which is intended to be rejected by the 
speaker. Let us look at the following caption, which is a caption 
for a Mazda advertisement:
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(19) The perfect car for a long drive.
The advertisement shows a Mazda car parked on a lengthy drive 
which leads to a mansion. The word 'drive' can mean 'a car ride', 
and on this interpretation the audience would derive (20):
(20) The perfect car for a long car ride.
Given that it is an advertisement for a car, (20) would yield a 
number of contextual effects, which include (21) and (22):
(21) The car is for people who have to go on long car 
rides.
(22) The car functions well for a long drive.
However, 'drive' can mean 'driveway* and the illustration 
showing a long driveway would encourage this interpretation. Thus, 
the addressee is encouraged to derive (23) from (19) as well:
(23) The perfect car for people who have a long driveway.
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The illustration also shows a mansion to which the driveway leads, 
and it would encourage the addressee to extend her search for 
assumptions about the kind of life style which may be suggested by 
it. Thus, the addressee might derive further contextual effects, 
such as (24) and (25):
(24) The car is perfect for people who have a long drive­
way and a mansion.
(25) The car is perfect for people who enjoy a comfortable
1 if e .
In this case, both (20) and (23) yield substantial contextual 
effects and it would not be clear to the addressee which is the
interpretation intended by the speaker. It is manifest to both the
addressee and the advertiser that both interpretations are relevant 
enough to be worth the addressee's attention, and both were intended 
to be triggered. One reasonable inference for the addressee to draw 
is that both were intended to be retained.
The next example is an advertisement for women's underwear:
(26) Next to myself, I like Vedonis.
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where 'Vedonis' is a brand name. The audience would probably derive
interpretation (27) as the most accessible one:
(27) After myself, I like Vedonis.
However, the addressee would not be able to help thinking that
it is a strange thing to say about underwear. For, underwear is not 
an obvious thing that one likes after oneself. It is more common to 
talk about, for example, one's mother.
'Next to' can be interpreted either physically or more 
abstractly. Considering that it is an advertisement for underwear, 
which one wears next to the skin, the addressee would also find a 
physical interpretation also possible, and thus recover proposition
(27):
(28) Next to my skin, I like wearing Vedonis underwear. 
This would give rise to further contextual effects, such as (29):
(29) Vedonis underwear feels good on one's skin.
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However, there is no denying that the communicator has chosen 
an utterance which causes his addressee extra processing effort by 
using (26), when he could easily have said, for example, (30) 
instead:
(30) Next to my skin, I like Vedonis.
Moreover, it would be more common to say (31), rather than (26), if 
one intends to communicate physical contact to one's skin:
(31) Next to me, I like Vedonis.
The interpretation would therefore seem to be inconsistent with the 
principle of relevance, since the intended effects could have been 
more economically achieved. Perhaps, the speaker has also intended 
the more abstract interpretation (27), which I repeat here for 
convenience:
(27) Alter myself, I like Vedonis.
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Underwear is not exactly meant to receive public exposure. 
Unlike other outfits, which can be chosen on the ground of their 
appeal to the spectators, underwear has to be chosen on the ground 
that it appeals to the wearer. Interpretation (27) is based on that 
assumption. Furthermore, the advertiser would like his addressee to 
choose underwear on the ground that the wearer likes it, rather than 
that it is functional. He is trying to encourage his addressee to 
buy underwear which she likes, not Just something sufficient, even 
though she may not be able to show it off to others. That seems to 
be the reason why the advertiser would want to tickle the 
addressee's narcissism.
The brand name 'Vedonis' can be analysed as a combination of 
'Venus' and 'Adonis', which are both names of mythological figures 
famous for their beauty. In Greek mythology, Adonis was loved by 
Aphrodite for his beauty, and Aphrodite herself was the goddes of 
beauty, corresponding to Venus in Roman mythology. Hence the more 
abstract interpretation may further suggest (32):
(32) I like Venus and Adonis for their beauty after 
myself.
Vhen I tried this hypothesis with native English speakers, the 
only person to come up with Venus and Adonis was an anthropologist, 
whose research interests include the language of advertising, and I
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did wander if we were reading too much into it. Vhat has happened 
is, perhaps, that due to an unusually high level of attention which 
the anthropologist and I shared, we put more than the usual 
processing effort into the interpretation, and we extended our 
search in memory to a greater degree than a general audience would 
have done. It could be argued that the advertiser could not have 
expected the audience all to be familiar with Greek and Roman 
mythologies, or have such a high level of attention. However, it is 
unlikely that it was a coincidence. The advertiser could not have 
expected it to be unnoticed by everybody in his _ audience, 
either.
Obviously, it was not the advertiser but the company which 
chose the name ' Vedonis' . This choice may have been made for its 
association with Venus, Adonis and beauty, and a context of this 
type might be automatically accessed by at least some readers of the 
advertisement. This will in turn provide access to implicated 
assumption (33):
(33) Vedonis underwear is so beautiful that some people 
might like it after themselves.
and this assumption can be combined with the more physical 
interpretation (28) to implicate the following conclusion:
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(34) I like Vedonis not only for its function, but also 
for its exceptional beauty.
Or, it could be-argued that the advertiser exploited the fact 
that the brand name is a combination of Venus and Adonis, and used 
it to further tickle the addressee's narcissism by suggesting (35):
(35) I like Venus and Adonis for their beauty, but only 
after myself.
The advertiser has chosen the caption, being aware that it will 
make the addressee go through both abstract and physical 
interpretations (27) and (28). Yet, in choosing utterance (26), he 
is consistent with the principle of relevance. For, if he had 
chosen an utterance such as (30) or (31), which are more 
straightforward, the addressee would not have recovered (27) and 
would have missed any additional implications to do with the 
exceptional beauty of the underwear. Without going through the 
process of having to reach the physical interpretation after the 
abstract one, the addressee would not pay as much attention to the 
caption, either, and therefore would not get the message. In 
deriving the interpretation intended by the speaker, the addressee 
is encouraged to process both the abstract and physical 
interpretations. Then she will be automatically given access to
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contextual assumptions needed for both interpretations, which 
include the functional qualities of underwear, narcissism and the 
mythologies. Thus, the relevance of (26) is established by 
recovering a wide range of weak contextual effects, arising from two 
distinct interpretations.
Thus, (19) and (26) are neither like (2), (4), (11a) and (lib),
nor like (12) and (15), in that the communicator has intended both 
interpretations to be recovered and retained. In the cases of (2) 
and (4), the communicator has intended only one interpretation to be 
retained and the rest to be rejected as irrelevant. In the cases of
(12) and (15), the communicator has intended only one 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the unintended interpretation is to 
be recovered to give access to encyclopaedic knowledge, which is to 
be used in processing the intended interpretations, so that 
additional contextual effects can be achieved. In the case of (19) 
and (26), neither of the two sets of possible interpretations, that 
is (20) and (23), and (27) and (28), respectively, is intended by 
the communicator to be rejected by the addressee. The communicator 
intends his addressee to process and retain both, together with 
their effects. Thus, (19) and (26) are not only ambiguous, but 
equivocal, i.e. unresolvably ambiguous.
Redfern's comment that puns provide 'two meanings for the price 
of one word or phrase' is valid in these cases. The word 'drive' 
means both 'car ride' and 'drive way', and they are both intended by 
the communicator, unlike the first two cases. The phrase 'next to'
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can be understood both in the physical and in more abstract senses. 
In the cases of the first two types, there is only one intended 
interpretation. However, more than one interpretation is triggered, 
and gives access to various kinds of encyclopaedic information, 
which can be used in processing the intended interpretation. In the 
case of the third type, both interpretations are intended by the 
communicator.
It has been argued that puns can be categorised in terms of 
hierarchy among possible interpretations they provide. However, 
this is not to say that they are distinctive categories. I would 
argue that the boundaries are not clear-cut and are a matter of 
degree. It could be argued that these examples occur along a 
spectrum, with examples (2), (4), (11a) and (lib) belonging to one
end of the spectrum, and example (19) and (26) belonging to the 
other. Other examples fall somewhere in between.
I have thus argued that Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory 
(1986a) sheds light on a variety of ways in which puns function in 
advertising:
1. They attract the addressee's attention; the extra processing 
effort involved may be said to be the price the advertiser has 
to pay to get his message noticed at all. Without going 
through the whole process, the addressee might ignore the 
message, and hence no effect would be achieved.
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2. The extra processing effort demanded is compensated for by the 
increased strength of the message conveyed, or by increased 
memorability. An opinion which the addressee might discount as 
obviously of little credibility is strengthened and possibly 
remembered due to the extra processing effort involved.
3. There are extra contextual effects based on the addressee's 
pleasure and satisfaction at having solved the pun: these may 
affect the addressee's attitude to the advertiser and 
ultimately to the product advertised.
4. The extra unintended, or uncommunicated, interpretation 
provides access to encyclopaedic information which is used in 
processing the intended interpretation, and thus gives rise to 
additional contextual effects.
In all these cases, the advertisement achieves optimal 
relevance despite the extra processing effort, because it is still 
the most economical way of achieving the full range of intended 
contextual effects.
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3.3. Ambiguity and the pun
I have argued above that a pun presents more than one possible 
interpretation and that the hearer selects the interpretation which 
is consistent with the principle of relevance, which should be the 
one intended by the speaker. Then, does a hearer of a pun see it as 
ambiguous? In this section, I investigate the relationship between 
the pun and ambiguity.
Leach argues that a pun 'forbids us to recognise that the sound 
pattern is ambiguous* (1964:25), without explaining how the hearer 
is 'forbidden' from seeing a pun as ambiguous. Whatever his reasons 
may be, I would argue that his comment is unsound. The audience 
must see the ambiguity of the pun in order to recognise it as a pun.
Attridge argues that a pun is not just ambiguity, but it is 
'ambiguity unashamed of itself' (his italics) (1988:141). He points 
out that in spite of its polysemous nature, language works well 
enough because a context acts as a disambiguating device:
In place of a context designed to suppress latent 
ambiguity, the pun is the product of a context
I
deliberately constructed to enforce an ambiguity, to 
render impossible the choice between meanings, to
i
leave the reader or hearer endlessly oscillating in 
semantic space. (his italics)
(Attridge 1988:141)
There is an underlying assumption in his argument that a 
context is determined prior to an utterance. However, this 
assumption is false, as argued by Sperber and Wilson (1986a) and 
discussed in Chapter 2. Attridge goes on to argue that a context, 
which normally helps disambiguation, enforces ambiguity in the case 
of a pun, althou^khe does not explicate how a context 'enforces' the 
ambiguity of a pun.
Leach and Attridge seem to contradict each other. On the one 
hand, Leach argues that, although a pun is ambiguous, the audience 
does not recognise it as ambiguous, because there is something about 
a pun which prevents the audience from recognising it as ambiguous. 
On the other hand, Attridge's claim is that a pun is not only 
ambiguous - and presumably that the audience would recognise it as 
ambiguous - but also that its context is constructed in such a way 
that the ambiguity of the pun is enforced.
First of all, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by
'ambiguous' here. Utterances which are strictly speaking
indeterminate are so ubiquitous in ordinary communication that it is 
difficult to find utterances which do not require any
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disambiguation, reference assignment and enrichment. Let us look at 
the following examples.
(36) a. Kay went to the bank.
b. Paul has got his umbrella.
c. I will see you soon.
The word 'bank' in (36a) can refer to either a financial 
institution or a river bank and needs disambiguation. The umbrella 
mentioned in (36b) can be either Paul's or some other male human
being's, and 'his' has to be assigned to an appropriate reference.
The hearer of (36c) would have to enrich it by deciding how soon the 
word 'soon' means, whether it is a matter of a few minutes, hours, 
weeks, and so on.
However, hearers of (36a) - (36c) do not necessarily regard
these utterances as ambiguous. Nor do the speakers usually intend 
these utterances to be ambiguous. They may be linguistically 
ambiguous - in fact, Sperber and Wilson would treat (36a) as
ambiguous, and (36b) and (36c) as ambivalent or vague - but the 
ambiguity is almost invariably resolvable in context. Indeed,
unless the ambiguity is resolved the utterance will not succeed as a 
vehicle for communication. What the hearer has to do in processing
utterances, such as (36a) - (36c), is to identify the propositions 
which meet the criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance.
However, there are cases in which the hearer is not able to 
identify the interpretation intended by the speaker. These 
utterances are then interpreted as ambiguous, and the hearer, by 
asking, 'Which bank?', 'Whose umbrella?', 'How soon?' and so on, has 
to seek clarification before being able to recover the speaker's 
intention. Such unrecoverable ambiguity is called equivocation.
Sperber and Wilson argue that the success of communication 
depends on the hearer's recovery of the speaker's intended meaning 
of the utterance (not merely on her recognition of its linguistic 
meaning) (1986a:23). Communication can succeed, even when there is 
more than one possible interpretation of the utterance. In
principle, it can succeed with various types of indeterminacy of the 
utterance, so long as the speaker's intended interpretation is 
recoverable. Communication fails when ambiguity is unresolvable, 
for unless there is such resolution, the hearer will not be able to 
determine which intentions the speaker had. It becomes equivocal
when the hearer is unable to disambiguate it and hence assign it a
single intended interpretation.
Puns stand in striking contrast to this because conscious 
recognition of ambiguity as part of the utterance process is
essential to processing the utterance as a pun. However, even in
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these cases, there is a single communicative goal which a speaker is 
trying to achieve in using a pun, and this is what the hearer has to 
recognise. In some cases, this goal is transparent. Although two 
or more interpretations are intentionally triggered by the speaker, 
only one is intended to be retained, as we have seen examples (2), 
(4), (12) and (15). Let us look at example (11a), which is a 
caption for an advertisement promoting Milton Keynes, found at the 
railway station. I repeat it here for convenience:
(11) a. Mind your own business. Move it to Milton Keynes.
This is accompanied by a line underneath, saying:
(37) Curious to find out why so many top British companies
are moving to Milton Keynes? Ring (the number).
The first sentence of (11a) is a pun. The expression 'mind 
your own business' can mean (38):
(38) Do not concern yourself with other people's affairs.
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However, this does not yield enough relevance to outweigh the 
addressee's processing effort, as the addressee would have no idea 
what other people's affairs it is referring to. It would probably 
help to attract the addressee's attention, for the expression 'mind 
your own business' tends to be used as a harsh statement.
The addressee would then be encouraged to search for 
alternative interpretations in her memory, and she would hopefully 
remember that 'mind' can mean 'look after' and that 'Business' can 
mean 'firm', 'company' and so forth. Furthermore, the addressee
would probably know that it is an advertisement, because of the kind 
of place in which it is found. (37) would help her to realise that 
it is an advertisement for Milton Keynes. She would then derive 
(39):
(39) Look after your own company.
Together with the latter part of the caption, the addressee would 
derive further contextual effects, such as (40):
(40) You can improve your company prospects by moving to 
Milton Keynes.
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Thus, (39) would yield enough relevance to make the addressee's 
processing effort worth while.
The addressee would recover (38), but reject it, as it does not 
yield enough relevance to make it worth her while to process it. 
Then she would recover (39), which is consistent with the principle 
of relevance. It is manifest to both the addressee and the 
advertiser that the advertiser intends her to notice both (38) and 
(39). However, it is also made mutually manifest to both the 
addressee and the advertiser that (38) is to be rejected and that
(39) is the interpretation which is intended by the advertiser. 
Ambiguity is not tolerable unless the communicator could have meant 
both. But the communicator could only have meant both if both 
contribute however indirectly to the single overall intended effect.
Example (11a) belongs to the first category of puns, as we have 
discussed above. There is only one interpretation that is intended 
by the speaker, namely (39). The other interpretation (38), which 
the audience would be likely to recover first, is intended by the 
speaker only to be triggered but eventually rejected as irrelevant.
Leach's comment that a pun forbids the audience from 
recognising it as ambiguous is acceptable insofar as the ambiguity 
of a pun is usually resolvable. The audience of a pun would be able 
to identify the intended interpretation, which is the key to 
successful communication. Moreover, the audience would appreciate
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the ambiguity of the pun as essential for its success, and would not
see ambiguity as failure.
However, what about the third category of puns, such as (19) 
and (26)? They have more than one interpretation intended by the
speaker, both of which are intended to be retained, unlike the first
two types of puns. I repeat the example for convenience:
(19) The perfect car for a long drive.
As discussed above, it has the following interpretations.
(22) The car functions well for a lengthy drive.
(25) The car is perfect for people who enjoy a comfortable 
life.
However, despite the independence of (22) and (25) from each 
other, they can combine the additional premise that people who have 
a long drive are the sort of people who, drive long distances. So, 
despite the essential recognition and retention of the two triggered 
interpretations, there is a single overall message conveyed to which
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the two interpretations jointly contribute. Thus, despite the 
ambiguity caused by the two interpretations, the pun does not lead 
to communication breakdown.
In this section, I have considered the relationship between the 
pun and ambiguity. It has been argued that there are different 
degrees and types of ambiguity in utterances in general. It has 
also been argued that there are different types of puns. In some 
cases, the ambiguity of the pun is resolvable, as in (11a), and in 
some cases, there is genuine equivocation, i.e. unresolvable 
ambiguity, as in (19). In either case, it is essential for a pun to 
be successful that the addressee should recover more than one 
interpretation. Two or more interpretations were intended by the 
speaker, whether some of them are only intended to be triggered and 
eventually rejected, or whether they are all intended to be 
retained. It could be argued that the essence of the pun lies in 
ambiguity.
3.4. Puns and metaphors
It has been argued that interpreting a pun involves recovering 
one or more interpretations, after rejecting the most accessible 
one. A metaphor similarly involves the recovery of an
interpretation, apparently via some literal interpretation which is
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discarded. Vhat then is the difference between pun and metaphor? 
This is the question I shall investigate in this section.
First, let us consider the following caption from an 
advertisement for British Rail:
(41) Will you end up at this station?
Underneath this caption is a picture of the blue light typically 
seen outside a police station, with the word police on it, and a 
second caption urging the audience to get the right ticket before 
travelling.
The word 'station' is a pun, used to trigger two separate 
interpretations, i.e. the train station and the police station. 
Then, (41) makes the audience process the following interpretations:
(42) Will you end up at this train station?
(43) Will you end up at the police station?
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Both interpretations (42) and (43) are intentionally triggered 
by the speaker. However.it is mutually manifest that he intended
(42) to be rejected in favour of (43). (43) is the one that the
communicator intended to communicate.
Thus, (41) offers more than one interpretation, namely, (42) 
and (43), even though (42) is intended by the speaker to be derived
and then rejected by the addressee. In processing (41), the
addressee would have to search in her memory information about the 
word 'station' and derive more than one interpretation, i.e. (42)
and (43) .
Does this make (41) a metaphor? It has been established above 
that puns involve the triggering of two or more interpretations, 
with the addressee in some cases rejecting one of these, leaving 
just one interpretation as the intended one. On the other hand,
metaphors similarly involve the recovery of an interpretation, 
apparently via some literal interpretation which is eventually 
discarded. There is no reason why the word 'station' should not be 
used as a metaphor. If (41) is not a metaphor, what then is the 
difference between a pun and a metaphor? This is the question which 
I shall investigate in this section.
First, I shall consider Sperber and Wilson's approach to the 
analysis of metaphor. Having done this, I shall compare puns and 
metaphors and consider what the differences between them are.
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Crucial to Sperber and Wilson's analysis of metaphor (see 
1986a) is the notion of interpretive use, which has been discussed 
in Chapter 2. Metaphor involves an interpretive relation between 
the proposition expressed by an utterance and the proposition of the 
thought it represents, perhaps the thought of the speaker. The two 
propositions resemble each other, that is they partly share 
contextual effects. However, unlike descriptive use, the
proposition of an utterance need not be true of the state of affairs 
it is used to represent.
According to Sperber and Wilson, the relevance of a metaphor is 
established by recovering an array of contextual implications 
(1986a: 236). The range and the strength of these implications are a 
matter of degree. On the one hand, in the case of a standardised 
metaphor, the addressee would be encouraged to recover a narrow 
range of strong implications. On the other hand, in the case of a 
novel metaphor, the addressee would be forced to look for a wide 
range of weak implications. The following is an example of a fairly 
creative metaphor:
(44) He was just a station in my life.
The addressee would have to search through her encyclopaedic 
knowledge of 'station' for a number of assumptions about the word. 
For, it is false to say that a person is a station and therefore it
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t
is not possible to derive relevance from a strictly literal construal 
of (44). The addressee would then hopefully remember that a 
station is where one stops for a short time, that it is where only 
temporary stops are made, that the stops which one makes at the 
station are not important in the journey, and so on. When (44) is 
processed against this context, which contains such information, it 
will yield a fairly wide range of weak implications as follows:
(45) a. He is just somebody with whom I had a short
affair.
b. The relationship with him was meant to be a casual 
affair.
c. The affair with him was not very significant in my 
life.
However, the speaker could not have intended to communicate 
(45a) - (45c) alone. Had he done so, he would have used an
utterance, such as (46), rather than (44):
(46) He was just someone with whom I had a short, casual 
and insignificant affair.
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For (46) would require less processing effort than (44). There are 
other contextual effects intended by (44) to outweigh the processing 
effort. Perhaps it could be the degree of casualness, which is more 
than the addressee might imagine otherwise. Or, the lack of
committment on the part of the speaker might be beyond the
addressee's imagination. Perhaps, the speaker intended to suggest 
other characteristics of a station, for instance that a station is 
never a destination in itself, and that it is only en route to
somewhere else, which the speaker could not have quite communicated 
with (46). Thus, there are contextual implications intended by the 
speaker of (44), which could not have been communicated by (46), and 
an extra processing effort caused by (44) would be compensated by
them. The relevance of (44) is achieved by inferring weak 
contextual implications which are derived around the encyclopaedic 
information about 'station'.
Note that in the account of this example, there has been no 
mention of first recovering the literal meaning and then the 
metaphorical interpretation. Rather, the use of the word 'station', 
with its evocation of the contextual implications of being intended 
for a short and temporary stop was sufficient to trigger the single 
interpretation.
Puns, however, by definition involve processing more than one 
interpretation, although nothing precludes one of these being a 
metaphorical interpretation. In the case of (41), the addressee 
would be given access to two seperate schemata, namely, the train
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station and the police station, even though the access comes from a 
single word 'station'. Furthermore, these two schemata have a
different status. The access to 'the train station* is triggered by 
the speaker, but it would not lead to the intended message, whereas
'the police station' is the one intended by the speaker. The
speaker has intended to make (42) mutually manifest to the addressee 
and himself, but he has also intended it to be rejected by the
addressee, so that she would go on to look for the intended 
interpretation that 'station' means the police station.
Thus, the relevance of the pun is achieved by rejecting the 
seemingly most accessible interpretation and finding the intended
r
interpretation. The addressee would have to go though more than one 
schema triggered by a word, and the success of a pun depends on 
having access to those different schemata. The effect of a pun 
involves the contrast between the two schemata, that is, that of the 
train station and that of the police station in the case of the 
example above.
Interpreting a metaphor involes a single schema. Unlike puns, 
where the effect comes from the contrast of two or more 
interpretations, the effect of a metaphor lies in the condensation, 
in the fact that a single expression can offer a wide range of weak 
implicatures. This is one of the major differences between a pun 
and a metaphor.
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As we have seen above, metaphor is based on resemblance between
the proposition of the utterance used and the proposition of the
speaker's thought. The two propositions share some contextual 
effects. However, there is no clear definition as to which 
contextual effects they share. In example (44), the speaker intends 
to communicate something along the lines of (46), but it cannot be 
paraphrased, partly because paraphrasing loses something, and partly 
because the message is not so definite. Thus, a metaphor conveys an 
indeterminate thought, that is, the speaker intends to communicate a 
range of implicatures, rather than a fixed set of them, and the 
communication would succeed when the hearer has recovered some of 
the inplicatures within the range.
Moreover, in the case of a pun, none of the examples in our
previous section involved indeterminacy of communicative effect. 
For example, the speaker of (41) intended to make manifest (42) and
(43), even though he intended (42) to be rejected eventually, and he 
did not intend the addressee to look for further interpretations. A 
pun necessarily triggers two or more interpretations, which contrast 
with each other, but these interpretations are definite, unlike 
metaphors which convey an indeterminate thought.
Furthermore, a metaphor communicates a wide range of weak 
implicatures, while a pun may communicate as little as a single 
implicature, even though additional interpretations may be
triggered, and this intended implicature can be strong. It must be 
added that the strength of implicatures communicated by a metaphor
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varies: in the case of a standardized metaphor, the speaker intends
to communicate a narrower range of stronger contextual effects, 
whereas in the case of a novel metaphor a wider range of weaker 
contextual effects are intended. However, in general, the
contextual effects of a metaphor are relatively weakly communicated.
Thus, the pun and the metaphor are completely different, even 
though processing a pun and a metaphor both involve a search for 
relevance through a single expression. They are mutually
independent of each other.
However, it must be pointed out that the pun and the metaphor 
are not mutually exclusive of each other. That is to say that an 
expression can be both a pun and a metaphor at the same time, and in 
fact, many puns are also metaphors, as in example (47):
(47) Ve colour pictures. Not facts.
(47) is a caption of an advertisement for The Mirror, and it is 
a pun and a metaphor at the same time. The addressee would 
eventually recover the following interpretation:
(48) Ve (literally) colour pictures, but we do not 
(metaphorically) colour facts.
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Given that it is an advertisement for a newspaper, (48) would have 
implications, such as (49) and (50):
(49) Ve paint pictures, but we do not influence the facts.
(50) The Mirror has coloured pictures, and the facts are 
presented without distortion.
The 'colour the facts' metaphor would give rise to a wide range of 
contexual effects, such as the way the facts are transformed 
according to how they are presented, the degree to which they 
change, the similarities and contrast between colouring pictures and 
transforming iacts, and so on. The relevance of (43) is established 
by recovering literal and abstract interpretation of the word 
'colour', and a wide range of contextual effects is achieved from 
searching for resemblances between painting objects and affecting 
facts.
The main purpose of this section has been to compare the pun 
with the metaphor. I have argued that, whereas the relevance of 
metaphors is established by recovering an indeterminate range of 
weak contextual implications which are derived by searching memory 
around a single schema, the relevance of puns is achieved by 
inferring two or more determinate interpretations which come from
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two or more contrasting schemata. The pun and the metaphor are
mutually independent of each other, although they are not mutually 
exclusive of each other.
3.5. Conclusion
Sperber and Wilson say (1986a:217) that style is the 
relationship. They argue that the style which the speaker chooses 
reveals what kind of relationship he envisages between himself and 
his addressee:
From the style of a communication it is possible to infer 
such things as what the speaker takes to be the hearer's 
cognitive capacities and level of attention, how much help 
or guidance she is prepared to give him in processing her 
utterance, the degree of complicity between them, their 
emotional closeness or distance. In other words, a 
speaker not only aims to enlarge the mutual cognitive 
environment she shares with the hearer; she also assumes a 
certain degree of mutuality, which is indicated, and 
sometimes communicated by her style.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:217-8)
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For the advertiser, it is crucial to attract the addressee's 
attention. For this reason, advertisers take advantage of various 
linguistic and non-linguistic devices to attract attention. As I 
have argued, the pun is one of them. It functions as an attention- 
getting device, enabling the advertiser to make seemingly negative 
or implausible statements, which would be highly relevant if true, 
for example, 'less bread', 'no jam1, 'mind your own business' and so 
on.
This might help to raise the addressee's level of attention, 
making her more alert, and hence more prepared to work out the 
effect of the advertisement. Moreover, as the addressee has to 
reject the most obvious interpretation and infer the intended 
interpretation, it causes her an extra processing effort. This 
might help to sustain her attention for longer. Moreover, it might 
lead to higher memorability. These aspects would help to involve 
the addressee in the advertisement.
The wit and humour of the pun might also contribute to 
congenial feelings towards the advertiser. In spite of what
literary critics and advertising agencies have said, there is some 
indication that the general public do enjoy puns. Deciphering a pun 
might create in the addressee a self-congratulatory thought. This 
pleasure would help the addressee form favourable feelings about the 
advertiser. Having said that the advertiser cannot expect a high 
level of attention from the addressee, a large number of 
advertisements using puns have been found in places such as stations
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and trains, where the advertiser has not only a captive audience but 
also a bored audience, who might appreciate entertainment. By 
offering an amusing pun at a tube station, the advertiser is 
providing the addressee with some entertainment which she wants.
There is, perhaps, more to this humorous and aesthetic effect 
of the pun than Relevance Theory is capable of analysing, as it now 
stands. Relevance is defined and measured in terms of contextual 
effects and processing effort. However, it is possible that a pun 
provides a kind of humorous pleasure and aesthetic effect which are 
not fully analysable in terms of contextual effect alone. For 
example, in the case of the airline advertisement, the advertiser 
uses a pun to refer to the girl's breasts. Now, there is a problem 
in accepting that the message is relevant; it is possible to argue 
that the message is not relevant but provides some aesthetic 
pleasure to the addressee. Then, one could argue that the pun  ^
raises a problem for Relevance Theory in its present stage of ^
elaboration. Further research on humour and aesthetics in the 
Relevance framework is awaited. I shall return to this from a 
different viewpoint, using the same airline advertisment as an 
example, in Chapter 4.
As I have shown above, the relevance of the pun is generally 
established by recovering two or more interpretations. The pun 
presents more than one interpretation, even though only one 
interpretation is intended by the speaker. This would give the 
addressee access to different schemata, from which she would derive
-  262  -
various contextual implications. It has also been argued that some 
puns are equivocal. However, it is clear that there is nothing 
equivocal about the ultimate message advertisements are conveying, 
namely, 'Buy this product!1.
flow, the advertiser does not aim to send his ultimate message 
by directly communicating this single message: rather, he would like 
to communicate an 'impression' or 'impressions' of the product or 
the company. In the Relevance framework, an impression is seen as a 
change in one's cognitive environment, which results from relatively 
minor alterations in the manifestness of a large number of 
assumptions, instead of major alterations of a few assumptions 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:59). The pun could help achieve this 
effect. For example, in the case of the Mazda car advertisement, 
the pun creates two separate impressions: one is the fact that it is 
a pun, hence witty, thus creating a feeling of complicity and 
cleverness in the audience; the other, through the 'long driveway' 
interpretation, allows access to assumptions about the lifestyle of 
the car's drivers, generating a certain impression of the car 
itself.
Thus, a pun can provide the advertiser with a way of 
communicating two or more impressions; one by the very fact that it 
is a pun, and the other (s) by its intended interpretation(s). If 
his advertisement manages to create an impression in his addressee, 
he would consider the advertisement successful. This must explain 
why there are so many puns in advertisements.
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Chapter 4: Covert Communication
4.1. Introduction
Crystal and Davy (1983:222) have argued that two of the main 
functions of the language of advertising are to inform and to 
persuade. However, these two functions are not of equal importance: 
there is a hierarchy between them. The advertiser does not inform 
for the sake of improving his viewers' knowledge about the world; he 
informs in order to persuade them to buy the product which he is 
advertising. He would be content if he managed to persuade them but 
failed to inform them of something (if that was possible), but not 
vice versa. It is certainly the ultimate goal of the advertiser to 
persuade his viewers to buy a product. In this chapter, I 
investigate how the process of communication is manipulated in 
language to achieve this goal and I try to show how Relevance Theory 
provides a useful framework for the analysis.
In Section 4.2, I examine in detail Sperber and Wilson's 
account of ostensive communication. In Section 4.3, I discuss 
examples in advertising which appear not to satisfy the requirements 
of ostensive communication, thus providing apparent counter-examples 
to their account of communication. Section 3.4 discusses the notion 
of ostention and the role it plays in communication. In Section
4.5, I examine weak implicatures and how they differ from covert
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communication. Finally, in Section 4.6, I show how Relevance Theory 
can analyse covert forms of communication.
4.2. Sperber and Wilson's ostensive communication
Sperber and Wilson's theory of utterance interpretation is 
based upon the definition of 'ostensive-inferential communication' 
repeated here for convenience:
Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator 
produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to 
communicator and audience that the communicator intends, 
by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions <I).
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:63)
Information is manifest to an individual at a certain time if 
the individual is capable at that time of representing it and 
accepting that representation as true or probably true. Information 
is mutually manifest to two individuals if it is manifest to both, 
and it is manifest to both that it is manifest to both, and so on
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indefinitely. Moreover, manifestness is a matter of degree: the
more likely the individual is to construct a certain representation, 
the more manifest it is to him.
According to this analysis, ostensive communication involves 
two layers of intention; a first-order intention to inform the 
hearer of something, which Sperber and Vilson call the informative 
intention:
Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest 
to the audience a set of assumptions -(I).
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:58)
and a second-order intention, the communicative intention to make 
that informative intention mutually manifest:
Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to 
audience and communicator that the communicator has this 
informative intention.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:61)
-  166  -
There is thus in Sperber and Wilson's definition of ostensive 
communication a requirement of overtness, to the effect that the 
speaker's informative intention must be made mutually manifest. 
This requirement of overtness is crucial for Sperber and Wilson's 
theory. It is the assumption that the informative intention is 
being made mutually manifest which helps the hearer to recover the 
intended message - that is, the set of assumptions <I) which the 
speaker intended to make manifest, or more manifest, to the hearer. 
Only if the speaker's informative intention becomes mutually 
manifest does ostensive communication take place.
When this requirement of overtness is not fulfilled, that is, 
when the informative intention is not made mutually manifest, 
Sperber and Vilson believe that this is not a genuine instance of 
ostensive communication. They give the following example of ' non- 
ostensive' non-verbal communication:
Suppose, for instance, that Mary wants Peter to mend 
her broken hair-drier, but does not want to ask him
openly. Vhat she does is begin to take her hair-drier to
pieces and leave the pieces lying around as if she were in 
the process of mending it. She does not expect Peter to
be taken in by this staging; in fact, if he really
believed that she was in the process of mending her hair­
drier herself, he would probably not interfere. She does 
expect him to be clever enough to work out that this is a
- 167 -
staging intended to inform him of the fact that she needs 
some help with her hair-drier. However, she does not 
expect him to reason along just these lines. Since she is 
not really asking, if Peter fails to help, it will not 
really count as a refusal either.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:30)
Sperber and Vilson argue (1986a:30) that there is 'an intuitive 
reluctance to say that Mary "meant" that she wanted Peter's help, or 
that she was "communicating" with Peter in the sense we are trying 
to characterise', and that this reluctance is 'well-founded' and 
comes from the fact that Mary's second-order intention to have her 
first-order informative intention recognised is hidden from Peter.
I shall investigate cases of verbal communication which, it 
will be argued, are parallel to Sperber and Wilson's example of non­
verbal, non-ostensive communication. The language used in
advertising often exhibits examples of 'covert forms of information 
transmission' (Sperber and Vilson 1986a:30) .
4.3. Non-ostensive communication in advertising
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Let us look at the example of All Nippon Airlines again. I
repeat it for the sake of convenience: (
(1) Oo Kli NAa VAh.
As I have pointed out in Chapter 3, there are the following two 
possible readings:
(2) Okinawa
(3) How big! Wow!
The question which (3) raises is: what is big? The problem
here is that there are at least two possible candidates for the
object described as ookii (big). That is, the Okinawa Islands,
which are the destination of the flight promoted in the
advertisement, and the big breasts of the girl shown in the
illustration. The second interpretation would lead to (4):
(4) In those islands, there are a lot of beautiful girls 
with big breasts.
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However, though the advertiser may have intended (4) to be 
manifest to the audince, he surely did not intend (4) to be manifest 
on the basis of making this informative intention mutually manifest. 
Thus, the communicator's intention to convey an interpretation is 
sometimes made mutually manifest, and in others it is not.
Nudity is shown to a greater extent in advertising and in mass 
media in general in Japan than in the U.K. Even so, to show a well- 
endowed girl in a bikini and explicitly say, 'Vhat big breasts she 
has!1 would be regarded as irrelevant and vulgar in an advertisement 
for an airline company. Since there is an alternative
interpretation, the advertiser's intention to refer to the girl is 
not made as manifest as it could have been; it may not become 
mutually manifest at all. It is vague, which leaves some room for 
the advertiser to deny the intention if necessary.
There are some more examples of this sort. (5) is the caption 
of an advertisement for men's toiletries, the brand name of which is 
Tech 21, for which I have provided the translation in (6):
(5) Otoko wa seinoo. 
man topic capacity
(6) For a man, it is capacity (which is desirable).
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Considering that it is an advertisement, the following premise must 
be added to the context:
(7) The product advertised helps the buyer attain what is 
desirable.
When assumptions (6) and (7) are combined, the conclusion in (8) can 
be recovered by the audience:
(8) The product helps the buyer attain his capacity.
The word seinoo (capacity) refers to functional capacity and is 
usually used to describe machinery, such as a car, a camera, etc. 
It is not a common collocation to use the word for a description of 
people. However, the brand name, Tech 21, has some overtones of 
machinery, and it may be the company's principle, not the
advertiser's, to advertise it in association with machinery. 
Perhaps, after all, it is not just women who are treated as sex 
machines in advertising.
Two Chinese characters are used to transcribe the word seinoo, 
each with its own meaning, that is, sei (sex) and noo (ability). 
Thus, the following interpretation is possible:
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(9) Otoko wa sei noo. 
man topic sex ability
which can be translated into English as follows:
(10) For a man, it is sexual ability (which is desirable).
This interpretation is reinforced by the illustration, which shows 
the face and torso of a young Western man with long hair (arms not
shown).
When (10) is processed in a context which contains assumptions
(7) and (8), the conclusion in (11) can be recovered:
(11) The product helps the buyer attain his sexual 
ability.
However, it could hardly be argued that the advertiser has 
communicated (9), and consequently (10) and (11), by making mutually 
manifest his intention to do so. Seinoo (capacity) is one word, 
even though it is transcribed in two separate Chinese characters and 
therefore can be broken down into two words, namely, sei (sex) and
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noo (ability). The advertiser could not be said to have overtly 
communicated (9), (10) and (11).
It is not surprising that an advertiser, promoting men's
toiletries, should want to associate the product with sexuality, 
especially when one recalls that homosexuals consume far more
toiletries than heterosexuals, and are therefore a potential target
group for advertisers. In fact, there are in the illustration some 
overtones of a picture from a 'gay' magazine. However, at the same 
time, it is reasonable that the advertiser should not want 
explicitly to make an association with sexuality, for that might be 
regarded as vulgar and distasteful, particularly as men's toiletries 
are often purchased by women as a gift, and such women might be put 
off by an obvious association between toiletries and sexual ability.
The next examples are both captions, advertising the same
miniature television set:
(12) Ki-tai mono o gamansuru to ningen
watch-want to thing obj. forbear if personality
ga chijimimasu. 
topic shrink
If you go without watching what you want to watch, 
your personality will shrink.
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(13) Mi-tai mono o gamansuru to jinsei
watch-want to thing obj. forbear if life
kuraku narimasu.
depressing become
If you go without watching what you want to watch,
your life will be depressing.
These captions are accompanied by somewhat similar illustrations. 
C12) is shown with three young Western people, two girls dominating 
the picture, intimately holding each other. A boy is holding one of
the girls from behind with one hand, and he has a miniature
television set in the other, with the faint suggestion of an orgy.
Caption (13) is illustrated by two Western girls intimately close to
one another, with one girl dominant and holding the other from 
behind. The girl who is being held is playing the piano, on the 
keys of which is placed a miniature television set. There are strong 
overtones of a lesbian relationship, and a sense of forbidden 
romance.
There is also some text attached to these captions. (14) and
(15) accompany (12) and (13), respectively:
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(14) Jinrui batten no rekishi, kore sunawachi kookishin 
juusoku no rekishi. 'Are mo mitai, kore mo mitai' no 
yajiuma-konjoo koso, ningen-seichoo no gendooryoku-na 
no de arimasu. . .
(15) Are-kore to, mamanaranu-koto no ooi kono yononaka. 
Semete, mi-tai mono gurai jiyuu ni mire-nakya, mani 
ga tanoshimi de ikite-iru no ka wakara-naku narimasu 
yo ne. . .
I have provided the following translations for these two texts:
(16) The history of the development of mankind is the 
history of the satisfaction of curiosity. 'Want to 
see this. Want to see that...' The curiosity which 
drives a mob is the source of energy which has 
driven mankind to grow this far...
(17) Can't do this, can't do that... There are many 
things forbidden in this world. What's the point of 
living unless we can at least watch what we want to 
when we want to?...
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The caption and text are closely related. (12) and (14) both
encourage curiosity. (12) says that if you give up your curiosity 
you will 'shrink', and (14) says that it is curiosity which helps 
people grow. There is a contrast between chijimu (shrink) and 
seichoo (growth). The word chijimu (shrink) is normally used to 
describe an inanimate object, and it is unusual for people to be 
said to 'shrink'. The word has a slight hint of the lack of 
erection. Thus, (12) may be interpreted as follows:
(18) If you refrain from watching what you want to watch, 
your penis will shrink.
or, to the extent that the illustration suggests an orgy;
(19) If you refrain from having an orgy, your penis will 
shrink.
Both (13) and (15) are about taboos; (13) says that life is 
depressing when one goes without the forbidden, and (15) asks what 
is the point of living if we are to go without what is forbidden. 
With the illustration suggesting a lesbian relationship, which is 
taboo, the following interpretation is possible:
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(20) If you go without a lesbian relationship, your life 
will be depressing.
Moreover, there is a caption, written in English, found in both 
advertisements:
(21) Anytime OK! Everywhere OK!
Vhat is OK anytime and everywhere is ambivalent. Considering that 
it is an advertisement for a miniature television set and that the 
caption is apparently talking about not being able to watch 
something, the following interpretation is possible:
(22) With our television set you can watch television 
anywhere at any time.
On the other hand, in a context in which (18) and (19), or (20) are 
present, (23) and (24) may be recovered, respectively.
(23) You can have an orgy anywhere at any time.
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(24) You can have lesbian sex anywhere at any time.
However, there is an intuitive reluctance to say that the 
advertiser has overtly communicated (18), (19), (20), (22), (23) and
(24) by means of (12), (13), (14), (15), and (21). (23) and (24)
are inconsistent with the fact that they are advertisements and that 
they are advertising a miniature television set. They are 
advertising neither an orgy nor a lesbian relationship, and there 
seems to be no reason why an advertisement for a television set 
should be encouraging an orgy or a lesbian relationship, which are 
not only irrelevant to the advertisement, but are also taboo in 
Japanese society. Even though it is known that sex is used in 
advertising in order to catch the attention and provide stimulation 
(Key 1973), the discussion goes onto a 'subliminal* level, and it 
does not apply to ostensive communication. It cannot be argued that 
the advertiser has intended to inform his audience of (18), (19),
(20), (22), (23) and (24) by making mutually manifest to himself and
his audience his intention to do so.
In some forms of communication, such as the one we have just 
seen, although the speaker has an informative intention - he intends 
to make certain information manifest - he does not intend to make 
that informative intention mutually manifest to his hearer and 
himself. In advertising, and indeed in communication in general, 
the success of the communication, i.e. the recovery by the hearer of 
the intended information, is not always achieved by making the
informative intention mutually manifest. In some cases, as I shall 
show, the fulfilment of the speaker's informative intention can 
actually best be achieved if the speaker's communicative intention, 
i.e. his intention to make his informative intention mutually 
manifest, is concealed from his hearer.
The cases just described would be considered by Sperber and 
Wilson as cases of 'information transmission* but not ones of 
'ostensive communication' governed by the principle of relevance. 
Sperber and Wilson argue (1986a:2) that there is no general theory 
of communication, and they propose a theory specifically to account 
for ostensive communication.
According to Sperber and Wilson (1986a:158), the principle of 
relevance only applies to ostensive communication, where the 
speaker, by his linguistic behaviour, intends to affect the mutual 
cognitive environment of himself and the hearer, i.e. the set of 
assumptions mutually manifest to both the hearer and the speaker. 
When the mutual cognitive environment of the hearer and the speaker 
is affected, i.e. when the speaker's informative intention is made 
mutually manifest, further assumptions are made mutually manifest to 
both interlocutors. As a result, their social relationship is 
affected, in particular their possibility of future linguistic or 
non-linguistic interaction.
In a case of information transmission, on the other hand, the 
mutual cognitive environment of the speaker and the hearer is not
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affected. Information transmission only affects the cognitive 
environment of the audience. A set of assumptions (I) become 
manifest to the hearer; the speaker's informative intention may 
become manifest, too, but it does not become mutually manifest to 
the hearer and the speaker. As a result, no new social relation is 
created between the speaker and the hearer, that is, their mutual 
cognitive environment is not affected. This may itself be a reason 
for the advertiser to engage in these forms of communication. I 
shall call these forms of communication 'covert communication', as 
opposed to ostensive communication.
The advertisement captions, discussed above, can be explained 
along these lines. The advertiser of the Japanese airline intended 
to make manifest to the audience assumption (4), but he has avoided 
a possible accusation of pornography or a protest from feminists by 
not making that informative intention mutually manifest to himself 
and to his audience. Similarly, the advertiser of Tech 21 intended 
to make manifest to the audience assumptions (10) and (11), but has 
avoided negative reaction to explicit statements about sexuality.
The advertiser of the miniature television set intended to make 
manifest to the audience assumptions (15), (16) and (17), but he has
not made his informative intention mutually manifest to the audience 
and himself, for those assumptions are apparently inconsistent with 
the principle of relevance and they may be offensive to viewers.
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The advertiser of the television set seems to have calculated 
that his advertisements would not be too offensive to his audience, 
as they both appeared in a Japanese magazine equivalent to the 
supplement to The News of the World. It is worth noting at this 
point that a different advertisement for the same television set 
appeared in a magazine equivalent to the supplement to The Sunday 
Times around the same time in 1986, showing four people: a middle- 
aged woman, apparently a housewife, a schoolboy with a baseball cap, 
a young woman with a magazine, and a young boy, apparently a 
student. Apart from the young woman holding her magazine and 
looking at the camera/ audience, everybody else is watching the 
miniature television set, with caption (25):
(25) Chikagoro, tsuukin-densha ga shumi desu. 
recently commuting-train topic hobby is
Recently the commuting-train has become my hobby.
Because everybody, except for the girl looking at the audience, is 
watching television, a further interpretation can be derived:
(26) Recently, watching television on the commuter train 
has become my hobby.
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There is no trace of sexual suggestion either in the writing 
or in the picture. The English caption (21) has been replaced by 
the following Japanese caption:
(27) Itsu-demo doko-demo TV taimu. 
when-even where-even TV time
TV-time, anytime, anywhere.
where 'TV' is written in the English alphabet, and taimu (time) in 
katakana characters, which are used for foreign loan words. From 
this, interpretation (28) can be derived:
(28) You can watch television anywhere at any time.
In (27), the topic, television time, is specified and there is 
no other possible topic. In the earlier advertisements, the topic 
in the English caption is not specified and it is left ambiguous as 
to what 'O.K.' might refer to. Considering that it is an 
advertisement for a miniature television set, watching television is 
an obvious candidate for being 'O.K.', but the pictures suggest an 
orgy and a lesbian relationship. Thus, the audience are left with 
two possibilities.
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These advertisers intended to affect the cognitive environment 
oi their audience by making them recover assumptions (4), (10),
(11), (18), (19), (20), (22), (23) and (24), and yet they avoided
any modification of the mutual cognitive environment of the audience 
and themselves by failing to make this intention mutually manifest 
to themselves and to the audience. By this sort of manipulation, 
the advertiser has avoided the social consequences of making his 
intention mutually manifest to his audience and himself, and he has 
allowed himself the possibility of denying having had that intention 
in the first place.
A cognitive environment is a set of assumptions that are 
manifest to an individual. A mutual cognitive environment is a set 
of assumptions that are mutually manifest to two or more 
individuals. Sharing a mutual cognitive environment is the basis 
for cooperation between 'equal' interlocutors.
Mutual manifestness may be of little cognitive importance, 
but it is of crucial social importance. A change in the 
mutual cognitive environment of two people is a change in 
their possibility of interaction.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:61-62)
However, in many cases of verbal exchange in advertising, and in 
communication in general, although the speaker intends to transmit 
some information and intends to make his addressee recognise that 
information, and perhaps the intention behind it, he does not want 
to affect the mutual cognitive environment that he shares with his 
addressee, precisely because he wants to avoid the social 
implications that such a modification of the mutual cognitive 
environment necessarily brings with it.
In the Okinawa case above, the speaker does not make his
informative intention mutually manifest to himself and the addressee 
because of the possible social consequences. The advertiser intends 
to inform the addressee of (4), but making his informative intention 
mutually manifest may have unwanted side effects, such as provoking 
accusations of pornography or sexism. The fulfilment of his 
informative intention, that is, the recovery of the intended
information by the addressee, is not helped by his obscuring his 
informative intention. However, the picture of the well-endowed
girl in a bikini is sufficient to help the addressee to get the 
message. That is why, even though some of my informants were not 
sure if the association between the word ookii (big) and the girl's 
breasts was intended by the advertiser, the advertiser's intention 
was achieved, because these audience could not help making the
connection between the two.
In the men's toiletries advertisement, the advertiser does not 
make his informative intention mutually manifest to himself and his
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addressee, because he wishes to avoid being accused of vulgarity and 
bad taste, or of encouraging homosexuality. The advertiser intends 
to inform the addressee of (10) and (11), but wishes to avoid the 
unwelcome social consequences it may bring to make this intention 
mutually manifest to the addressee and himself. He hopes that the 
addressee will be able to recover (10) and (11) on their own, with 
the help of the illustration.
In the case of the miniature television set advertisements in 
the Japanese equivalent of The News of the World, the advertiser 
intends to inform the viewer of (18), (19), (20), (22), (23) and
(.24), but does not intend to make his informative intention mutually 
manifest, in case doing so may cause some unwanted reaction, such as 
accusations of pornography or dislike of the advertiser. He has 
chosen a Japanese equivalent of The News of the World for his 
advertisements, as the readers of such a paper are unlikely to have 
negative reactions to these advertisements, but he is still careful 
not to make his informative intention mutually manifest and not to 
take entire responsibility for these interpretations.
The addressee who recovers interpretations (18), (19), (20),
(22), (23) and (24) has to take a larger share of the responsibility
than usual, being helped by the illustrations. When these 
interpretations are recovered without the addressee responding 
negatively to them, it may even create a feeling of solidarity with 
the advertiser for being daring and interesting. For the Japanese 
equivalent of The Sunday Times, the advertiser has chosen a
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completely different version, for he is aware that the readers are 
more likely to find the advertisements in the other magazine 
unacceptable. The readers of the Japanese equivalent of The Sunday 
Times would not have felt solidarity with an advertiser showing 
sexually suggestive illustration. They would have been dismayed, if 
not appalled.
As we have seen in this section, there are examples in 
advertising, in which advertisers attempt to communicate something 
without making their informative intention mutually manifest to the 
audience and themselves. In contrast, ostensive communication, 
which is defined in terms of the principle of relevance, requires 
some overtness: the speaker's informative intention must be made
mutually manifest to the audience and the speaker himself.
Is covert communication no longer a case of communication? Is 
it a deviation from the norm not to have the speaker's informative 
intention made mutually manifest? The issue here is not just a 
terminological one. As was pointed out above, Sperber and Vilson 
maintain that there can be no general theory of communication, and 
propose a theory to account for a specific type of communication, 
i.e. ostensive-inierential communication, which is defined in terms 
of the principle of relevance. The interesting questions are: how
can one explain covert communication or information transmission? 
Can Relevance Theory provide a useful framework for this process, 
and if so how? These are the questions I shall consider in the 
following sections.
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4.4. Communication and ostension
Sperber and Wilson argue that it is not hard to see how the 
fulfilment of the communicative intention, that is, the 
communicator's intention to make it mutually manifest to both the 
audience and himself that he intends to inform the audience of 
something, can lead to the fulfilment of his informative intention:
...the realisation that a trustworthy communicator intends 
to make you believe something is an excellent reason for 
believing it.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:163)
As it stands, the argument is sound. However, it raises the 
quesion: who is a trustworthy communicator? It is idealistic and
unrealistic to assume that communication always takes place between 
a trustworthy communicator and a trusting addressee. Let us look at 
Sperber and Wilson's argument again:
There are situations in which the mere fact that an 
intention is recognised may lead to its fulfilment.
Suppose that Mary intends to please Peter. If Peter 
becomes aware of her intention to please him, this may in 
itself be enough to please him. Similarly, when the 
inmates of a prison recognise their warden's intention to 
make them fear him, this may be enough in itself to make 
them fear him. There is one type of intention for which 
this possibility, rather than being exceptional, is 
regularly exploited: intentions to inform are quite 
generally fulfilled by being made recognisable.
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a:21-22)
Although it is not stated explicitly, in Sperber and Wilson's 
example, Mary ar\d Peter are presented as a couple living together, 
apparently on equal terms, and are portrayed as a trustworthy 
communicator and a trusting addressee. In this case, the fact that 
the communicator intends to make the addressee believe something is 
an excellent reason for the addressee to believe it. There is 
underlying 'cooperation' between the interlocutors which justifies 
the addressee in believing something, on the grounds that the 
communicator intends to make the addressee believe it. In the case 
of a prison warder and inmates, the warder is in a position where he 
could make the prisoners' life difficult, if he were to set his mind 
to it. Again, this is a case where, for the addressee to believe 
something, it is sufficient that the communicator should intend to 
communicate it. The communicator is clearly in possession of a
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social power which enables him to achieve his intention over his 
addressee, regardless of the addressee's reaction.
Let us look at some examples. Suppose that Peter has said to 
Mary (29):
(29) I'll make a meal because you are tired.
In this case, the mere fact that Mary has intended to make Peter 
believe (.29) is an excellent reason for her to believe it.
Or, let us suppose a prison warder has said (30) to his 
prisoners:
(30) You'd better be cooperative, or you may find life 
here unpleasant.
It is a good enough reason for the prisoners to believe (30) that he 
has intended to make them believe it.
However, this does not mean to say that these cases are the 
norm and that anything that does not work in the same way is a 
deviation from normal communication. The point which Sperber and
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Vilson make, as illustrated in these examples, is that the strength 
with which the communicated assumptions will be entertained is 
commensurate with the hearer's trust in the speaker. If the hearer 
does not trust the speaker, she would not believe what he says; if 
she trusts him a little, she will believe it a little; and if she 
has a great trust in him, she will believe it to a great extent. 
Moreover, the speaker can not only satisfy the hearer's expectations 
he can also exploit them.
However, as Sperber and Vilson are aware, there are cases in 
which the assumptions about a trustworthy speaker and a trusting 
hearer do not hold. For example, when a double-glazing salesman 
intends to make his customer believe that she would benefit from his 
services, it is unlikely that the customer would regard the fact 
that the salesman intends to make her believe it as a good reason to 
believe it. Similarly, neither side in a court case, whether 
plaintiff or defendant, would accept as a good reason to believe 
something the mere fact that the communicator intends to make the 
audience believe it. Suppose that (31) has been said by a double- 
glazing salesman, and (32) by a defendant in a court:
(31) You would find the room much quieter.
(32) I am innocent.
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The customer and the jury would not regard it as a good reason to 
believe (31) and (32), respectively, that the salesman and the 
defendant had intended to make them believe these statements. It is 
obvious that (31) and (32) have been said for the respective speaker 
to achieve his own goals. Each speaker might have said (31) or (32) 
even if these statements were inconsistent with the truth, that is, 
not worth the hearer's while to believe.
These cases, where it is not a sufficient reason for the 
addressee to believe something that the communicator intends to make 
her believe it, are not exceptional. The kinds of communication 
which take place in advertising, political debate, and academic 
discussion, for example, all seem to belong to this category. 
Indeed, even in our daily social conversation, these cases are rife. 
Suppose someone is trying to impress you, the realisation that the 
communicator intends to make you believe something would not be a 
good reason for you to believe it. On the contrary, it is likely 
that it would prove to be an excellent reason for you not to believe 
it.
As Sperber and Vilson show, the hearer can recover the set of 
assumptions (I) intended by the speaker without actually believing 
them. As argued above, the strength which the hearer assigns to 
these assumptions depends on her confidence in the speaker. All 
this applies to ostensive-inferential communication. The hearer has 
to firstly recognise the informative intention, and secondly decide 
whether she believes what she is being told. The success of
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communication has been defined as the hearer recovering the 
speaker's informative intention, and not as the speaker making the 
hearer believe something.
Communication can take place between interlocutors who trust 
each other, hold this trust to be mutual, and strive towards the 
same goal, that is, the enlargement of the mutual cognitive 
environment, as in the case of Peter trying to please Mary. It is 
mutually manifest that there is social cooperation between them.
Communication may also occur between socially unequal 
interlocutors, as in the case of the prison warder frightening his 
inmates. The warder possesses a power over the inmates which 
enables him to do things to them regardless of their will, or even 
against their will. The inmates cannot but take the warder's 
communicative intention seriously for their own interest. They are 
forced to cooperate with the warder.
The case of the double-glazing salesman persuading his customer 
is different again from either category just mentioned, except that 
it has in common with the case of the prison warder and his 
prisoners the fact that communication takes place between unequal 
interlocutors. Here the addressee does not necessarily regard the 
communicator as trustworthy, and the communicator intends to inform 
the addressee of something without her trusting him, or even despite 
her distrusting him. It is mutually manifest that the intended 
effect of the communication is for the communicator's benefit, and
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not necessarily for the addressee's, even though the communicator 
may claim otherwise. It is the addressee who has a power over the 
communicator. The communicator cannot afford to rely on the 
addressee's cooperation.
This is not to argue that the hearer's trust and co-operation 
are necessary for ostensive communication. Vhen it exists, it is 
just one contextual factor among others. However, it does help the 
fixation of belief, which is presumably why people engage in 
communication. The point is that there is a social aspect to be 
taken into consideration when studying communication.
It must be pointed out here that the language of advertising is 
a language of unequal interlocutors, unequal in the sense that the 
speaker and the hearer are not on equal terms. They are not a 
trustworthy speaker and a trusting hearer, who cooperate with each 
other, and strive for the same end. It is like the type of 
communication which takes place between a double-glazing salesman 
and his customer, or a defendant and the jury, rather than that 
between a prison warder and his prisoners. It is manifest to both 
the advertiser and his addressee that he is saying something because
he wants her to buy the product or service for his own benefit, and jy-y^ c^ 
not because he genuinely believes that she would benefit from the 
product or the service. It is not a good reason for the addressee 
to believe something that the advertiser has intended to make her 
believe it. The advertiser must make his addressee believe
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something without her trusting in him, or, indeed, despite her 
distrusting him.
At this point, it is worth distinguishing 'cooperation' at the 
social level from 'cooperation' at what one can call 'the cognitive 
level'. Cooperation at the cognitive level is always present when 
communication of any kind takes place, and it is a prerequisite for 
it to happen. Even when war is declared against an enemy, the enemy 
pays attention to the stimulus the communicator is using, the enemy 
processes it, and then communication becomes successful. The two 
sides may not be cooperative with each other socially, but they have 
cooperation at the cognitive level.
There are cases of communication in which there is cooperation 
between the communicator and the addressee, not only at the 
cognitive level, but also at 'the social level', as in the case of 
Peter offering Mary to make a meal. Sometimes a communicator can 
rely on the fact that he is regarded by the addressee as a 
trustworthy communicator, that she is a trusting addressee, and that 
it is an excellent reason for her to believe something that he 
intends to make her believe.
Sometimes a communicator can depend on the adressee's 
cooperation at both cognitive and social levels, but not intend to 
bear responsibility for the social consequences which result from 
the communication, as we have seen in the case of Mary getting Peter 
to mend her hair-drier. The communicator can rely on both .cognitive
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and social cooperation from the addressee, even if the communicator 
does not reciprocate by being willing to modify the mutual cognitive 
environment, as in this case.
Furthermore, there can also be a communicator who does not 
expect cooperation at the social level. He has to aim at the 
intended effect by means of his stimulus, and not by means of the 
addressee's willingness to cooperate. The double-glazing salesman 
is an example of this category. All these communicators have their 
addressees' cooperation at the cognitive level, or otherwise 
communication does not happen at all, but it is cooperation at the 
social level which varies depending on the situation.
This distinction between the cognitive and the social level in 
cooperation between communicator and addressee is crucial to my 
analysis of advertising. The advertiser does not take for granted 
that he has his addressee's cooperation at either level. Firstly, 
he works at drawing the addressee's attention and thus at obtaining 
her cooperation at the cognitive level, by using various stimuli, 
not only linguistic but also audiovisual. Secondly, even when he 
has managed to gain the addressee's cognitive cooperation, he cannot 
expect her cooperation at the social level. It is mutually manifest 
to the advertiser and to the addressee that they are not equal 
partners engaged in communication and striving to reach the same 
goal. The addressee would not treat the fact that the advertiser 
intends to make her believe something as a good reason for 
believing it. On the contrary, she might even regard it as an
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excellent reason to disbelieve it. The communicator has to resort
to other ways of making his addressee believe his message.
In ostensive communication, the speaker provides a guarantee of 
optimal relevance, and asks for the hearer's cooperation at a 
cognitive level. However, as Sperber and Vilson point out, the
speaker needs not live up to the guarantee of relevance: he may give 
it in bad faith. So, the cognitive co-operation of the speaker is 
not required even for ostensive communication to take place.
Relevance Theory can provide a useful framework to analyse 
ostensive communication in terms of the two layers of intentions, 
namely, the informative intention and the communicative intention, 
and the notion of mutual manifestness. I will repeat here the
definitions of informative and communicative intentions for the sake 
of convenience:
Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest 
to the audience a set of assumptions II) .
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:58)
Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to 
audience and communicator that the communicator has this 
informative intention.
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(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:61)
The goal of communication can be described as the fulfilment of
the communicator's informative intention. However, communication 
may succeed without the communicator's informative intention being 
fulfilled, for it is possible that the addressee disbelieves or 
disagrees with assumptions which the communicator intends to make 
manifest or more manifest to her. The communicator's informative
intention can be recognised without its being fulfilled. All the
communicator can do is to hope that the addressee will believe what 
is intended to be made manifest or more manifest to her by the 
communicator's stimulus.
In ostensive communication, the communicator hopes to increase 
his chances of success in communication, that is, of his informative 
intention being fulfilled, by means of his communicative Intention, 
i.e. by making his informative intention mutually manifest to both 
the addressee and himself. He hopes that the fact that he intends 
to inform his addressee of something will be a good enough reason 
for her to believe it.
Vhat happens, then, after the communicator's informative 
intention has been made mutually manifest, is described by Sperber 
and Vilson as, follows:
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By making her informative intention mutually manifest, 
the communicator creates the following situation: it 
becomes mutually manifest that the fulfilment of her 
informative intention is, so to speak, in the hands of 
the audience; if the assumptions that she intends to 
make manifest to the audience become manifest, then she 
is successful; if the audience refuses to accept these 
assumptions as true or probably true, then she has 
failed in her informative intention.
(Sperber and Vilson 1986a:62)
Whether the communicator's informative intention is fulfilled or 
not, in ostensive-communication, the communicator's communicative 
intention is, by definition, fulfilled. This then alters the 
mutual cognitive environment of the communicator and the addressee, 
regardless of the fulfilment of the communicator's informative 
intention. In other words, the mutual cognitive environment is 
affected whether or not the communicator achieves the fulfil-ment of 
his informative intention.
Vhat is crucially involved in ostensive communication is the 
alteration of the mutual cognitive environment between the 
communicator and the addressee, and this inevitably causes the 
alteration of the social relationship between them. By engaging in 
ostensive communication, the communicator leaves the fulfilment of
his informative intention 'in the hands of' the addressee, as 
Sperber and Vilson put it (1986a:62). The addressee can accept it 
or reject it. Either way, this creates, as a result, some change in 
the relationship between the communicator and the addressee.
I have examined situations, such as the case of Mary getting 
Peter to mend her hail— drier, in which the communicator makes his 
informative intention manifest to the addressee, without making it 
mutually manifest to both the addressee and the communicator 
himself. This can be put in the following way: the communicator may 
intend to have his informative intention fulfilled without reference 
to his communicative intention. In all the relevant cases I have 
referred to above, the communicator uses other means of 
communication to help, such as the display of a hair-drier being set 
apart, or the illustrations used by the advertisers. Perhaps, these 
non-linguistic stimuli act as an aid to the fulfilment of his 
informative intention, which could be helped with the communicator's 
communicative intention in the case of ostensive communication.
Here, the communicator aims at the fulfilment of his informative 
intention without having a communicative intention of the type 
described above. He intends to make his informative intention 
manifest to the addressee, in other words, to have his informative 
intention recognised by the addressee, but not to make it mutually 
manifest to the addressee and himself: no communicative intention is 
formed. His motivation for doing this is to avoid any alteration of 
the mutual cognitive environment of the addressee and himself, and
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thus any social consequences the alteration may bring with it. 
Having recognised the communicator's informative intention to make a 
set of assumptions manifest, the addressee is given a choice of 
accepting these assumptions as true or probably true. However, 
because the communicator's informative intention is not made 
mutually manifest, whether the addressee accepts these assumptions 
as true or not, the mutual cognitive environment of the communicator 
and the addressee stays unchanged. Consequently, the communicator 
is saved from any social implications that may result if his 
informative intention is made mutually manifest to the addressee and 
himself.
In the case of the double-glazing salesman persuading his 
customer, the communicator intends to fulfil his informative 
intention without making this intention manifest to his addressee. 
In other words, the communicator may intend to make manifest or more 
manifest a set of assumptions, concealing his informative intention. 
In this case, the reason for the communicator to engage in such 
communication is that he is aware that revealing his informative 
intention to the addressee may have adverse effects on. the 
fulfilment of his informative intention.
The examples of the advertisements discussed above which 
contain sexual stimuli seem to belong to a yet another type. Having 
his informative intention mutually manifest to the viewer and the 
communicator himself may bring unwanted social implications, as the 
advertiser of the Okinawa advertisement may face protest from
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feminists. Or, it may have adverse effects on the achievement of 
his aim, as viewers of advertisements in general may distrust 
advertisers. Moreover, it may not be crucial for the communicator 
to make the addressee believe a set of assumptions to be true. As 
long as concepts of sex are triggered, the addressee will entertain 
them, as humans are inclined to be drawn to them, and the ac^essee 
will presumably form favourable assumptions and associate them with 
the advertisement, and consequently with the product advertised in 
it.
In the case of ostensive communication, it is hoped that the 
recognition by the addressee of the communicator's informative 
intention should lead to the fulfilment of his informative 
intention. The cases of non-ostensive communication are different 
and achieved without the communicator's communicative intention 
formed, that is without the communicator's informative intention 
mutually manifest. In the case of Mary getting Peter to mend her 
hair-drier, the recognition by the addressee of the communicator's 
informative intention would help with the fulfilment of this 
intention. However, the social implications which the modification 
of the mutual cognitive environment between the communicator and the 
addressee may bring must be avoided, and therefore the 
communicator's informative intention is not made mutually manifest. 
The double-glazing salesman does not make his informative intention 
mutually manifest, as doing so may interfere with the fulfilment of 
this intention. In the examples of advertisements containing sexual 
stimuli as discussed above, the communicator merely intends to
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trigger concepts of sex, and it is not crucial for him whether the
addressee should believe his message to be true.
In this section, I have examined the notion of ostension and
the role it plays in communication. Ostension is based on two
layers of intentions, namely, the informative intention and the 
communicative intention. The fulfillment of the communicative 
intention, i.e. the recognition of the informative intention, can 
lead to the fulfillment of this informative intention, which is 
presumably the communicator's ultimate goal. However, for the 
communicative intention to successfully lead to the fulfillment of 
the informative intention, there has to be some kind of cooperation
between the communicator and the addressee. I have considered the
significance of cooperation between the communicator and the 
addressee, and distinguished between cognitive cooperation and
social cooperation. For communication to take place at all, 
cooperation at the cognitive level is a prerequisite.
Although social cooperation is not a requirement for
communication to occur, it can play a crucial role in the fixation 
of beliefs, and hence in the fulfillment of the communicator's 
informative intention, that is the intention to make a set of 
assumptions manifest to the addressee. However, there are cases in 
which the communicator has to make his addressee believe something 
without having her social cooperation. In these cases, the 
communicator may resort to covert communication. He intends to make 
his informative intention manifest without forming any communicative
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intention, i.e. intention to make his informative intention mutually 
manifest to both the addressee and himself. Or, the communicator 
may engage in covert communication, not necessarily because he does 
not have the addressee's social cooperation, but possibly because he 
wishes to avoid the social consequences which engaging in ostensive 
communication may cause.
Communication does not always occur between a trustworthy 
communicator and a trusting addressee, or between socially equal 
participants. It may bring adverse effects for a communicator to 
engage in ostensive communication, making his informative intention 
mutually manifest to the addressee and himself. Or, it may have 
social implications, which the communicator does not welcome. Thus, 
the communicator may not form any communicative intention, or he may 
conceal part or all of his communicative intention. These would not 
be cases of ostensive communication; they are cases of covert 
communication. Sperber and Wilson's notions of informative and 
communicative intentions provide an adequate framework to analyse 
the difference between ostensive communication and covert 
communication.
4.5. Weak implicatures and non-ostensive communication
Before I try to analyse covert forms of communication, it will 
become important to distinguish weak implicatures, which are 
nontheless ostensively communicated, from covert forms of 
communication, which are non-ostensive. In this section, I shall 
examine weak implicatures which conform to Sperber and Wilson's 
notion of ostensive communication and therefore can be analysed in 
terms of the principle of relevance.
In indirect but ostensive communication, some implicatures are 
strongly backed by the speaker, whereas some are very weakly 
implicated and, therefore the hearer has to take a great 
responsibility if she is to believe them. Nevertheless, these weak 
implicatures are ostensively communicated. It is worth recalling 
here that in ostensive communication the communicator's informative 
intention must not only be made manifest to the addresse, but must 
also be made mutually manifest to both the addressee and the 
communicator himself. This overt aspect of communication is crucial 
to Sperber and Wilson's account of ostensive-inferential 
communication. Weak implicatures, which are ostensively
communicated, however weakly communicated they may be, comply with 
this requirement of overtness. They must be distinguished from 
covert forms of communication, which are non-ostensive and therefore 
do not conform to this overtness.
In Sperber and Wilson's account of ostensive communication, the 
communicator's informative intention is not an intention directly to 
modify the addressee's thoughts. What he does intend instead is to
modify the cognitive environment of the addressee, by making a set 
of assumptions manifest or more manifest to her. Let us suppose 
that Paul has said (33) to Kay:
(33) I went to Glyndebourne last Saturday.
Now, where is the hearer supposed to look for the relevance of (33)? 
The explicatures of (33), that is, assumptions obtained by
development of the logical forms encoded by (33), include the 
following assumption:
(34) Paul has said that he went to Glyndebourne on the 
previous Saturday.
It can be said that Paul has explicitly communicated (34). It is 
also plausible to argue that he has expected Kay to supply premise 
(35) and derive (36):
(35) Glyndebourne is known for its opera company.
(36) Paul went to the opera at Glyndebourne.
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The question is, what more, if anything, has Paul implicitly
communicated? Are there further assumptions which are members of
(I), that is, assumptions which Paul has intended to make manifest 
to Kay? Kay could provide premises (37)-(40), for example:
(37) Tickets for Glyndebourne are expensive.
(38) People who can buy expensive opera tickets are 
wealthy.
(39) People who go to the opera are cultured.
(40) People who go to Glyndebourne belong to a certain 
social class.
Processing (33) in a context which includes (37) - (40), Kay might 
derive (41) - (43):
(41) Paul is wealthy.
(42) Paul is cultured.
(43) Paul belongs to a certain social class.
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However weak these implicatures may be, in many circumstances 
Paul would overtly communicate (41)-(43), even if he did not intend 
Kay to derive these particular conclusions. It cannot be argued 
that he strongly backs them up; she takes the responsibility to a 
degree for supplying these particular premises and conclusions. On 
the other hand, Paul could have made a certain assumption about 
Kay's knowledge and guessed that she would supply just these 
premises and conclusions.
Thus, it could be that Paul has said (33) in order to impress 
Kay with his financial and social background, that he is wealthy, 
cultured, and belongs to a certain social class. He has probably 
succeeded in making mutually manifest his intention to make these 
assumptions manifest to her, hence implicated them. Vhat he cannot 
be sure oi is that she will actually access and use just these 
assumptions, of all those that were manifest. That is what makes 
them weak implicatures in many circumstances. Because they are 
weakly implicated, he is dependent on the hearer's ability and 
willingness to supply these premises and derive the intended 
conclusions. But he could try to raise his success rate by making a 
right assumption about Kay, about what information she is likely to 
have accessible.
Thus, the communicator can achieve successful communication 
through weak implicatures. Even though he cannot be sure of 
success, he can make a right assumption about his addressee that she
is likely to access and use certain assumptions in interpreting his 
utterance, and aim at high probability.
It has been argued that there is a sole criterion by which the 
hearer identifies assumptions ostensively communicated by the 
utterance, namely, consistency with the principle of relevance. 
Thus, (33) opens up a number of possibilities of implicature. The 
hearer supplies premises which are accessible in her cognitive 
environment, and then derives implicatures consistent with the 
principle oi relevance. These are implicatures which a rational 
speaker might have thought would yield enough effects to make her 
processing effort worth while, and put her to no unjustiable 
processing effort in achieving these effects.
The question here is, how far should Kay seek for
possibilities? In other words, how far should she keep adding 
premises to the context and recovering further conclusions? For 
example, should Kay add (44) the context and derive (45)?:
(44) People who go to Glyndebourne do not like hunting,
shooting and fishiing.
(45) Paul does not like hunting, shooting and fishing.
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It is very doubtful that Paul has given his hearer Kay any 
encouragement to supply the premise in (44) and derive (45). The 
conclusion to be drawn from these examples is that there may be no 
cut-off point between assumptions strongly backed by the 
communicator, i.e. implicatures, and assumptions derived from the 
utterance, but only on the addressee's sole responsibility, i.e. 
non-iraplicated contextual implications.
It can be argued in the example above that (35) is a strongly 
implicated premise and (36) a strongly implicated conclusion, which 
are strongly backed by the speaker. In contrast, (44) is a very 
weakly implicated premise and (45) a very weakly implicated 
conclusion. Though there is some backing from the speaker, the 
backing is very weak, and the hearer has to derive them on her own 
responsibility. Nevertheless, both strong and weak implicatures are 
ostensively communicated, and therefore are consistent with the 
principle of relevance.
On the one hand, from the hearer's point of view, there are 
actually two criteria which she uses in deciding how far she is to 
investigate. Firstly, the hearer uses the criterion of consistency 
with the principle of relevance. Secondly, in deciding how far she 
should go in providing premises, adding them to the context, and 
deriving conclusions, she uses the criterion governing her own 
cognitive activities, namely, the search for maximal relevance. 
That is, she goes as far as she finds it relevant to go. She would 
not go beyond the point where her processing effort outweighs the
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effects she gets out of the derived conclusions. If the effect 
obtained from the derived assumptions is weighed against processing 
effort, there will be a point at which it is not worth going any 
further. On the other hand, from the speaker's point of view, the 
sole criterion is consistency with the principle of relevance.
It has been argued that the communicator can achieve successful 
communication through weak implicatures. Even if he cannot be 
absolutely sure of success, he can rely on a high degree of 
probability that his addressee will access and use certain 
assumptions in interpreting his utterance. However, because each 
individual has a differen-t cognitive environment, and different 
cognitive preferences and abilities, what is worth the processing 
effort depends on the individual. Let us suppose that Paul has said 
(46) :
(46) I like Beethoven.
In uttering (46), Paul has in mind symphonies and concertos by 
Beethoven, as many people might have. On the other hand, his 
hearer, Kay, has just seen the opera Fidelio, and has (47) 
immediately accessible in her mind:
(47) Beethoven composed Fidelio.
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Thus, she adds premise (47) to the context and derives (48):
(48) Paul likes Fidelio.
However, it is quite possible that Paul did not have Fidelio in 
mind on uttering (46) and did not expect Kay to derive (48). Indeed, 
Paul may not even like Fidelio at all. But since Kay has just seen 
Fidelio, she finds it the most accessible piece by Beethoven. 
Providing premise (47) thus does not cause her much effort. From 
Kay's point of view, (48) is a conclusion easily derived from Paul's 
utterance (46). From Paul's point of view, he has certainly not 
strongly encouraged his hearer to derive (48); he only very weakly 
implicated it. Thus, as mentioned above, in the case of a weak 
implicature, the hearer must take considerable responsibility if she 
is going to treat it as true.
The communicator can take advantage of this indeterminacy, as 
we shall see in the examples below. Since there is no clear 
boundary between assumptions implicated by the communicator and non­
implicated assumptions derived on the addressee's responsibility, 
and since the addressee is always to some extent responsible for 
weakly implicated assumptions she derives, there is no fool-proof 
way of determining which assumptions are weakly implicated by the 
communicator and which are merely non-implicated premises and 
conclusions: that is, there is no way of proving which assumptions
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are weakly, ostensively communicated, and which are not ostensively 
communicated at all.
Let us look at the following exchange between Malcom Turnbull, 
the lawyer who acted for Peter Wright, and Sir Robert Armstrong, who 
was the main witness, representing the British government, in the 
Spycatcher trial. During the trial, seeing Armstrong nervous and 
rattled by the suggestion that he had told an untruth in order to 
protect the sources of operations of M15, Turnbull ploughed on. He 
turned to a letter, which was written by Sir Robert Armstrong to 
William Armstrong, chairman of the book's publishers, on 23 March 
1981, which reads as follows:
I have seen the extracts in the Daily Mail today from 
Chapman Pincher's forthcoming book, Their Trade is 
Treachery. The prime minister is in my judgment likely to 
come under pressure to make some statement on the matters 
with which Mr. Pincher is dealing ... I should like to be 
able to put her in a position where she could make a 
statement this Thursday (26th March), if she could wish to 
do so. I should therefore be very grateful if you would 
be willing to make one or (preferably) two copies of the 
book available to me as soon as possible ...
(From 'The wily colonial boy versus the upper
- 232 -
class Brit' in the 15th March, 1987 issue of 
The Sunday Times)
Sir Robert agreed that the letter was designed to give the 
impression that the gove^nent did not have a copy of the book, 
whereas it had somehow obtained the page proofs some six weeks 
previously. He was communicating the following implicature:
(.49) The government did not have a copy of Their Trade is 
Treachery.
This was followed by the exchange below:
T: I put it to you that this letter contains an untruth.
A: It does not say that we have already got a copy of the 
book, that is quite true.
T: So it contains a lie?
A: As one person said, it is perhaps being economical with
the truth.
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(Edited extracts from 'The wily colonial boy 
versus the upper class Brit' in the 15th March, 
1987 issue of The Sunday Times, 
where 'T.' stands for Turnbull and 'A.' for 
Armstrong.)
Armstrong did intend to communicate, even though by 
implication, (.49). It was, perhaps, indirectly and weakly
communicated, nevertheless, it was ostensively communicated by 
Armstrong making his informative intention mutually manifest to the 
publisher and himself.
Thus, in this case, the speaker was trying to take advantage of 
the fact that he was communicating certain assumptions by 
implicature, rather than explicature, and he was denying his backing 
for these assumptions, despite the fact that he had ostensively 
communicated them. These cases are not exceptional; implicatures 
are often denied by speakers who ostensively communicated them but 
want to shift the responsibility for them to their audience.
The examples I have considered in this section involve weak 
implicatures. However weakly they may be implicated, they are 
ostensively communicated, and therefore can be analysed in terms of 
the principle of relevance. They all conform to the requirement of 
overtness, i.e. the communicator intends to inform his audience of
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something by making his informative intention mutually manifest to 
the audience and himself.
In the next section, I shall go back to examples of covert 
forms of communication, where this overt aspect of communication is 
lacking, and I shall consider how they can be analysed.
4.6. Covert communication
In Section 4.3, I examined examples of covert communication, in
bwhich the speaker does not formAcommunicative intention, that is, he 
does not intend to make his informative intention mutually manifest, 
for example, advertisement captions (1), (5), (12) and (13). These
are not cases of ostensive communication, and therefore the 
principle of relevance does not apply to them, for it applies only 
to cases of ostensive communication. In Section 4.5, I have also 
considered examples of weak implicature, which are ostensively 
communicated, and therefore can be accounted for by the principle of 
relevance.
Now, can Relevance Theory account for covert communication? 
Sperber and Wilson's notions of informative intention and 
communicative intentions provide an adequate framework to define 
covert communication. On the one hand, in ostensive communication,
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the speaker aims at the fulfillment of his informative intention by 
fulfilling his communicative intention, that is, his intention to 
make it mutually manifest to the addressee and himself that he has 
this informative intention. On the other hand, in covert 
communication, the speaker intends to achieve fulfillment of his 
informative intention without forming any communicative intention, 
i.e. without intending to make his informative intention mutually 
manifest to the addressee and himself. In these cases, the speaker 
intends to affect the cognitive environment of his addressee by 
making her recover certain assumptions, yet he avoids modification of 
the mutual cognitive environment of the addressee and himself by not 
making this intention mutually manifest to his addressee and 
himself. The difference between ostensive communication and covert 
communication has been described as follows:
Ostensive communication: an overt form of
communication where there is, on the part of the speaker, 
an intention to alter the mutual cognitive environment of 
the speaker and the hearer.
Covert communication: a case of communication where the 
intention of the speaker is to alter the cognitive 
environment of the hearer, i.e. to make a set of 
assumptions more manifest to her, without making this 
intention mutually manifest.
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(Rencherif and Tanaka 1987)
Relevance Theory deals not only with a specified type of 
communication, that is, ostensive-inferential communication, but 
also with cognition. I argue that the notion of relevance can be 
extended to account for non-ostensive stimuli, and that 
considerations of relevance offer an appropriate explanation of how 
covert forms of communication are carried out.
In non-ostensive communication, the hearer does not have the
speaker's guarantee of optimal relevance, which offers a criterion
for deciding what the speaker intends to communicate, and thus
5
directs the hearer's attention to certain assumptions. However, the 
principle of relevance is not the only factor involved in human 
cognition. Human cognition is organised in such a way that it is 
perhaps more susceptible to certain stimuli than others.
According to Sperber and Wilson, human cognition is designed to 
pick out relevant stimuli, and to process them in the most efficient 
way. The notion of relevance proposed by Sperber and Wilson is not 
only valid in ostensive-inferential communication, but describes a 
general cognitive tendency determining which of the available 
stimuli are likely to be processed, and in what way.
It can be argued that covert communication exploits this human 
susceptibility to certain stimuli. The communicator intends to
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communicate something without being overt about it, that is, not by 
making his informative intention mutually manifest to the addressee 
and himself, but by relying on the addressee noticing certain 
things, given the way her general cognitive system is organised. Ve 
have considered examples in which sex is used as a stimulus which 
draws the audience's attention to something. In Chapter 3, it was 
suggested that perhaps food was one of the stimuli which appeal to 
human cognition as relevant.
In example (1), the advertiser intends to convey (4) without 
making the informative intention behind it mutually manifest. He
can expect to succeed in conveying (4), even though he does not make
his informative intention mutually manifest, because he knows that 
his audience will probably notice the girl's breasts. The audience 
are likely to notice the breasts, not because the advertiser made it 
mutually manifest that he intended them to notice it, but because 
their mind is organised in such a way that it is susceptible to such 
stimili, that these stimuli are relevant to them.
In (5), the suggestion of sex is carried out through both the 
Chinese character which can mean 'sex' on its own and the
illustration, showing a naked torso of a young man. This
information transmission is achieved, because the audience are 
likely to pay attention to these phenomena, even though the 
advertiser does not make his informative intention mutually manifest 
to them and himself.
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The advertiser of (12) and (13) succeeds in making some 
assumptions about sex manifest or more manifest to his audience 
without having to make his informative intention mutually manifest 
to them and himself, and therefore without giving his guarantee of 
relevance. The slightest hint of an orgy and a lesbian relationship 
draws the audience's attention, because their cognitive system is 
organised in such a way that it is more susceptible to this kind of 
information. Quite generally, covert communication manipulates 
triggers of the sort which the human mind cannot avoid responding 
to.
Despite the prima facia inconsistency of some aspects of 
communication in advertising with Relevance Theory, the central 
concepts of the theory in fact make it possible to provide an 
explanation oi these very aspects. Thus, we have used the concepts 
of mutual cognitive environment, mutual manifestness, informative 
and communicative intentions to bring out the distinction between 
equal and unequal partners in acts of communication.
Sharing a mutual cognitive environment is the basis for the 
cooperation and coordination which underlie all genuine acts of 
communication between 'equal' partners, where the speaker is sincere 
and the hearer trusts him, and where they both strive towards the 
same end, that is, maximising the relevance of all new information 
in order to modify their knowledge of the world.
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However, in unequal partnerships, such as in advertising, the 
communicator, though intending to transmit some information and 
intending to make the audience recognise that information, does not 
wish to affect the mutual cognitive environment that he shares with 
his audience, because he wants to avoid the social consequences that 
such modification of their mutual cognitive environment necessarily 
brings with it.
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4.6. Conclusion
The notion of ostention is crucial to Sperber and Wilson's 
analysis of ostensive-inferential communication. Ostensive
communication must have the overtness of the speaker intending to 
alter the mutual cognitive environment shared by the hearer and 
himself.
The main purpose of this chapter has been to consider examples 
oi discourse which do not conform to ostention. In this type of 
communication, covert communication, the speaker intends to alter 
the cognitive environment oi the hearer but does not intend to make 
this intention mutually manifest to the hearer and himself and thus 
alter their mutual cognitive environment. The reason for this may 
be that the speaker believes that revealing his informative 
intention would have an adverse effect on the fulfilment of his 
informative intention. Or, it may be that the speaker wishes to 
avoid the social consequences which might ensue from engaging in 
ostensive communication.
JL
Now, does Relevance Theory offer^contribution to analysing this 
type of communication, which does not confarm to ostensive 
communication? I have argued that the notion of informative and 
communicative intention provides an adequate definition of covert 
communication and distinguishes it from ostensive communication.
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The notion of relevance is defined in terms of contextual
effect and processing effort: everything being equal, the more
contextual effect, the more relevant; everything being equal, the 
less processing effort, the more relevant. The hearer processes a 
stimulus and derives contextual effects as a reward. Contextual
effects are derived through inference.
In covert communication, however, the hearer does not get her 
reward entirely through inference. Nor does the speaker rely on the 
hearer to receive enough contextual effects to compensate for her 
processing effort. The speaker exploits the fact that humans are 
susceptible to certain stimuli, such as sex and food. In 
advertising, for example, the advertiser includes a sexual
illustration in the advertisement, which acts as a reward to 
compensate for the audience's attention.
It could thus be argued that there are elements in covert 
communication, such as the fact that humans are suceptible to 
certain stimuli, which are not fully accounted for by Relevance 
Theory as it stands. The theory provides a useful framework to
define covert communication and delineates the position of such 
elements, but it does not explain how they work. Further research 
is awaited to explain how factors such as human suceptibility and 
emotions function in communication and how they interact with the 
principle oi relevance.
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Chapter 5: Images of Women in Advertising
5.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses some specific examples of the language 
used in contemporary advertisements in Japan and the U.K. which 
target young women. The projection of the image of women in 
advertising has been the subject of a vast literature in various 
disciplines, such as linguistics, anthropology, and sociology. My 
aim in this chapter is to show how assumptions of Relevance Theory 
can be used as the basis for a detailed analysis of how individual 
concepts are manipulated in advertising. The focus here is on words 
which are frequently used in relation to women in advertisements. 
'Intelligence', 'individualism' and 'feminism' have been chosen to 
illustrate this process. I am concerned to reveal what these words 
actually mean within the particular medium of advertising, and what 
values they present, by analysing how they are used in a number of 
concrete cases.
Vhat follows is not a systematic sociological study of the 
manipulation oi Japanese or British women by advertisers, but rather 
an attempt to see how studying the language used by advertisers may 
indicate some of the techniques of manipulation. Moreover, in doing 
so, I attempt to show the position of women in the respective 
societies.
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The examples have been culled from Japanese monthly magazines 
for young women, J.J., Can. Can, More, With and Cosmopolitan, between 
September 1984 and December 1987 as well as the British equivalents, 
such as Cosmopolitan, Vogue, Elle, and New Women. It is worth 
noting that these Japanese magazines all have English titles. As 
will be seen later on, a certain cultural dependence on the Vest 
informs much of the interpretation of these words.
Section 5.2 is the discussion of theoretical framework. After 
a brief examination oi how word meaning has been analysed in various 
linguistic approaches, I shall argue that Relevance Theory provides 
a principled account for the analysis of the words in question. In 
the sections which follow, namely, Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, I
shall describe the particular examples 'intelligent*,
'individualism' and 'feminist' and their use in advertising.
5.2. Word meaning and concepts
There are a number of different linguistic approaches to word 
meaning. Among them, there seems to be a general agreement that the 
'meaning' of a word can be analysed in terras of the associated 
concept. The classical view is that the meaning of a word is a set 
of semantic features or a complex concept. This approach is called 
componential analysis and claims that word meaning is provided by a
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definition which expresses the necessary and sufficient conditions. 
According to this approach, the word 'bachelor' would mean a d u l t an d 
male an d h u m a n an d u n m a r r i e d . This analysis suffers from various 
defects, however, one of which is that it is not plausible that a 
total and exhaustive account of a particular word can be provided by 
a componential analysis of the word.
Based on this criticism, some linguists have adopted an 
approach, called meaning postulates, as an alternative to
componential analysis. This approach views the meaning of a word as 
a simple concept with meaning postulates or inference rules
attached. In this approach, the word 'bachelor' would mean 
BACHELOR, plus inference rules showing that propositions about 
bachelors entail propositions about unmarried adult human males. 
This approach does not suffer from the assumption about exhaustive 
decomposition of the meaning of a word into an integral number of 
so-called universal components, nor is it based on any assumptions 
about atomic components. It has considerable advantages over 
componential analysis.
Componential analysis presupposes that the meaning of a word
is firmly fixed. But some linguists stress the lack of clear-cut
boundaries. The alternative approach might be called the fuzzy 
meaning approach. It is based on the assumption that the meaning of 
a word is an inherently fuzzy concept and its main claim is that it 
is impossible to assign a firm definition to any word. What is 
claimed to iollow from this is that there is no point in asking
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whether a certain container that seems to fall somewhere between 
being a cup, a mug, a bowl and a vase is really any one of them. 
Rather, these concepts are fuzzy, in such a way that any one of them 
can accommodate our container as a marginal case, even though its 
level of so-called cuppiness, mugginess, and so on, is low. The 
advantage claimed for the notion of fuzzy concepts over that of 
well-defined classificatory concepts is that it offers an account of 
a wider range of data than the latter can possibly cover.
Sperber and Wilson agree with Fodor, and in fact many others,
in that they see the advantages of meaning postulates over
componential analysis (.see Sperber and Wilson 1986a). They argue
tko,
that the meaning of^ majority of words cannot be decomposed into more 
primitive concepts, and that words such as 'bachelor* , to which 
componential analysis provides a convincing analysis, are 
exceptional (1986a: 91). They point out that one only has to think 
of a word such as 'yellow' to realise the difficulty of analysing 
all words in terms of componential analysis.
Incidentally, the meaning postulates approach is compatible 
with the fuzzy meaning approach. The meaning of a word can be a 
fuzzy concept and can be analysed in terms of meaning postulates. 
Sperber and Wilson's main claim is that there is nota single format 
which maps different words on to their respective meanings and that 
different words may have meanings of different formats (1986a:90). 
What seems to follow from this suggestion is the possibility that
some words are classi- ficatory and some are fuzzy.
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However, this distinction between classi—  ficatory words and 
fuzzy words does not concern me here. The point I am making in this 
chapter goes well beyond the question of whether 'intelligent' and 
so on are fuzzy concepts, although Sperber and Wilson would treat 
them as fuzzy (Wilson, personal communication; Sperber, workshop 
presentation, Essex University, June 1989). My point is that in the 
advertisements I examine, words, such as 'intelligent', are being 
used in ways which clearly go beyond their standard meanings, 
whether these meanings are classificatory or fuzzy. To say that a 
concept is fuzzy is not to say that it can be stretched indefinitely 
far: the word 'cup' may be reasonably applied to various objects, as 
Labov has shown (see 1973), but to call a computer a 'cup', for 
example, would be unacceptable. I shall show with examples that 
the concepts which are dealt with in this chapter are being 
stretched beyond what most people would consider normal limits. 
What concerns me in this chapter is not normal fuzziness of meaning, 
but ovei— extensions of meaning.
Having accepted that some or all simple concepts may be fuzzy, 
Sperber and Wilson argue that existing arguments for fuzziness are 
inadequate. There is a pitfall: the baldness paradox (see Sperber
and Wilson 1986b). To summarize their argument, one is led into 
this paradox by accepting, first, that a man with no hair is bald, 
and secondly, that if a man with no hair is bald then a man with one 
hair is bald,, and then, via the general principle that if a man with 
(n) hair is bald then a man with (n + 1) hair is bald, to the
conclusion that a man with a full head of hair is bald.
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Sperber and Wilson offer a solution to this paradox. It starts 
off by accepting that 'bald' is classificatory concept after all. 
The underlying assumption is that existing accounts for fuzziness 
have not shown fuzziness at all. A classificatory concept offers a 
way of avoiding the baldness paradox. 'Bald', they claim, has a 
necessary and sufficient condition: having no hair. It follows from 
this that to describe a man with one hair as bald is strictly 
speaking false. However, they show, with examples, that many 
utterances which are strictly speaking false are nonetheless 
pragmatically appropriate. The use of 'bald' to apply to a man with 
very little hair would fall into this category. I outline their 
solution below.
Sperber and Wilson suggest that what is often analysed as 
literal use of a fuzzy concept might instead be analysed as loose 
use of a classificatory concept (see Sperber and Wilson 1986b). In 
the example above, 'bald* may well have clear-cut boundaries and 
still be used loosely, but acceptably, to refer to a person who 
falls outside these boundaries.
In this approach, the notions of descriptive use and 
interpretive use are crucial. As I have outlined in Chapter 2, an 
utterance can be used to represent a state of affairs which makes it 
true, namely, descriptive use; or an utterance can be used to 
represent another utterance or thought which it resembles in 
meaning, i.e. interpretive use. Utterance (1), for example, may be 
descriptively used to represent a certain state of affairs, or
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interpretively used to represent another thought or utterance which 
it resembles in meaning.
(1) I'm starving.
A proposition, in isolation from any context, has a number of 
analytic implications. However, propositions are entertained not in 
isolation but in a context of background assumptions. When a 
proposition P is processed in a context <C>, P may yield a number of 
contextual implications. As shown in Chapter 2, a contextual 
implication of P in the context <C> is a proposition implied neither 
by P alone, nor by <C> alone, but by the combination of P and (C). 
According to Sperber and Wilson, two representations with P and Q as 
their propositional content interpretively resemble one another in a 
context {C> to the extent that they share their analytic and 
contextual implications in the context {C}. Thus, by definition, 
interpretive resemblance is context-dependent.
In normal circumstances, a descriptive use of (1) would be 
false, for the speaker is not really starving. However, the truth 
of an utterance is not necessary for successful communication. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, Sperber and Wilson argue that there is no 
requirement for a maxim of truthfulness. They further argue that 
the sole criterion that the hearer uses in utterance comprehension 
is a presumption of relevance, that is, the speaker, in choosing his
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utterance, has caused his hearer no unjustifiable processing effort 
in conveying his message. Utterances are used to represent the
speaker's thoughts, and the assumption is that the speaker will 
choose the most economical means of conveying the thought in
question.
Now, Sperber and Wilson call an utterance 'literal' (1986a:233) 
if it has the same proposition as the thought it is used to express.
That is to say that all the implications of the proposition
expressed are endorsed by the speaker. When only some of the
implications of the proposition expressed are endorsed by the 
speaker Sperber and Wilson call an utterance 'loose' (1986a:234). 
I argue that the notion of loose use of language, provides an
adequate framework for the ways in which words such as
'intelligence' are used in advertising.
Sperber and Wilson argue that loose use of language is rife in 
ordinary communication, in fact they argue that cases where an 
utterance is used strictly literally are a limiting case (see 
Sperber and Wilson 1986a, 1986b). One may recall that in Relevance
Theory, no maxim of truthfulness is required. The only
consideration that the speaker has is considerations of relevance, 
which is defined in terms of contextual effect and processing 
effort. The speaker will aim at optimal relevance, rather than at 
literal truth. Often the most economical means of communicating the 
speaker's thought is not a literal interpretation of it: more often 
than not, it is a loose one. From the hearer's point of view,
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unless there is a specific reason for her to believe that the
utterance is literal, she would assume that some, and not
necessarily all, of the implications of the proposition expressed 
by the utterance are communicated by the speaker.
This matches our intuition. For example, my flat is in the
building which is located exactly opposite the main entrance of the
British Museum. All my visitors are informed of this in advance, 
but every single one of them points out on their arrival, with a 
tone oi surprise, that my flat is exactly opposite the British 
Museum. This seems to confirm that the hearer does not take for
granted that an utterance is literal, and that all the implications
of the proposition expressed are endorsed by the speaker, and 
assumes that only some of the implications are communicated. My
hearers follow this, despite my effort to convey that ray utterance 
is literal.
Thus, utterance cl), which is strictly speaking false, may be
good enough for pragmatic purposes, and may indeed be better, than a
strictly speaking true one, such as (.2), for (1) shares many 
contextual implications with (2), and yet is easier to process than
(2), and thus causes the hearer less processing effort:
(2) I'm extremely hungry and want to eat immediately.
- 231 -
The question here is: how, of all the implications of the
proposition expressed by the utterance, does the hearer identify the 
intended subset? Sperber and Wilson argue that a presumption of 
optimal relevance provides the sole criterion. When an utterance is 
made by the speaker, the hearer assumes that it is intended as an 
interpretation of one of the speaker's thoughts. She processes the 
utterance and computes those implications which may be relevant to 
her. She continues to do so as long as it is consistent with the 
principle oi relevance, that is, so long as she gets enough 
contextual effects to make her processing effort worth while. This 
process is done in order of accessibility. It is plausible that the 
literal interpretation is exceptional, rather than the norm, for the 
literal interpretation may not necessarily be the most accessible 
one.
Sperber and Wilson's approach deals with loose use without 
abandoning truth-conditional semantics. When a proposition or 
concept is loosely used, it is not necessarily the case that it is a 
vague proposition or concept: it is not that a guarantee of
approximate truth is given to the proposition expressed, for no 
guarantee of truth is given to this proposition at all in the first 
place. Instead, only some of its logical and contextual
implications are taken to be accompanied by a regular guarantee of 
truth, whereas others are simply ignored.
There is a point at which looseness becomes unacceptable. This 
is context-dependent (see Sperber and Wilson 1986a, 1986b). To call
a man with one hair bald is just as false as calling a man with a 
full head of hair bald. The difference between them is not the fact 
that one is true and the other false, but the fact that one is an 
acceptable loose use because many of its logical and contextual 
implications are true, whereas the other is unacceptable since the 
hearer would be able to derive from it virtually no true descriptive 
information about the state of affairs it purports to represent.
Thus, the notion of loose use offers a better alternative to 
the fuzzy meaning approach, which supersedes assumptions of fuzzy 
meaning but does not share its defects.
It has been mentioned above that the meaning of a word is 
provided by the associated concept. According to Sperber and Wilson 
(1986a:86), a concept holds three distinctive types of information, 
namely, logical, encyclopaedic and lexical. Firstly, the logical 
entry for a concept is a set of deductive rules. These deductive 
rules apply to logical forms of which the concept is a constituent, 
and thus determine its analytic implications. For example, the 
logical entry for the concept 'elephant' would indicate that it is 
an animal. Secondly, the encyclopaedic entry for a concept consists 
of information about the extension of the concept. This type of 
information contributes to contextual implications of the concept. 
The encyclopaedic entry for the concept 'elephant' would include 
assumptions about its tusks and trunk. Finally, the lexical entry 
of a concept is information about its counter-part in the natural 
language. The lexical entry of the concept 'elephant' would contain
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that it is expressed by the word 'elephant' in English. The 
structure oi a concept analysed in terms of these three types of 
information will be crucial to the explanation of over-extended ways 
in which words may be used, in one of the cases leading to a shift 
in word meaning, as I shall show in the following sections.
Relevance Theory provides a comprehensive framework for 
analysing a variety of ways in which words may be used. In this 
section, I have examined different linguistic approaches to word 
meaning. I have argued that the notion of fuzzy concept offers an 
apparently attractive analysis of many words. However, it has been 
argued by Sperber and Wilson that the existing arguments for fuzzy 
concepts are not satisfactory: they do not show real 'fuzziness'. I 
have discussed the alternative approach by Sperber and Wilson which 
centres around the notion of loose use. It has also been accepted 
that word meaning can be analysed in terms of its associated 
concept. The structure of a concept has been discussed within 
Sperber and Wilson's framework.
In the following sections, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, I shall examine 
how a selection of words and concepts are used in Japanese and 
British advertisements. In doing so, I hope to explore the ways in 
which women are presented in advertising in the respective 
societies.
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5.3. Intelligence
In this section, the following examples are designed to show 
how the words chisei (intelligence) and chiteki (intelligent) are 
used in Japanese advertising. In advertisements found in the 
magazines studied, and in recent advertisements in general, these 
words have become ubiquitous. It appears that these words are used 
in Japanese advertisements to mean something like 'sophisticated', 
'elegant', 'fashionable', and so on, to indicate a desirable quality 
about women, in particular, about their appearance. This, however, 
is not an indication of a fuzzy concept of 'intelligence'. Rather, 
I argue that it is a straightforward case of loose use. Let us 
examine the following:
(4) Chiteki-ae joohin-na sJbiruku burause.
intelligent noble silk blouse
(Tokyo Blouse)
An intelligent and noble silk blouse.
(5) Chotto ereganio-de cbotto interijensu-na inshoo...
a bit elegant a bit intelligent impression
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<Paco Rabanne)
The impression of being a bit elegant and a bit intel­
ligent. . .
(6) Intelligence. (written in English)
Sore ga kimi no utsukushisa. 
that sub. you of beauty
Kite-iru fuku ni chisel o kanjiru.
wear-ing clothes in intelligence obj. feel
Tazta ippon no kuchibeni kara mo...
only one oi lipstick from even
(Kanebo)
Intelligence, (in English)
That is (the secret of) your beauty.
Your intelligence is seen in your clothes. Even in 
the lipstick you wear.
(7) Chisei to yasei. San Rooran no ganchiku.
intelligence and wildness Saint Laurent of suggestion
(Yves Saint Laurent)
Intelligence and wildness. Saint Laurent's 
suggestion.
These are only a lew among many examples of advertisements 
using chisei (intelligence). They are all for women's fashion and 
they all suggest that women should express their intelligence 
through their clothes, lipsticks, handbags, and so on. This 
suggestion is in direct contrast with the fact that in Japanese 
society, intelligence is regarded as a desirable quality in a man, 
but not in a woman, and that it is regarded as desirable that women 
should not be as intelligent or well-educated as men (see Hosoi 
1986, Smith 1987). Can we thus take this phenomenon as a sign that 
Japanese society is changing, and that now intelligent women are 
accepted and encouraged? This may be a premature conclusion. It is 
obvious in the examples above that chisei (intelligence) in these 
advertisements is a superficial quality, a sort of quality which 
clothes, cosmetics, and accesories can give women. It seems to be 
synonymous with 'elegance', or 'femininity', or 'sophistication', 
rather than 'brightness', 'cleverness' and so on as a thesaurus 
would tell us. It is used for appearances, rather than for one's 
mental state.
Words such as chiteki and chisei are usually, though not 
exclusively, used for women in advertising, that is, they describe 
women in advertisements which are targeted at women. It may be that
women are being seen as a chiteki gender, chiteki in a limited, 
superficial sense. And this is all desirable, even though women are 
still not encouraged to exercise their mental ability to the full. 
Perhaps women are accepted as chiteki in their own, small ways, so 
long as they do not cross the border and invade men's fields and 
threaten them. Example (8) provides support for this 
suggestion:
(8) Egao mo onna no chisei kashira.
smiling face also woman of intelligence it appears
(Narisu Cosmetics)
It appears that a smiling face is also women's 
intel1igence.
In (6), the caption reiers to smiling face as 'women's 
intelligence', implying that there is a distinction between 
intelligence for women and that for men, and that a smile belongs to 
the former, not the latter. It might be that 'intelligence' as we 
have observed it in the examples above is not 'intelligence' in an 
ordinary, general sense, but in a marked sense, i.e. intelligence 
for and only for women.
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It has been argued above that 'intelligence' in these examples 
is synonymous with 'elegance', 'femininity' and 'sophistication'. 
To be sure, 'sophistication' entails some mental quality; after all, 
it is derived from the Greek meaning 'wisdom'. But again the word 
is used here in a limited sense. It manifests itself in one's 
outfits and make-up. It might be that it is desirable for a woman 
to be intelligent in her choice of clothes and cosmetics. It is not 
that a woman is encouraged to be intelligent in a general sense, nor 
is it that she is encouraged to be silly. It is virtuous for a 
woman to be intelligent, but only in a restricted way. Japanese 
women are expected to rule the home, and it is they who are 
responsible for its day-to-day operation, the care of the children 
and the management of the household budget. They are encouraged to 
exercise their brain in their jobs, as managers of households, 
mothers and consumers.
It is possible to argue that Japanese society has long valued 
women's mental qualities, albeit in limited domains, for an ideal 
woman has been described since the Meiji era as ryoo-sai ken-bo, 
that is, 'good wife, wise mother' (see Smith 1987:7). One could 
argue that a chiteki (intelligent) woman as depicted in contemporary 
advertising is a kind of modernisation of this Meiji slogan.
It is worth noting at this point that in Japanese society women 
are the prime consumers not only of commodities but also of art and 
culture (Moeran 1983:101). It is possible that these two facts are 
connected. Advertisements seem to suggest that a chiteki woman is
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someone who wears smart clothes and decent make-up, smiles sweetly 
and goes to art exhibitions. Here is an example to illustrate this 
point:
(9) Bijutsukan e iku josei ga fuete-imasu.
art gallery to go women subj. increas-ing
Purachina o tsukeru josei ga fuete-imasu.
platinum obj. wear women subj. increas-ing
(Platinum Promotion Forum)
The number oi women going to art galleries is 
increasing.
The number oi women wearing platinum is increasing.
These images of women seem to parallel the kind of education 
received by women in contemporary Japan (see Hosoi 1986, Smith 
1987). Before the war, there was an enormous difference between the 
education received by men and women. After 1945, however, 
educational opportunities for women were improved. In fact, looking 
at the figures for boys and girls attending senior high school and 
college or university, it looks as though Japanese women are 
enjoying equal opportunities. But if one investigates the kind and 
quality of education received by men and women, one realises that
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there is a significant difference: women tend to go to junior
colleges, which are regarded as 'a modern version of the old schools 
for brides' (Smith 1987:11) and study so called women’s subjects,
such as home economics, education, language and literature.
It has been argued that the meaning of the word chisei 
(intelligence) is restricted to 'intelligence' which is to be 
manifested in limited domains. These are traditionally categorised 
as women's domains, such as fashion, the household, and the
consumption of commodities and culture. Sometimes the mental 
quality of the word even seems to be repressed altogether, leaving 
the word to mean simply some kind of desirability and appeal to men.
It is revealing to look at a feature carried by J.J. (October,
1986). It is entitled, 'Suggestions for intelligent elegance' 
(Chiteki eregansu no teian), and includes the following suggestions 
(my translation):
(10) a. In choosing a dress. . . (remember that) 50/i of the
y
creation oi an impre^ion oi intelligence depends 
on your neck-line. An appropriate round-neck and 
golden buttons are the key to success.
b. The main trend of this year's suits is towards 
those which have a tightly shaped waist. ...a 
tight waist-line leads to an expression of
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intelligence.
c. You cannot omit black, for it is a front runner 
for an intelligent-looking colour.
(10a) - (10c) give us a good idea of what an 'intelligent'
woman should look like: she wears a black dress with a roundneck and 
a tight waist-line, with golden buttons. There is no reason why a 
roundneck should be more 'intelligent' than a v-neck, for example. 
Nor is it self-evident why a small waist, the colour black, and 
golden buttons should be associated with 'intelligence'. The point 
is that all these features are in fashion at present. Moreover, 
this ensemble conforms to what Japanese men find desirable in women. 
I shall come back to this point.
Let us look at another example:
(11) Chiteki eregansu. Jetta.
intelligent elegance Jetta
Chiteki-na machi o chiteki-na josei to
intelligent town obj. woman with
Chiteki-ni hashirimasu, 
intelligent drive
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(Volkswagen)
Intelligent elegance. Jetta.
It drives through an intelligent town with an 
intelligent woman in an intelligent manner.
Whatever 'intelligent elegance' may mean, clearly the word 
chiteki here means something different from the English word 
'intelligent', or even from what the Japanese word chiteki, is 
supposed to mean. In Japanese, let alone in English, 'intelligent 
town' and 'The car drives in an intelligent manner' are 
pragmatically unacceptable, and 'intelligent elegance' pragmatically 
questionable. Only 'intelligent woman' is well-formed. However, 
what does it mean to say that a woman is chiteki (intelligent; here? 
Because the same word is used for a car and a town, which cannot 
have the quality oi being 'intelligent', it is dubious whether the
advertiser meant to describe the woman along these lines. The word
is used to express some desirable quality, but not one exactly to do 
with intellect. It is some sort of pleasant quality for a woman to
have, such as being 'fashionable' or 'sophisticated'.
It is worth noting that although the car advertised is German, 
the background to the advertisement is a European-style, red brick 
building, with a sign indicating that it is a French restaurant. 
Apparently, a French restaurant is seen as 'intelligent'. 
Possibly, the word chiteki is synonymous with 'fashionable', since
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that is how France is regarded by Japanese women. Or, it might be 
that German technology and French cooking are seen as chiteki assets 
of the respective countries.
The usage oi the word chiteki (intelligent) as seen above can 
be accounted for in terms of loose use. The word is used not in 
virtue oi truth-conditions, but in virtue of resemblance. There is 
some resemblance between the content the advertisers wish to 
communicate and what the word chiteki expresses. I assume, as 
pointed out above, that word meaning can be analysed in terms of 
the associated concept or concepts. I also assume, following 
Sperber and Wilson (1986a), that a concept consists of subsets of 
implications. Some of the implications of the concept associated 
with the word chiteki (intelligent), which have to do with 
desirability and good presentation, have been retained, while 
others, which have to do with mental ability, have been suppressed.
However, it is the latter implications which are, in normal 
circumstances, more accessible than the former. Vhat we have seen 
can be analysed as loose use of the word, and loose to a large 
extent it is. But the communicator can trust the addressee to 
achieve the intended interpretation of the word, that is, the 
implications to do with desirability and presentation, rather than 
those to do with mental ability, because of the context in which the 
word is used.. Our cognitive system is organised in such a way that 
it would just reject inconsistency or contradiction. In processing
(11), lor example, it would cause too much friction in the context
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to interpret the word as meaning 'mentally excellent', and there is 
no reason to believe that the word is being used to refer to some 
mental property, some of the normal implications are simply 
suppressed.
The images of women we have seen in the examples above all 
conform to a stereotype of Japanese women; presentable and a capable 
house-keeper but not intellectual or academic. Here, I rely on the 
notion of stereotype, which needs to be clarified in further 
research. But it seems plausible to argue that this stereotype 
helps the audience process these examples above by giving the 
audience access to an adequate context in which they should be 
processed.
It has been argued here that the words chiteki/ chisei 
(intelligent/intelligence) are used in Japanese advertising for 
women not to imply much about their mental quality, but rather to 
imply desirability to men. (12) is a clear example of this:
(12) Kono aki no shuryuu wa yahari
this autumn of main stream subj. as expected
chiteki-de sekushii.
intelligent-and sexy
(Robe)
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The main trend this autumn, as you may have guessed, 
is to be intelligent and sexy.
Can.Can,, a rival magazine of J.J. (mentioned above), carried a 
feature entitled 'the Declaration to become a "desirable woman"' 
('Ji onna' e no henshin sengen) (December 1987). The suggestions 
made there almost completely overlap with those in J.J., for 
'intelligent elegance', including the colour black, a small waist 
and golden buttons. The feature also recommends visits to art 
galleries, which supports the point made above. Furthermore, one 
of the three cars listed as 'Cars for "desirable woman"' was Jetta, 
which is mentioned above, for the very reason of being 'intelligent- 
looking'. Thus, 'intelligence' and desirability, that is, appeal to 
men, seem to be virtually interchangeable. Moreover, the
implications which are carried by both attributes, on the face of 
it, appear much more related to desirability than to intelligence.
I have argued that in Japanese advertising words such as 
chiteki (intelligent) and chisei (intelligence) are used to mean 
some desirable quality for women, which is to do with their 
appearance and possibly to do with their capability as a house­
keeper, rather than with their mental quality. I have also argued 
that this is achieved via the loose use of the words. More 
specifically, I have argued that, assuming that a concept consists 
of subsets of implications, one subset of the implications of the 
concept 'intelligent', which have to do with mental quality of a
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person, is suppressed, and the rest simply retained. Thus, the 
words mean some desirable attribute for women, without the drawbacks 
of being associated with assumptions about mental excellency, which 
are regarded as undesirable for women in Japanese society.
This is a clear case of intentional loose use of the words 
'intelligent* and 'intelligence'. In Japanese advertising they are 
used to imply sophistication, femininity, and elegance, which are 
regarded as desirab-le for women, which are, in turn, desirable 
selling points from the advertiser's point of view. In the next 
section, I shall examine another type of loose use.
5.4. Individualism
It is known that in Japan there has been a strong ideological 
emphasis on the importance of the group over the individual, and the 
necessity for the individual to subordinate her interests to those 
of the primary group to which she belongs. However, there has been 
an increasing number of advertisements which place an emphasis on 
the importance of kosei (individuality). Does this mean that 
Japanese group ideology is seriously threatened, a point raised by 
Moeran (1983:105, 1984:262)? Does it, in other words, mean that
Japanese conceptual structures are shifting? I shall argue that an 
analysis based on Relevance Theory reveals how the word is being
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used on the contrary to buttress such group ideology. Let us 
examine some examples.
(13) Vatashi wa interia-dezainaa. ...Ronjin no 
I subj. interior designer Longines of
konkuesto wa... chisei-bi dokusoosei ni
Conquesto subj. intelligence-beauty originality of
aiure, kiwadatte kosei-teki.
full strikingly individualistic
(Longines)
I am an interior designer. ...Longines'' Conquest is 
lull oi^/intelligent-beauty and originality, and is 
strikingly individualistic.
Here, it is worth noting that the watch is described in terms of 
chisei-be (intel1igent-beauty).
What is 'individualistic' about the Longines watch remains to 
be explained. The illustration shows a young European-looking
woman, apparently an interior designer, in black and white on the
left, and a pair of Longines watches in full colour on the right.
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It is worth noting that the woman is engaged in a so-called katakana 
profession, that is, a profession which is described in katakana 
script, which is the marked form of writing used for Western loan 
words. Katakana professions, such as kopii raitaa (copywriter), 
sutairisuto, and so on, due to their Western flavour, are regarded 
as fashionable and therefore desirable. The design of the watches 
is not dissimilar to that of the classical Rolex 'oyster', which is 
regarded as prestigious and are in fashion in Japan at the time.
The clue to what is meant by the word kosei-teki may be found 
in the way in which the word is used in the same magazine, With 
(July 1967) (My translation):
(14) a. This year's popular colour, green, plays an
important role in emphasising individuality...
b. You should wear a vivid-coloured polo-neck shirt 
to emphasise your individuality.
c. Your fringe should be cut short and 
'individualistic'...
d. The key to making you look fresh and
individualistic is to have your hair in an off- 
the-face style.
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(14a) suggests that the colour green provides you with 
individuality, for it is the colour in fashion. In the same issue, 
it is mentioned that green is the most fashionable colour in Paris 
at the present moment. (14b) widens the selection, as it suggests 
any vivid colour. (14c) and (14d) are suggestions about hair style; 
the former recommends a short fringe and the latter an off-the-face 
style, which is recommended every summer, since it is only sensible 
to keep one's hair short and off one's face to survive the hot and 
humid summer in Japan.
What (14a) - (14d) are suggesting is that wearing a certain
colour or having a certain hair style makes one kosei-teki 
(individualistic). It is not a matter of having your own style, but 
of doing things which are supposed to be 'individualistic', which 
include using a colour which is in fashion at the present time. An 
'individualistic' woman of 1987 wears a vivid-coloured polo-neck 
shirt, carries a green handbag, has her hair up and has a short 
fringe. Using a colour because it is in fashion, or because it is 
popular in Paris, is hardly an individualistic thing to do. Vivid 
colours have always been popular in summer, rather than winter, 
because of their association with the tropics. It has been
recommended every summer that a woman should wear her hair short, 
or, if long, put it up, for commonsensical reasons. The word kosei
in (14a) - (14d) implies 'fashionable', rather than
'individualistic'. It is used to mean doing things which are in 
fashion and which, therefore, other people are doing, rather than 
doing things one's own way.
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This interpretation of the word koselteki as doing things which 
are fashionable is not limited to advertising. A survey in 1972 
(see Suzuki 1975) asked the question 'Do you think that you can
achieve greater individualism by folowing fashion?' 61.5% of women
and 48.2% of men answered positively to the question. Whereas only 
slightly more women than men replied positively, it is interesting 
to note that nearly twice as many men as women answered with a clear 
no (41.9% vs. 22.9%), whereas a larger number of women were 
undecided.
Let us look at another example:
(15) . . . Itaria no ii iro, ii katachi Guccini.
Italy of good colour good shape Guccini
Jin&ei o kosei-teki ni tanoshimu josei-tachi
life obj . individualistic in enjoy woman-pl.
no tame ni. 
of sake for
(Guccini)
Good Italian colour and shape, Guccini. For women
who enjoy their life in an individual style.
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Individualism should be about accepting that every person is 
different and that each person should be allowed to believe or do 
whatever she thinks is right. But here in example (15), it means 
doing a particular thing, namely, buying certain table-ware; this
comes from Italy, which is regarded as a country which produces high
fashion and kitchen ware. Here are some more examples:
(16) Jibun-rashisa ni kodawarimasu. 
self-like to stick
(Hermes)
I stick to my own self.
C17) Shinayaka-ni watashi no tempo de ikite-yuku.
gracefully I of tempo at live-go
(Les Sportique)
I am going to live gracefully at my own pace.
Examples (15) - (17) promote European goods, all high-class and 
expensive. Being oneself is using Italian table-ware and wearing 
French suits. These advertisements apparently endorse the idea of 
doing one’s own thing, but in practice they advise buying European
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products which are expensive and have high status, and which are, 
therefore, approved of by society. There is a suggestion that the 
' individualism' seen in examples (15) - (17) is equivalent to
elitism: to be individualistic is to be able to afford expensive
European goods, such as Italian tableware and French outfits. Also, 
there is a hint that 'doing your own thing' is doing things Western, 
as in example (18):
(18) Kono natsu, jibun no kami o
this summer self of hair obj.
Amerika no onna no ko no yoo ni
America of female of child like
Yooroppa no onna no ko no yoo ni 
European of female of child like
Jibun de heaa-dezain shichao. 
self by hair-design let's
(Benezel)
Let's design our own hair this summer. Just like 
American and European girls.
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Thus, designing your own hair is doing what American and 
European girls do. Here, 'doing your own thing' is acceptable and 
desirable because, firstly, American and European girls are already 
doing it, and secondly because America and Europe are regarded as 
culturally superior by the Japanese.
As noted above, there is also a sense in which 'individualism' 
is equivalent to elitism: doing things European or American is
desirable, for they are superior. Individualism is accessible only 
to an elite group, who can afford to buy European or American goods.
Let us look at one more example:
(19) IVatashi no iro o motte-inai to, hazukashii.
I of colour obj. have-not then embarrassing
It is embarrassing not have my own colour.
(Casio)
This advertisement is promoting identical wrist watches in 
different colours. It is recommended to have one's own colour, for, 
otherwise it will be embarrassing. Thus, having one's own colour is 
a way of seeking social approval.
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Ve have examined advertisements which make use of the notion of 
individualism. References are always superficial, about clothes, 
accessories, hair style, and so on. Moreover, what is regarded as 
individualistic in these advertisements is what is in fashion at the 
time. Thus, being 'individualistic' means being fashionable.
Whereas individualism should be about each person acting in her 
perticular way, in Japanese advertising it is used to mean a 
specific thing, such as wearing a suit of a certain brand, having a 
handbag of a certain colour, and having one's hair done in a certain 
style. Considering that advertising is a form of mass communication 
and is thus targeted at a mass audience, it will mean everybody 
doing the same thing. What is described as 'individualistic' is
something which has already gained social approval, by being in
fashion, having high status, originating in the West, and so on.
I argue that Japanese groupism is far from being threatened by 
individualism. What is happening here is an extension of word
meaning via loose use of the word. And yet it is different in kind 
from the case of chiteki (intelligent) considered in the previous
section. In the case of the word chiteki (intelligent), the
implications oi the word about one's mental property are suppressed. 
The transformation of the word 'individualistic' is achieved rather 
more subtly. What is required is to add an extra premise to the 
context. The philosophy of individualism is being able to do what
one wants; to this context, add the premise that what a woman wants
is what the rest of society wants; then, in this context, the
philosophy oi individualism becomes doing what the rest of society 
wants.
Here, too, however, some of the implications of the concept 
'individualimsm' are abandoned: the implications which have to do
with each person doing unique things are forgotten. This is due 
to the fact that doing unique things does not go along with doing 
what the rest of society wants, where there is a strong emphasis in 
the society that one should behave as others do and that one should 
not stand out. As the human mind is organised in such a way that it 
rejects contradiction and inconsistency, it is part of a reasoning 
process to eliminate implications to do with doing unique things 
once it is accepted that ' individualism' is doing what the rest of 
society wants. The assumption that advertising messages are 
'positive' would also help this comprehension process: if
' individualism* is promoted in advertising, it must mean something 
positive and desirable, so it is unlikely to mean something like 
behaving differently from others and standing out in the crowd.
Thus, Japanese group ideology is rescued from supposed threats, 
absorbing them into the conventional. The use of the word kosei- 
teki (individualistic) in Japanese advertisements suggests a way of 
resolving a clash oi cultures by apparently absorbing a notion of 
the new culture, but interpreting it in the old context against 
conventional premises. This conclusion is consistent with the 
findings of Moeran (1984;262) that kosei is not equivalent to what 
we know as 'individualism' in the West and that kosei is neatly
absorbed in ’Japaneseness' and thus the Japanese have been saved 
from a clash with group ideology.
However, there is a question yet to be asked: how does the
notion of 'individualism' occur in Western advertising? Is its 
usage consistent with what we know as 'individualism', that is that 
each one of us acts in our own particular way? An immediate 
reaction would be to suspect that individualism in this sense is not 
promoted. For, if advertising is about selling things to a mass 
audience, how can it coincide with the ideology that people should 
be doing different things? The association between 'individualism' 
and elitism can be traced in advertising in the Western press, as is 
shown by an advertisement for Citizen Watch, which appeared in the 
Sunday Times colour supplement (13th December, 1987).
The picture, in grey or neutral tones, shows a naked girl who 
is said to be 'average' in height, hair colour, age and weight. The 
only thing that does not make her average is her Citizen watch, 
picked out in luminous gold on her wrist. The caption reads as 
follows:
(20) There is no such thing as the average Citizen.
There is a pun on the word 'citizen': on the one hand, it is 
the brand name, and on the other hand, it means a member oi society.
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As it is written with capitals, just like the brand name in the
advertisement, (21) would be recovered as the most accessible 
interpretation:
(21) There is no such thing as the average Citizen watch.
By adding to the context assumption (22), the audience would
derive (23):
(22) An advertisement tends to say how superior the 
advertised product is.
(23) A Citizen watch is better than average.
However, the alternative interpretation of the word, that is, 
'a member of society* is also encouraged by the fact that the
advertisement shows the woman as well, rather than only showing a 
watch, and the fact that her features are described as 'average'. 
Thus, the following interpretation is also made accessible:
(24) There is no such thing as an average member of
society.
- 258 -
The woman who, according to (20), is not 'average', is naked, 
and there is no overt sign of any social group or class about her. 
Moreover, she is described in the advertisement as 'average' in 
height, hair colour, age and weight. Her only obvious
distinguishing feature is the watch she is wearing. Thus, the 
wearing of a Citizen watch implies that she is a very special 
person. Here, just as women in Japanese advertisements become 
kosei-teki (individualistic) by weating an outfit of a particular 
brand or having a handbag of a certain colour, an apparently average 
woman in this British advertisement is made special by wearing a 
certain brand of watch.
It is worth noting that, although the woman in the 
advertisement is described as 'average' in various ways, the model 
looks anything but 'average' with her beauty and mysterious looks. 
This seems to suggest that it is not just that a Citizen watch makes 
one special but that special people like this beautiful woman wear a 
Citizen watch.
Thus, there is also a sign of elitism associated with 
'individualism' here in a British advertisement: to be
'individualistic' means to be able to afford an expensive watch. It 
is emphasised by the fact that the model, who is described as 
'average', is strikingly beautiful and apparently belongs fo a 
privileged group.
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The next example is a caption for Kotex Ferns Tampons, which 
reads as follows:
(25) Ferns. Doing things your way, 
which comes with the following text:
(26) Kotex Ferns Tampons are designed for today's woman.
The woman who chooses to do things her way.
Both the caption and the text apparently endorse the notion of 
individual ism.
There are two kinds of illustrations found with the above 
caption. One oi them shows a young woman dressed casually in a 
shirt and trousers with conspicuous pink punk hair with an orange- 
dotted, black bow. She has a dog which is in exactly the same pink 
colour with the same bow on its head. In interpreting (25) and (26) 
against this background, the audience would extend the context to 
the immediate visual environment, and interpret this woman as 'the 
woman who chooses to do things her way' . The audience would be 
given access to a context in which women are oppressed and cannot 
do things their way, and therefore do not have such unconventional
hair or pets. The context would also contain a premise such as the 
following:
(27) Dyeing your hair pink is doing things your way.
The other illustration shows a tall office building. Out of 
its many windows comes a typewriter, apparently thrown by someone 
inside, breaking the window pane. The only way (25) and (26) could 
be relevant would be to interpret them as describing a woman who 
cannot be seen in the illustration but is throwing the typewriter 
out oi the window. The audience would be encouraged to imagine a 
situation in which a woman has been working over a typewriter but 
has lost her temper and is throwing the typewriter out of a window. 
The audience would also be encouraged to extend the context by 
thinking of another situation in which a woman is repressed and not 
able to show her temper and throw a typewriter out of a window; she 
would be a woman who does not do things her way. The context chosen 
for the interpretation oi the advertisement would include a premise 
such as the following:
(28) Throwing your typewriter out of the window is doing 
things your way.
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Here, individualism manifests itself in dyeing one's hair pink 
and throwing a typewriter out of a window. However, these forms of 
behaviour are not part oi mature and responsible adulthood. They 
are trivial, irrelevant, irrational, and irresponsible. 
Individualism might imply doing something that other people do not 
do. The use of the concept in these advertisements has retained only 
this implication: it shares only some implications of the concept,
and not others, such as being responsible for the consequences of 
one's own behaviour.
The notion oi individualism here is reduced to that of doing 
things which are childish and silly. The women portrayed in these 
advertisements exercise their individuality by dyeing their hair 
pirik and throwing a typewriter out of a window, rather than doing 
something that is responsible and significant and yet unique. One 
does not have to be outrageous in order to be individualistic. 
However, in the advertisements, outrageousness is emphasised.
Thus, in Japanese advertisements, individualism means doing 
what other people are doing, or elitism, which particulary manifests 
itself in the posession of expensive Western goods. In the U.K. 
also, individualism implies elitism, as we have seen in the Citizen 
advertisement; or it implies doing something childish and 
irrational. This last description fits a stereotype of women. 
Thus, it can be argued that in the U.K., as well as in Japan, the 
notion of individualism is being used to endorse stereotypes, rather 
than reflecting real changes in women's status in the respective
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societies. The basis of the explanation of such apparently 
inappropriate uses of the concept can be provided by context- 
extension. Here again, as in the case of 'intelligence',
stereotypes of women help the audience process utterances which 
involve the concept of individual is/" by providing easy access to a 
context which includes certain assumptions about women, thus leading 
to intended interpretations.
5.5. Feminism
In this section, I examine a case which cannot be explained in 
terms oi loose use, but rather in terms of what Wilson would call 
(personal communication) 'loose understanding'. One of the
situations where loose understanding may happen is where a word is 
borrowed by one society from another, thus resulting in a change of 
meaning.
First, let us look at the following example of a caption used 
in a series of advertisements for Tokyo Gas, one of the city gas 
companies. This series was so successful that it won the 1984 Asahi 
Advertising Prize.
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(29) Toshi gasu-tte feminisuto ne.
city gas feminist tag-q
(Tokyo Gas)
City Gas is a feminist, isn't it?
Why is the gas company called a feminist? The answer may lie 
in the pictures shown in the advertisements. One of them shows a 
large pot boiling over on a gas cooker. Another depicts a woman 
wearing an apron and holding a plate, doing the washing up. Yet
another shows the same woman's reflection in a mirror, putting on
lipstick. She is not looking at herself, for her attention seems to 
be diverted by something else. These advertisements are for a gas 
cooker with a special sensor, which automatically stops the gas 
supply when the tire is extinguished, a gas boiler with similar 
sensor equipment, and an alarm for gas leaks. These are all new 
apparatuses produced by the company. The company is described as 
'feminist' on the grounds that it has come up with these instruments 
to help women with their house work.
The use of the particle ne in (29) marks the utterance as 
distinctively feminine. Thus, the audience is encouraged to imagine 
a woman's voice praising the gas company for improving kitchen 
equipment and thus helping women in their household chores.
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It is obvious that the loan word feminisuto in these 
advertisements does not mean what the original English word means. 
A Japanese audience would know what the word feminisuto means in 
Japanese, whether or not they know what the word 'feminist' means in 
English. However, it is not necessary for the audience to know the 
meaning of the word in advance. If someone saw the advertisement 
and read the description, she would realise that feminisuto does not 
mean the same thing as the original English 'feminist'. Apparently, 
it does not take very long for students doing Japanese at a British 
university to learn, once they are in Japan, that a feminisuto is 
someone who readily opens the door for women whereas a feminist 
might get offended by such a male chauvinistic gesture. They learn 
it not because of their previous knowledge of the English word, but 
despite their knowledge about it, through the contexts in which the 
Japanese word is used.
The word feminisuto is used in the advertisements to describe a 
desirable quality. It is meant as a compliment to Tokyo Gas that 
they should be called feminisuto. The company is being praised for 
improving kitchen instruments, because they help women to perform 
their household chores. It is chauvinism, rather than feminism, to 
assume that a way of gaining women's praises is to improve kitchen 
instruments. Despite the use of the word feminisuto, which
originated from English 'feminist', the attitude behind the 
advertisements is sexist. These kitchen instruments are made for
the use of women. And some women do not even question why this is 
so; they simply compliment the gas company by calling it feminisuto.
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For these women, housework is part of being a woman, just as putting 
on lipstick is. According to Hosoi (1986:80), 89 per cent of women 
accept that housework is the women's responsibility. The very 
concept of a feminist might be foreign to them.
Vhat seems to have happened to the word is that when the 
English word 'feminist' was absorbed into Japanese, it only retained 
part of its meaning, namely, the part that involved being somehow 
nice to women and being worth receiving women's praises. The part 
that involved being nice to women by treating them equally was 
ignored. From the point of view oi the original meaning of the 
word, the Japanese usage was loose. And it would have been an 
unacceptable loose use of the word within an English-speaking 
community, for it contradicts many of the logical and contextual 
implications of the word 'feminist', such as accepting women as 
equal to men. When the word was introduced into Japanese to express 
male chauvinistic behaviour, there was no clash between the way the 
word was used and people's knowledge of the word, given that the 
word did not exist in Japanese. Thus, it was a completely 
acceptable use of the word. It could be argued that the Western 
notion oi feminism was introduced into Japanese-speaking society in 
a distorted form. Moreover, the Japanese meaning has ended up by 
being more contrary than similar to the original meaning. It must 
be noted that the word 'feminist' has a different meaning in 
Japanese society in general, not just in Japanese advertising for 
women.
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This meaning shift can be explained using Sperber and Wilson's 
framework for word meaning. And so, it seems, can historical 
meaning change and the meaning changes that arise during language 
acquisition. Let us assume that most words express simple concepts, 
which have logical entries which determine their analytic 
implications, and encyclopaedic entries which contribute to their 
contextual implications. When one first hears the word 'feminist', 
for example, one opens a new conceptual address, and begins, in a 
gradual way, to build its logical and encyclopaedic entries. 
Possible changes of meaning may occur in at least the following 
ways: (a) a hearer with radically different encyclopaedic
assumptions about the world may fail to notice some of the 
contextual implications intended by the speaker, and recover other, 
unintended ones which may become part of the encyclopaedic 
stereotype associated with the concept; (b) something that for the 
original speaker was an analytic implication, determined by a 
logical entry, may be perceived as a contextual implication 
determined by an encyclopaedic entry, and vice versa. In either 
case, 'loose understanding' occurs, and as the result a change of 
meaning happens.
In the case of 'feminist', I suspect that the first process 
mentioned above happened. That is to say that a Japanese-speaking 
hearer, who held drastically different encyclopaedic assumptions 
about women and their position in society failed to understand a 
subset of implications intended by the speaker, which have to do 
with women being independent and having equal opportunities, and
only recovered other implications , which have to do with being nice 
to women. This latter subset of implications may have been 
unintended by the speaker, but they may have been relevant and 
easily accessible to the hearer because of the kind of society she 
was in.
Thus, in Japanese the loan word feminisuto means something 
quite different from the original English word 'feminist'. The 
Western notion of feminism was introduced into Japanese-speaking 
society in a distorted form which was contrary to the original 
meaning. the Japanese have managed to alter the meaning, not 
necessarily by redefining it, but by altering its implications. It 
could be argued that the distortion in the meaning of the word is an 
indication of the fact that Japanese society was not prepared for 
feminist concepts.
In this section, I have examined an example which involves a 
shift of word meaning which may occur when a word is borrowed by one 
language from another. In Japanese the word feminisuto (feminist) 
is used in a way which is drastically different from the original. 
I have argued that this shift can be explained in terms of what 
Sperber and Wilson would call 'loose understanding', where a hearer 
of a new word, due to different assumptions about the world in 
general, fails to notice some of the contextual implications 
intended by the speaker using the word, and only recovers other 
implications unintended by the speaker, which become attached to the 
concept. In this case, the word 'feminist' has retained
implications about being nice to women and inviting women's praises, 
but has lost implications about treating women equal to men and 
respecting women's rights. Wilson suggests (personal communication) 
that loose interpretation is the source of much change in word 
meaning: children understand adults loosely (i.e they recover some
analytic or contextual implications, but not others); foreigners 
understand foreign words loosely, and so on. Relevance Theory 
provides a comprehensive framework to analyse such changes in word 
meaning.
I am aware that there is much more work to be done in this 
area. However, I hope to have provided a sketch of how the change 
of word meaning may be analysed in the new pragmatic framework. 
This is no more than a suggestion for a whole new area of research.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered some concrete examples of 
advertisements using a small number of specific words and shown how 
extension and shift of word meaning may be analysed in a framework 
based on Relevance Theory by Sperber and Wilson (1986a). The words 
which have been examined in this chapter are 'intelligent', 
’individualistic1 and 'feminist'. I have deliberately selected an 
extremely small data set to exemplify how different kinds of 
extension of word meaning, which may result in the change of word 
meaning, can be explained using the assumptions of the theory.
Section 5.3 discussed Japanese examples involving the word 
'intelligent', and showed how the word is used as synonymous with 
words such as 'feminine', 'sophisticated', and 'elegant', I have 
argued that this can be analysed using the notion of 'loose use' 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986a, 1986b), where some of contextual
implications associated with the word are abandoned, while others 
are retained. Contextual implications about one's mental quality 
are suppressed in the examples, whereas those about presentability 
and desirability to men are emphasised.
Section 5.4 focused on 'individualism' and examined Japanese 
and British examples. It was argued that in advertisements in both 
societies 'individualism' is used as closely associated with
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eliti- sm, that is to say that those who can afford to buy special 
expensive goods, often Western goods in the case of Japanese 
examples, achieve 'individualism'. It was also argued that, rather 
than reflecting true individualism, the word in the examples tends 
to maintain stereotypes of women. My claim was that this may be 
analysed as yet another type of loose use which involves the 
addition of an extra premise to the context.
The loan word feminisuto (feminist) has been examined in 
Section 5.5. Examples have shown that in Japan the word has a 
drastically different meaning from the original. I have argued that 
this can be analysed in terms of what Sperber and Wilson would call 
(personal communication) 'loose understanding'. The analysis is 
based on the assumption that some contextual implications associated
with the word intended by the speaker may be lost by the hearer
because she has assumptions, easily accessible, about the world 
which are not shared by the speaker, and vice versa.
In my analysis of how these words are used in advertising, I
also demonstrated the ways in which women are portrayed. Contrary 
to the frequent use of words such as 'intelligent' and 
'individualistic', which might suggest new images of women, a close 
examination reveals reinforcement of the traditional role models. 
Women's 'intelligence' manifests itself in their choice of clothes 
and cosmetics and their sweet smile. 'Individualism' turns out to 
be a search for high fashion and social approval. A 'feminist' is 
someone who provides sophisticated kitchen gadget and thus helps
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women to do what is regarded as their job, i.e. housework. Rather 
than reflecting a real change in the attitude to women, these words 
are used in ways which support and emphasise stereotypes of women.
The observation of the advertisements using words such as 
'individualistic' and 'feminist' has shown ways in which a society 
may absorb new notions from another society. Japanese society seems 
to have coped with potential threats from the introduction of 
concepts such as individualism and feminism by interpreting them 
against the background of traditional values, or removing some of 
the contextual implications attached to the concept which may 
contradict conventional premises. Thus, Japanese group ideology and 
male chauvinism have been rescued, and potential cultural clashes 
have been resolved.
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EPILOGUE
The purpose of this thesis has been to evaluate some of the 
basic assumptions of Relevance Theory and apply the theory to an 
analysis of the language used by advertisers. In so doing, I hope 
to have shed new light on some of the theoretical assumptions and to 
have added to an understanding of the overall style of advertising 
language.
The heterogeneous nature of the thesis is the result of an
attempt to analyse a recognisable style. I take style to be a
re.
jigsaw puzzle; a picture consisting of numerous pieces of diffent 
shapes and colours. A particular style of writing is a complex 
conglomerate of various aspects of language use. Chapters 3 - 5  
have isolated for analysis some of the most striking
characteristics of one particular style. Thus, Chapter 3 examined 
the use of the pun in advertising. This took us through 
considerations of ambiguity and metaphor. The focus of Chapter 4 
was audience manipulation via covert communication, as opposed to 
ostensive communication which is the core of Sperber and Wilson's 
analysis of communication. This gave us an opportunity to re­
examine fundamental properties of communication. Chapter 5
discussed how individual words can be used in extended ways, in one 
case leading to a definitive shift in word meaning. In doing so, we 
were faced with sociological considerations of the status of women.
- 2 7 3  -
The apparently narrow analytical focus of these chapters in 
this way has led us through a whole array of theoretical and 
descriptive problems in semantics, pragmatics, rhetoric and 
sociology. Despite the low respect which advertising is accorded in 
the intellectual world, advertising has thus in a sense proved an 
avenue toward understanding the human mind.
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Botes
1 Contrary to Sperber and Wilson's usage, I systematically consider 
the speaker to be male and the hearer to be female, on the 
grounds that advertisers are nearly always men and their targets 
tend to be women.
2 Vowel sequences such as aa, ii, and oo are frequently considered 
to be long vowels. A true long vowel, however, can only be 
assigned a prominence, that is, high tone or stress, on its 
initial element. But it is possible for the second element of 
a so-called long vowel in Japanese to bear such prominence. 
Thereiore, they should be written as sequences of two vowels.
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